What is NATO's Countering Information Threats task force?

Marie-Doha Besancenot: My division's mission is to propose messages to the Secretary General of NATO. To do so, we needed a team capable of understanding and analysing the information environment. I therefore created this task force a year and a half ago, three weeks after my arrival, to analyse the hostile narratives we detect and alert in real time. Its objectives are to detect, track, and report threats against NATO in the information domain, and to use this data to propose political responses.

Who participates in this task force?

Around ten people from different services: analysts and communicators from the public diplomacy division, but also colleagues from the intelligence branch, capable of alerting us in case of an attack in cyberspace. We also have personnel from NATO's Crisis Centre, who track what happens in the physical domain. This multiplicity of perspectives provides us with a cross-knowledge of the security environment.

How does it operate?

Every week this task force meets to spotight points of attention in the information domain. We look at what goes on there thanks to our tools, whether there are any highlights. We decide on the issues we wish to keep under surveillance and anticipate those that may emerge. Our intelligence colleagues can help us determine if the amplification of an issue in the information sphere is accompanied by incidents in the physical and cyber spheres, or if it is merely an excitement in the Twitter sphere, for example. The cross perspectives of all these analysts with their different mandates and tools allow us to stand back from what we analyse in the information space. We then know the degree of urgency to alert our political leaders and the response scenarios we favour.

What tools do you use to monitor the information domain?

We focus on NATO issues, that is to say, the debates and discussions related to the Alliance. For this, we use two types of tools. The typical ones: those of social listening², namely used by companies, with which we carry out a watch based on keywords. To know NATO's reputation, we look at the number of iterations, the language used, and the content of the message. These are quantitative elements that give us clues on the following questions: who is talking about us? Who is leading the conversation? Are our elements prevailing?

We also have screening³ tools for the information environment, incorporating artificial intelligence. These instruments virtually replicate conversations on social media. They provide a mapping of players, grouped according to their interactions in real time. We observe who produces narratives about NATO, and how these narratives travel from one group to another. These big data⁴ tools photograph in real time all the social media, including Telegram, and 110 million websites every day.

What new features do these tools bring?

NATO has always invested in understanding the public of the Alliance. Each year at least 10% of my budget is dedicated to this. Opinion polls have been conducted annually for decades. They are useful for tracking the evolution of NATO's perception, but also for understanding the concerns and expectations of the Alliance's publics: do they trust it to defend them? Are they afraid? Are they willing to fight for another allied nation? Do they feel protected by the solidarity of Article 5? Our new tools allow us to adapt to the changes in the information domain. We continue to conduct opinion polls based on a sample of the population. But in addition, by scanning the online information environment, we take into account the feelings expressed directly and accessible in open source⁵.

With all this data, how do you characterise a disinformation manoeuvre?

We track hostile narratives against NATO from their emergence. The most common ones depict NATO as an aggressive organisation, behind a weapons market. This narrative emerges almost with every conflict. A campaign manifests itself through the coordination and mass of similar narratives disseminated. To define our responses, we look at whether they remain located in conspiracy spheres, which would not necessarily call for a reaction. If they evolve towards groups of players who are usually moderate and likely to influence public opinion, we may choose to speak out to correct the hostile narrative. This analysis allows us to prepare communication recommendations for the Secretary General.

Do you have an example of a rectification campaign against hostile narratives?

Based on opinion polls, we identified that part of the Bulgarian population showed a deterioration in their perception of the Alliance last year. We therefore wanted to re-explain NATO's missions in this country, reaffirm its defensive mission, and put forward the reasons to be proud of belonging to the Alliance. We produced a historical documentary on the country's accession to NATO, broadcast on television. This is an example of a long-term campaign, on a medium that reaches the elderly, rather than the immediacy of social media. It is important to choose the most appropriate broadcasting channels.

How do you work with Allies on these issues?

We encourage member countries to share information on the threats they have identified in the information domain and to mobilise NATO as a platform for best practices sharing. This year, to accelerate the process, we created the Rapid Response Group, an alert mechanism among Allies regarding the campaigns they are facing.

Can you provide an overview of the proactive countries in the fight against disinformation within NATO?

Allies have different levels of maturity depending on their history and their apprehension of risk. Some have never forgotten Russian propaganda – this is the case for the states on the Alliance’s eastern flank. What they all have in common is the experience of being victims of targeted campaigns at their national audiences, in their native language. Everyone is aware of being targeted for political destabilisation, as seen recently in Romania and in a partner country, Moldova. Protecting their population involves agile and sustainable inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms. The Northern countries, too, have never forgotten Soviet propaganda and they have a very strong tradition of societal resilience. In Finland and Sweden, the level of trust in traditional media is higher than elsewhere and, conversely, the propaganda media have a low audience. This is the result of education on information integrity and awareness of emotional manipulation, which starts from a young age. Sweden is also the only European country to have an organisation with a mandate similar to that of Viginum: the Psychological Defence Agency.

What about France?

Very early on France understood what was happening in the information domain was a matter of national security, as it was hit on its territory by repeated terrorist attacks, as well as by hostile campaigns. We have an enlightened sensitivity to information manipulation campaigns and their fallout in the real world. Viginum was created in response to these attacks. This unique system allows us to save time, i.e. to very quickly analyse disinformation campaigns, their tactics, the players, their targets, to share the challenges with political decision-makers. This speed between analysis and political denunciation is a real asset, which also helps to increase vigilance and resilience of the general public.

Collected by Laura Garrigou

¹Task force for combating information-related threats.

²Activity of collecting and analysing data on social media.

³Screening software.

⁴Megadata.

⁵Open sources.