You were by the President’s side during his speech at Île Longue. What implications does this speech have for the French Ministry for the Armed Forces and Veterans?

For more than sixty years, the fundamental principles of France’s deterrence doctrine have remained unchanged. The adjustments announced by the President of the Republic during his speech at Île Longue primarily concern an increase in the number of nuclear warheads in our arsenal. They also aim to make the European dimension of our vital interests a reality, through the introduction of forward deterrence with willing partners. Lastly, the President reaffirmed the need to underpin our strategy with strong conventional forces. Delivering on this roadmap requires the involvement of the entire Ministry, through strategic dialogue with our willing allies, the operational readiness of the Armed Forces, and ongoing work with the defence industrial base. I have met with members of the Armed Forces, engineers and industry representatives to advance these critical priorities: first at Île Longue, the home port of France’s ballistic missile submarines; then at the Cherbourg naval base, where they are built; and finally at the CEA-DAM site in Valduc, which plays a central role in the design, production and maintenance of nuclear warheads. I also maintain regular dialogue with the leading defence companies involved in this strategic endeavour. One of the key priorities of the update to the multi-year Defence Spending Law (LPM) — which I presented to the Council of Ministers and defended before Parliament — concerns nuclear deterrence. More than ever, we must meet the 2035 deadline for renewing the delivery systems and missiles of both the ocean-based and airborne components of our deterrent.

France’s arsenal has historically been more limited than those of the United States, Russia and, more recently, China. Are we entering an arms race?

The increase in our arsenal, which was halved in 2008 compared to its Cold War level, in no way calls our non-proliferation commitments into question. Our force structure is adapting to changes in the international environment and to the closer cooperation we are seeing between Russia, North Korea and China. This does not mean we are entering an arms race. Our arsenal is calibrated to ensure that our nuclear forces can inflict unacceptable damage on any state that threatens our vital interests. We do not determine its scale by reference to the nuclear or conventional capabilities of other countries, and that principle remains unchanged. We recognise the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the responsibility that comes with possessing them. That is what underpins the choices we have made regarding the size of our arsenal.

Forward deterrence represents a major shift introduced in the Île Longue speech. In practical terms, what does this mean for the armed forces?

Before talking about change, it is important to recognise what remains unchanged: France’s vital interests have always had a European dimension. Furthermore, that dimension should not be limited to the eight partners with whom we will be developing cooperation under the forward deterrence initiative announced by the President. The first objective is to give France greater strategic depth by enabling the deployment of elements of its nuclear forces, thereby presenting a potential adversary with additional strategic dilemmas. Depending on the circumstances, the French Strategic Air Forces (FAS) can disperse from French territory to partner countries. The second objective of these strategic dialogues — which do not involve the acquisition of nuclear weapons or any sharing of decision-making authority — is to demonstrate, in the clearest possible terms, France’s commitment and determination to support European security.

Doesn’t forward deterrence create competition with existing collective security arrangements within NATO?

France’s commitment to NATO’s deterrence and defence posture remains unchanged. Forward deterrence is not intended to compete with existing arrangements; it complements NATO’s extended deterrence.

Even before forward deterrence, cooperation between France and the UK was already very close in the field of deterrence. How will this new step further strengthen ties between Paris and London?

As the only European nuclear powers recognised under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), France and the United Kingdom bear a special responsibility. Since the 1995 Chequers Declaration, we have worked together to strengthen Europe’s nuclear core. At the end of last year, the French Ministry for the Armed Forces took part in the Nuclear Steering Group, which met in Paris for the first time under the joint leadership of Downing Street and the Élysée. In another unprecedented step, British representatives observed a simulated nuclear strike conducted by the Strategic Air Forces during Operation Poker. The ties between our two countries are stronger than ever and demonstrate that our independent deterrents can operate in a coordinated manner. This reinforces the credibility of Europe’s nuclear core at a time when both nations are fully embracing their responsibility for the security of the continent, as reflected in their leadership of the Coalition of the Willing in support of Ukraine.

Conventional forces contribute to supporting nuclear forces. Early warning, extended air defence and deep-strike capabilities have been mentioned. How is this being implemented in practice?

In a conflict below the nuclear threshold, we need conventional capabilities that give us options for managing escalation. But this cannot be approached solely from a national perspective, because the theatre of operations would be Europe. We therefore need a genuinely European approach. Shortly after taking office, I signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) with my German counterpart, marking an important step towards the development of a European early warning capability. Through the JEWEL (Joint Early Warning for a European Lookout) initiative, we will build sovereign capabilities to monitor, detect and respond to ballistic threats. This will rely on a combination of space-based sensors, including dedicated satellites, and ground-based radar systems. The first national building block, the Nostradamus radar, is already being developed. We also plan to establish a command-and-control centre to bring together observations, analyse data and send out alerts to the decision-making centres of all our partner nations. The same applies to extended air defence. During visits to Romania, Ukraine and the Middle East, where French forces are deployed, the personnel I met all stressed the scale of the challenge. Faced with short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and the growing proliferation of Shahed-type drones and other aerial threats, we need a broader range of solutions to provide effective and sustainable air defence at an acceptable cost. My priority is to ensure that our Armed Forces can access and fully exploit every capability that strengthens our protection. Together with my teams, we are working every day to develop and integrate these capabilities, from radars and satellites to interceptor drones, because they are essential to operational effectiveness. The update to the Defence Spending Law (LPM) therefore provides an additional €1.6 billion in this area over the 2026-2030 period, bringing the total investment to €6.9 billion between 2024 and 2030. The same principle applies to deep-strike capabilities. If an adversary sought to challenge us below the nuclear threshold, we must be able to raise a credible, proportionate and controlled response. Our objective is clear: we must leave no doubt that France has both the resolve and the means to defend itself. Consequently, through the LPM, we are accelerating the acquisition of new capabilities able to penetrate adversary defences, including faster and more manoeuvrable cruise missiles, conventional ballistic missiles, long-range loitering munitions that can be produced at scale, and guided bombs with ever greater range. An additional €1.2 billion is being allocated to these deep-strike capabilities.

How are you working with the companies involved in these major investment programmes?

Nuclear deterrence rests on two inseparable pillars: credible, modern and operational deterrent forces, and a sovereign, innovative and resilient defence technological and industrial base (DTIB). Since 2017, we have entered a new phase in the modernisation of our deterrent. This represents the third major investment cycle since its creation, following the first at the end of the 1960s with the establishment of the Strategic Oceanic Force (FOST), and the second some twenty years later with the renewal of both the submarine fleet and the combat aircraft fleet.

We are currently preparing for 2035, with the renewal of delivery systems, missiles and nuclear warheads. This is important to give our industrial partners the long-term visibility they need. Nuclear deterrence also supports a major industrial ecosystem: a core network of 700 companies and nearly 2,000 contributing firms, including Naval Group, Dassault Aviation, MBDA and ArianeGroup, all of which are key partners of the State. Ensuring the long-term future of this ecosystem is a responsibility I carry every day when I meet with companies across France. And let me be clear: without this exceptional industrial base, there would be no French nuclear deterrent.