The Red Sea, the Black Sea, Baltic Sea... Few maritime zones have been spared from the deterioration of the geostrategic context, marked by the end of the peace dividends and the return of high-intensity combat at sea. These vast spaces are actually the scene of growing competition between powers, marked by a phenomenon of "territorialisation of the seas", when they do not simply become an extension zone of land battles. As a result, our flows of raw materials and manufactured goods¹, our seabed, the cables that criss-cross them, our fishery resources, the rare earths buried in the depths, and even some of our overseas territories, are increasingly coveted and disputed. "This rather concerning panorama shows two major strategic changes of the era we are living in: the simultaneity of crises and the increase in the level of violence. This deterioration has lasting effects at sea," says Admiral Nicolas Vaujour, Chief of the French Naval Staff. Faced with these threats, the French Navy is logically in the front line to defend our interests and uphold international law.

¹ 80% of manufactured goods are transported by sea.

Extension of Land Combat at Sea

In its response to Russian aggression, the Ukrainians have managed to inflict considerable damage on Moscow's fleet, pushing it far from its shores. A success for Kiev, which has been able to restart its maritime traffic, particularly its agricultural exports. "Attrition against the Russian fleet trapped in the Black Sea is the priority objective set by Ukraine. It is achieving this through the skilful combination of a barrage of cruise missiles and a horde of naval or aerial drones, whose number and lethality are constantly increasing," explain Captain Thibault Lavernhe and Commander François-Olivier Corman¹, associate researcher at the FMES institute. On 7 July 2024, Ukraine had damaged or destroyed 27 enemy ships, according to Ukrainian Vice-Admiral Oleksiy Neizhpapa, i.e. 36% of the 74 ships of all sizes that the Russian Black Sea fleet had at its disposal at the beginning of the conflict.

This extension of land combat at sea is also found in the Red Sea. To reach it from the Indian Ocean, you first have to pass through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a strategic chokepoint on the major shipping routes of global maritime trade linking Asia to Europe via the Suez Canal. But on 19 November 2023, Yemeni Houthi rebels intercepted the Galaxy Leader, a cargo ship linked to an Israeli businessman and took its 25 crew members hostage. The attackers claimed to act in solidarity with the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, due to the war between Israel and Hamas. Since then, there has been an increase in attacks against merchant and military vessels. As a direct consequence, traffic in the Red Sea, which accounted for 13% of global traffic, 30% of container traffic, and 21% of energy traffic, has been halved.

In response to these recurrent attacks², the European Union launched Operation Aspides in February 2024. Its missions: to protect maritime traffic and contribute to the freedom of navigation in the region. In total, 21 member states are participating in this mission, and three, including France, are committing top-rank vessels.

¹ In the Red Sea, the reaction time to ballistic missile strikes is just a few seconds, and a few minutes to One-Way Attack (OWA) drones.

² In « Orques contre piranhas - dix enseignements de la guerre navale en mer Noire et en mer Rouge » (FMES, December 2024).

Territorialisation of Maritime Space

Since the ratification of the Montego Bay Convention and the creation of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in 1982, maritime spaces have exacerbated competition between major powers. Strategic and economic interests intertwine to create a contested environment where the law of the sea is increasingly disregarded. This phenomenon of territorialisation of the seas is not confined to a single region. However, the Indo-Pacific is the region where most inter-state tensions are concentrated.

For two decades now, the South China Sea has become one of the emblematic cases of both the contestation of international legal rules and the aggressive appropriation of new territories by the People's Republic of China. The Chinese strategy is based on two pillars: on the one hand, the claim of a territorial space under "historical heritage", and on the other, the creation of a permanent military presence on the contested islets. For Beijing, the militarisation of the reefs in the South China Sea thus appears as the second stage of a fait accompli strategy aimed at extending its territorial presence southwest of its continental and insular territories at the expense of Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and other players in the region.

Claims along with acts of intimidation also extend to Japan. Tokyo is actually challenged over its Senkaku Islands, deemed by Beijing to be of fundamental strategic interest. At the same time, North Korea regularly conducts ballistic missile tests towards the Sea of Japan. The latest, in early January 2025, was even presented by the North Korean Central News Agency as a hypersonic missile test.

For France, the intensifying of the competition at sea constitutes an issue of national sovereignty. With its 10.2 million km², 97% of which are in the overseas territories, it has the second-largest EEZ in the world after the United States. These spaces must be protected from hybrid threats from states, but also from non-state actors. By regularly patrolling along important straits, such as the Malacca Strait through which 80,000 ships pass every year, or one every six minutes, France and its Navy have a clear objective: to defend international law to prevent any policy of fait accompli. "Freedom of navigation is also essential to have an intervention capability, wherever in the world," recalls Commander Luc, from the Navy's operations staff.

Mastering the Seabed

September 2022. While the war in Ukraine had begun nearly six months earlier, Europe, then largely dependent on Russian gas, experienced a dramatic increase in energy costs. But an event would further worsen the situation: the sabotage of Nord Stream, these two gas pipelines lying at the bottom of the Baltic Sea and connecting Russia to Germany. The origin of these impressive leaks is still unknown today. But the fact remains that they reveal the vulnerability of some strategic facilities.

Even more recently, an undersea cable in the Baltic Sea connecting Finland to Estonia broke down on 25 December 2024. While the investigation is still under way, suspicion falls on the tanker Eagle S, flying the Cook Islands flag but suspected of belonging to the Russian "ghost fleet¹". Many similar incidents have occurred in the Baltic since the Russian aggression in Ukraine in February 2022. Nevertheless, these two examples fit perfectly into the context of "hybrid warfare" between Russia and Western countries, particularly underwater.

Indeed, the seabed contains many sensitive or major interest sites. Controlling this environment is therefore a real sovereignty issue. As of February 2022, the French Ministry of Defence thus adopted a Seabed Management Strategy. The French Navy can already rely on two remotely operated robots, one capable of diving to a depth of 1,000 metres and the other to 2,000 metres. In 2023, the French Defence Procurement Agency was then entrusted, in conjunction with the General Secretariat for Investment, with the development of an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) and a remotely operated vehicle (ROV), both capable of diving to depths of 6,000 metres (3.7 miles). In addition to its alignment with the Seabed Mastery Strategy, this roadmap is mostly in line with the "Investing in the Seabed Field" objective of the France 2030 investment plan. The aim is to place France not only as a player but also as a leader of our future world.

EV1 Antoine Falcon de Longevialle

¹ This term refers to ships carrying Russian oil products despite the embargo.

 EV1 Antoine Falcon de Longevialle

¹ 80 % des biens manufacturés transitent par la mer.

² Dans Orques contre piranhas – dix enseignements de la guerre navale en mer Noire et en mer Rouge (FMES, décembre 2024).

³ En mer Rouge, le temps de réaction à des frappes de missiles balistiques n’est que de quelques secondes, et de quelques minutes face à des drones de type One-Way Attack (OWA).

⁴ Ce terme désigne les navires qui transportent des produits pétroliers russes malgré l’embargo les concernant.