VERS UNE NOUVELLE STRATÉGIE EUROPÉENNE DE SÉCURITÉ

Sous la direction du
Général de division (2S) Maurice DE LANGLOIS
VERS UNE NOUVELLE STRATEGIE EUROPEENNE DE SECURITE

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VERS UNE NOUVELLE STRATEGIE EUROPEENNE DE SECURITE

DERNIERS LABORATOIRES DE L’IRSEM

24. Fragmentations et recompositions territoriales dans le monde arabe et en Afrique subsaharienne
   Flavien BOURRAT, Amandine GNANGUENON (dir.)

23. The Role of the Military in the EU’s External Action: Implementing the Comprehensive Approach
   Major General Maurice de LANGLOIS, Andreas CAPSTACK

22. Les principes fondamentaux de la pensée stratégique russe
   Elena MORENKOVA-PERRIER

21. L’Asie du XXIe siècle ressemble-t-elle à l’Europe d’avant 1914 ?
   Pierre GROSSER

   Analyse comparée : France, Royaume-Uni, Allemagne
   David DELFOLIE

19. Penser le sentiment de confiance dans l’armée : pour un programme de recherche
   Olivia LEBOYER

18. La réforme des systèmes de sécurité : quel différentiel français ?
   Sophie DAGAND et Frédéric RAMEL (dir.)

17. Environmental Securitization within the United Nations: a Political Ecology Perspective
   Lucile MARTENS

16. La coopération internationale et bilatérale en matière de cybersécurité : enjeux et rivalités
   Alix DESFORGES

15. De l’asymétrie capacitaire à l’asymétrie des buts de guerre : repenser le rapport de force dans les conflits irréguliers
   Sarah GUILLET
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VERS UNE NOUVELLE STRATEGIE EUROPEENNE DE SECURITE

SOMMAIRE

Synthèse ......................................................................................................................... 11

Analyse croisée de la menace et des intérêts nationaux ........................................... 14
Maurice de LANGLOIS

Common threats against common interests ................................................................. 23
Ton van OSCH

Crossed Analysis of the French and Finnish White Papers ........................................ 31
Tommi KOIVULA

The German approach to international security ......................................................... 37
Barbara KUNZ

“Poland and France: a cross-analysis of security threats and national interests” .......... 46
Ryszard ZIEBA

The Spanish and French national security strategies: converging paths .................. 55
Mario LABORIE

France and the United Kingdom: a comparative analysis of their respective white papers ...... 63
Andrew M. DORMAN

Conclusion: vers une convergence européenne ......................................................... 69
Maurice de LANGLOIS

Bibliographie ............................................................................................................... 73
VERS UNE NOUVELLE STRATEGIE EUROPEENNE DE SECURITE

SYNTHÈSE


Du côté des États membres, plusieurs initiatives ont été lancées. Celle du triangle de Weimar regroupant l’Allemagne, la France et la Pologne, soutient l’idée de la création d’une nouvelle stratégie devant préciser les intérêts européens, un niveau d’ambition, une évaluation des risques et des menaces, ainsi que la définition des moyens et des instruments nécessaires pour y répondre (Ministres des Affaires étrangères et de la Défense de l’Allemagne, de la France et de la Pologne, 2015 : 3).

Plusieurs tentatives d’écriture d’une nouvelle stratégie ont déjà été menées mais avec peu de succès jusqu’à maintenant. La plus aboutie est celle d’European Global Security (EGS), qui regroupait quatre

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1 Article 3 : “A broad European strategy on foreign and security policy issues could identify and describe EU interests, priorities and objectives, existing and evolving threats, challenges and opportunities, and the EU instruments and means to meet them”.

2 “We propose to elaborate a new European foreign and defense policy...It should identify and describe EU interests, objectives to be achieved, existing and evolving objectives to be achieved, existing and evolving threats and challenges and the EU instruments to tackle them”.
VERS UNE NOUVELLE STRATEGIE EUROPEENNE DE SECURITE


Afin d’amener une contribution à l’élaboration de cette nouvelle stratégie, l’IRSEM s’est adressé à des collaborateurs de six États européens4 pour identifier des pistes de rapprochement entre leur stratégie nationale et le Livre blanc français de 2013, sur la base des analyses comparées de la menace et des intérêts nationaux. Ces travaux, qui ont associé des pays représentatifs de la diversité européenne par leur histoire, leur géographie et leur statut, ont été menés fin 2014 et début 2015. Comme les Livres blancs ou équivalents recouvrent rarement le même périmètre et n’ont pas le même niveau d’actualité, cette étude a aussi pris en compte les déclarations et interventions récentes des autorités nationales, principalement des ministres des Affaires étrangères et de la Défense. Il faut noter que le Royaume-Uni prépare une nouvelle stratégie nationale de sécurité (NSS) et une revue stratégique de défense et sécurité (SDSR) pour la fin de l’année, et que l’Allemagne va sortir un nouveau livre blanc en 2016. C’est aussi le cas de l’Italie et de la Suède dont les travaux devraient déboucher d’ici quelques mois sur la production d’un nouveau Livre blanc.

Cette étude conclut que, sur la base des approches comparées entre la France et six États européens, il existe bien une convergence de vue sur la perception de la menace qui peut conduire à la définition d’intérêts européens et, tout naturellement par la suite, amener les États à la rédaction d’une nouvelle stratégie de sécurité européenne, voire un Livre blanc européen. Il faudra cependant cesser d’esquiver les sujets de tensions, à savoir principalement la place de la souveraineté nationale, l’emploi des forces armées et l’avenir de la dissuasion nucléaire.

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3 Real Instituto Elcano, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Polski Instytut Spraw Miedzynarodowych (PISM) and Utrikespolitiska Institutet (UI).

4 Pr Andrew M Dorman, King’s College London, Dr Barbara Kunz, Stiftung Genshagen Berlin, Lieutenant-General Ton van Osch (ret.), SecDef Consult, Colonel Mario Laborie, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, Dr Tommi Koivula Finnish National Defence University, Pr Ryszard Zięba, University of Warsaw.

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VERS UNE NOUVELLE STRATEGIE EUROPEENNE DE SECURITE

ANALYSE CROISEE DE LA MENACE ET DES INTERETS NATIONAUX

Maurice de LANGLOIS
Général de division (2S) et Directeur du domaine Politiques de défense comparées

« Si tu veux construire un bateau, fais naître dans le cœur de tes hommes et femmes le désir de la mer ». Antoine de Saint-Exupéry


Ce chapitre analyse les contributions de six auteurs européens1 qui ont comparé leurs stratégies de sécurité nationales avec le Livre blanc français sur la défense et sécurité nationale de 2013. Les seuls aspects des risques, des menaces et des intérêts nationaux font l’objet de cette étude croisée.

En reprenant les principales observations et conclusions des six analyses comparatives entre l’approche française et celle des pays concernés, le chapitre rappelle certaines caractéristiques générales, puis brosse un aperçu des différentes perceptions des risques et des menaces, et mentionne les spécificités des intérêts nationaux. La conclusion sur les critères de convergence et de divergence fait l’objet d’un article à part en fin d’étude.

GENERALITES

Les stratégies de sécurité nationales

Il existe de grandes disparités entre les approches nationales sur la manière de développer une stratégie de sécurité. Certains d’ailleurs n’ont pas souhaité aller jusqu’à la production d’un Livre blanc et pour ceux qui en ont un, de nombreuses différences existent au niveau du périmètre traité, entre sécurité globale et défense, et de la définition des moyens pour y répondre.

Ces documents sont théoriquement le fruit d’une réflexion de fond, émanant de groupes de travail incluant plusieurs disciplines et expertises. Cependant, ce n’est pas toujours le cas car ils sont parfois

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1 Pr Andrew M Dorman, King’s College London, Dr Barbara Kunz, Stiftung Genshagen Berlin, Lieutenant-General Ton van Osch (ret.), SecDef Consult, Colonel Mario Laborie, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, Dr Tommi Koivula Finnish National Defence University, Pr Ryszard Zięba, University of Warsaw.
rédigés dans l’urgence pour justifier des choix politiques, à l’exemple de la stratégie nationale de sécurité britannique de 2010, selon Andrew Dorman.

Certaines productions restent à un niveau de réflexion générale, traitant plus ou moins de sécurité globale, sans aller jusqu’à la réalisation, caractérisée par la définition d’un modèle d’armées et de choix capacitaires. C’est le cas de la Pologne, de l’Allemagne, de l’Espagne et de la Finlande où il existe une dichotomie entre ambition stratégique et réalisation. D’autres, au contraire définissent un niveau d’ambition suivi d’une programmation militaire permettant sa réalisation : c’est le cas du Royaume-Uni et de la France.

Ainsi les approches françaises et britanniques semblent être les plus proches, s’il l’on considère que le pendant du Livre blanc français est la combinaison de deux documents britanniques, la National security strategy NSS, et la Strategic defence and security review (SDSR). Cependant, même s’il existe une programmation militaire, force est de constater que chacun des deux pays accepte soit des impasses capacitaires au Royaume-Uni, soit des réductions temporaires de capacités en France. Cette approche, qui permettait de s’accommoder d’un budget de défense insuffisant, a été justifiée à l’époque par une évaluation d’une situation sécuritaire qui semblait devenir plus stable dans les dix prochaines années, ce qui a été malheureusement contredit par les faits.

**Les caractéristiques des États**

Chaque pays définit, selon Barbara Kunz, sa stratégie d’après « une analyse de son environnement sécuritaire et une évaluation des risques et des menaces émanant de cet environnement ». Cette analyse repose sur des spécificités nationales qu’elles soient historiques, géographiques, économiques, constitutionnelles ou culturelles.

Pour des pays comme la Finlande ou les Pays-Bas, la notion de dépendance est une réalité, qu’elle soit énergétique, économique ou industrielle. La notion d’autonomie stratégique n’a plus beaucoup de sens dans ces pays de taille moyenne, tout en reconnaissant, pour un pays non-aligné comme la Finlande, le besoin de maintenir des forces militaires pour la défense de son territoire ; ceci peut se comprendre à partir du moment où un tel pays possède 1300 km de frontière commune avec la Russie.

La Pologne, qui devient un grand pays, se considère encore, selon Ryszard Zięba, comme un nouveau venu dans l’Union européenne : marquée par son passé difficile, elle reste obsédée par la menace russe, surtout après l’agression contre l’Ukraine. Elle place, comme la Finlande, la garantie de ses frontières comme sa principale priorité.

L’Allemagne, pour des raisons historiques, n’a pas, selon Barbara Kunz, de stratégie nationale de sécurité ni de culture stratégique: les intérêts nationaux sont à peine évoqués. Le Livre blanc de 2006 affiche un schéma qui est toujours d’actualité aujourd’hui: multilatéralisme, globalisation, interdépendance et une réticence générale à l’intervention armée, communément appelée la culture de la retenue. Mais ses élites s’interrogent de plus en plus sur son rôle international: si l’Allemagne doit conserver sa place hégémonique qu’elle a déjà acquis sur le plan économique, elle doit s’investir plus concrètement dans le domaine de la sécurité.

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2 Ou networked security.
VERS UNE NOUVELLE STRATEGIE EUROPEENNE DE SECURITE

Trois pays partagent le souci d’être présents en matière de sécurité sur le plan international, l’Espagne, le Royaume-Uni et la France : ils ont un passé colonial et encore une réelle influence sur plusieurs régions du monde. Andrew Dorman souligne néanmoins que seuls la France et le Royaume-Uni ont autant de points communs : les deux sont des puissances européennes, sont héritiers d’un empire colonial, sont membres du conseil de sécurité de l’ONU, possèdent l’arme nucléaire et ont la capacité de projection de puissance.

La France est vue par les six pays comme étant le pays dont le niveau d’ambition reste le plus élevé. Selon Tommi Koivula, par essence, le niveau d’ambition français est qualifié de « considérable ». Mario Laborie précise que le parapluie nucléaire fournit à la France l’autonomie de décision et d’action que l’Espagne ne peut détenir. Andrew Dorman renchérit en affirmant que la préservation de la dissuasion nucléaire est la garantie ultime de souveraineté. Il relève, qu’en matière de rayonnement international, la France maintient le deuxième réseau diplomatique du monde et possède quelques deux millions de citoyens qui vivent à l’étranger.

L’opinion publique joue un rôle important dans les politiques de défense. Si elle soutient globalement ses forces armées, elle est parfois réticente lors qu’il s’agit de les engager. Ainsi, selon Mario Laborie, l’opinion publique espagnole semble rejoindre l’allemande sur son aversion à l’utilisation de la force et n’est pas en faveur des opérations de type expéditionnaire.

Les valeurs de l’Union européenne

L’UE faisait déjà référence à des valeurs dans la stratégie européenne de sécurité de 2003 mais sans les décrire. En revanche, elles sont déclinées dans le préambule du traité de Lisbonne : « … les droits inviolables et inaliénables de la personne humaine, ainsi que la liberté, la démocratie, l’égalité et l’État de droit ». Dans un esprit de complémentarité avec ce qui relève de la responsabilité des États, le traité précise, dans son article 3, que : « l’Union offre à ses citoyens un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice sans frontières intérieures » et, « dans ses relations avec le reste du monde, l’Union affirme et promeut ses valeurs et ses intérêts et contribue à la protection de ses citoyens. Elle contribue à la paix, à la sécurité, au développement durable de la planète ».

Ce sont des valeurs communes à tous les pays européens et même plus largement. À titre d’exemple, Mario Laborie rappelle que la stratégie nationale de sécurité de 2013 évoque la défense des intérêts et des valeurs de la nation, ainsi des intérêts et des valeurs partagés (Présidence du Gouvernement d’Espagne, 2013). Cette notion d’intérêts et de valeurs partagés mérite d’être développée au niveau européen car c’est seulement sur cette base que l’UE peut produire son Livre blanc.

La souveraineté et la subsidiarité

Selon Ton van Osch, la souveraineté ne concerne pas seulement la capacité à décider en toute indépendance, c’est aussi la capacité à agir efficacement.

3 Traité de Lisbonne article 3: “to face armed conflicts that may arise either as a result of the defence of interests or values exclusively national, or the defence of shared interests and values”.

4 “…sovereignty is not only about the power to independently decide. It is also about the power to effectively act”. 
Ainsi la majorité des auteurs fait référence au seul pays européen autant attaché à sa souveraineté, la France. Barbara Kunz affirme que l’autonomie stratégique est un objectif clé de la politique étrangère et de sécurité de la France⁵ : faisant référence, dans le Livre blanc français, à la notion de « force de frappe » de la dissuasion nucléaire, elle la présente comme étant la garantie ultime de la souveraineté nationale. Sur cette question, Ton van Osch va plus loin en affirmant que la perception des autres pays est que les intérêts nationaux français semblent l’emporter sur les intérêts communs⁶.

De là, se pose la question d’une souveraineté partagée au niveau européen dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense, car elle doit accepter pour les États le maintien d’un degré d’autonomie suffisant. C’est la nécessaire subsidiarité entre l’UE et les États membres dont la responsabilité de protéger leur incombe en premier, avec principalement la protection des citoyens, la protection des infrastructures et la protection des intérêts économiques, de la recherche et de la technologie.

Cette souveraineté partagée est d’autant plus importante que les États sont entrés dans une relation de dépendance telle que même les deux seuls qui se déclarent capables de conduire des opérations en autonomie, le Royaume-Uni et la France, ne peuvent le faire qu’avec une aide substantielle de leurs partenaires, principalement dans les domaines du renseignement et du transport stratégique. Cette dépendance est aussi une réalité au regard non seulement de l’effacement de la différentiation entre sécurité intérieure et sécurité extérieure, mais aussi de la diversification des menaces, principalement dans ce que les anglo-saxons appellent les espaces communs⁷, c’est-à-dire le domaine maritime, le cyberspace et l’espace.

La subsidiarité qui s’applique en matière de défense et de sécurité peut être élargie à tous les champs concernés par la résolution d’une crise, qu’ils concernent le domaine politique, diplomatique, économique ou humanitaire. Elle nécessite la mise en place d’une coordination des moyens au titre de l’approche globale pratiquée par l’UE, les États membres et ses partenaires.

LES RISQUES ET LES MENACES

Les grandes tendances


Globalement, les États reconnaissent la montée en puissance d’une menace multiforme en Europe.

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⁵ "Strategic autonomy’ is France’s key foreign and security policy objective”.
⁶ "in the view of other countries, French interests seems to prevail common interests”.
⁷ Global commons.
⁸ Les efforts de défense des pays européens s’échelonnent entre 0,81 et 2,09% (données 2013) contre plus de 4 % pour les USA.
Le lien transatlantique

La préservation du lien transatlantique est mentionnée comme essentielle par la majorité des pays, même si elle est vue différemment dans sa mise en œuvre. Dans le cas de la Finlande, Tommi Koivula précise, que même si son pays n’est pas un membre de l’alliance atlantique, la possibilité de rejoindre l’OTAN est toujours à l’étude. Mais aujourd’hui, la Finlande se considère toujours comme un pays non-aligné et consacre la majeure partie de ses capacités à la défense de son territoire, ce qui ne l’empêche pas de rappeler la clause d’assistance mutuelle du traité de Lisbonne qui doit faire jouer la solidarité européenne en cas d’invasion. Barbara Kunz note que la France consacre un long, voire trop long développement aux effets du « pivot » américain vers l’Asie-Pacifique. Plusieurs pays précisent que le « pivot » peut avoir des conséquences sur l’engagement des États-Unis en Europe mais aucun ne le mentionne d’une façon aussi prégnante que la France.

Ceci montre une divergence de perception dans les pays européens sur l’intérêt porté par les Américains à l’Europe. Même si les effets du « pivot » ont été atténués par les mesures de « réassurance » américaine à l’OTAN suite à la crise ukrainienne, il est clair que ce rééquilibrage n’est pas fondamentalement remis en cause. Mais, selon Tommi Koivula, tous reconnaissent que les États-Unis restent engagés vis-à-vis de l’Europe et qu’ils sont l’ultime garantie de sa sécurité.

Le lien fort et inconditionnel entre le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis a été rappelé dans tous les documents stratégiques depuis plusieurs décennies. En particulier, Andrew Dorman souligne que les documents de 2003 et de 2004 n’envisageaient un engagement britannique dans une opération de grande envergure qu’avec la participation express des Américains, ce qui ne devrait pas changer dans la nouvelle stratégie.

Appréciation des risques et des menaces


Barbara Kunz rappelle l’évaluation de la menace telle qu’elle est décrite dans le Livre blanc allemand de 2006 : les risques et les menaces émergent principalement de pays faibles et de pays faillis, sous la forme du terrorisme et des réseaux criminels, mais aussi des effets des catastrophes naturelles, des flux migratoires, des épidémies et des pandémies. Elle complète cette analyse qui n’a rien perdu de son actualité, par une citation du ministre de la Défense, Ursula von der Leyen, qui évoque la nécessaire prise en compte des nouveaux types de risques et menaces, de la cyberguerre à la guerre...
vers une nouvelle stratégie européenne de sécurité

hybride, des actions terroristes de Daech au développement du virus Ebola, des conséquences du printemps arabe à la politique de puissance du Kremlin. Les autres pays partagent cette analyse mais ajoutent aussi les effets conjugués de la crise économique et de la réduction des budgets de défense ainsi que les problèmes de l’énergie et de l’accès aux métaux rares. La prolifération nucléaire, avec un non-respect préoccupant du TNP et la menace grandissante des missiles balistiques sont aussi des aspects partagés.

Ton van Osch, s’il mentionne la convergence de vue entre les Pays-Bas et la France sur l’évaluation des menaces, ajoute les risques encourus par le tissu industriel, scientifique et économique. À propos des États-Unis, il s’interroge sur les conséquences de leur changement de priorité dû à une moindre dépendance énergétique et à une prise en compte d’une situation sécuritaire plus préoccupante en Asie et dans le Pacifique. De même, les États-Unis qui tiennent à leur position hégémonique (La Maison blanche, 2015), mettent en œuvre le concept de « leading from behind » depuis les opérations en Libye en 2011. Ils l’ont conjugué depuis sous différentes formes (The White House, 2015), tout en reconnaissant que ce concept les place dans une position d’arbitre qui risque de leur faire perdre de l’influence.

Le Livre blanc polonais attire l’attention sur la résurgence des menaces dites traditionnelles, sous la forme de conflits armés pouvant menacer l’intégrité territoriale ou la stabilité régionale, qui sont appelées les menaces de la force dans le Livre blanc français. Mais il existe une différence de comportement entre les États sur leur perception ou non d’une menace grave à leurs frontières. Selon Ryszard Zięba, l’agression russe contre l’Ukraine est vue à Varsovie comme le possible précurseur d’une attaque contre la Pologne elle-même et, à ce titre, constitue une menace majeure. La Pologne voit dans la Russie d’aujourd’hui la volonté de redevenir une grande puissance et tout dépendra du maintien d’un dialogue visant à la mise en place de relations est-ouest équilibrées. La sécurité de la Pologne et de tous les États frontaliers de la Russie en dépend. Ainsi, la Pologne estime dans son Livre blanc de 2013 qu’elle s’est trop focalisée sur les opérations extérieures au détriment de la protection de son propre territoire. Elle diminue son engagement sur la scène internationale : à titre d’exemple, début 2014, lors de la conférence de génération de force, la Pologne a retiré un engagement initial à fournir un contingent de près de cinq cent soldats à l’opération EUFOR RCA (République Centrafricaine).

La perception des risques et des menaces est globalement partagée et fait l’objet d’un consensus. Ceci dit, les échelles de priorité ne sont pas les mêmes et divisent les États en deux clans, qu’ils perçoivent ou non une menace directe à leurs frontières.

12 “From cyber to hybrid warfare; from IS’ terror to Ebola, from the Arab Spring to the Kremlin’s power politics” (Von der Leyen U., 29 octobre 2014).
14 “The changing priority focus of the US, related to the changing dependency on energy, and especially related to a worsening security situation in East Asia and the Pacific”.
15 “The question is never whether America should lead, but how we lead”.
16 “We will lead with purpose, we will lead with strength, we will lead by example, we will lead with capable partners, we will lead with all the instruments of US power, we will lead with a long-term perspective…”
17 Le budget des opérations extérieures polonaises a été diminué de 50% entre 2013 (140 M€) et 2014 (72 M€).
VERS UNE NOUVELLE STRATEGIE EUROPEENNE DE SECURITE

LES INTERETS NATIONAUX

La notion d’intérêt national

Chaque pays fait plus ou moins clairement état de ce qu’il considère comme ses intérêts nationaux. Si la France les expose sans ambiguïté, d’autres sont plus embarrassés. Andrew Dorman affirme que le Royaume-Uni est moins à l’aise (apologetic) avec cette notion. Et pour Barbara Kunz, l’Allemagne refuse d’en parler, même si elle converge sur des principes généraux, de prévention et de gestion de crises qui la mettent en danger ainsi que leurs alliés.  

Au niveau du continent européen, la France raisonne plus en matière de sécurité globale et d’intérêt collectif mais, selon Barbara Kunz, n’a toujours pas réussi à convaincre ses partenaires de partager cette approche-là.

Les intérêts nationaux, selon Ryszard Zięba, reposent sur l’article 5 de la Constitution de son pays, à savoir l’existence et l’indépendance de l’État polonais à l’intérieur de frontières inviolables. Suivent la liberté et la sécurité des citoyens, le développement durable du potentiel économique et sociétal, ainsi que la protection de l’environnement. Ces intérêts, même s’ils sont marqués par une histoire chaotique, peuvent être déclinés sans restriction au niveau européen.

Dissuasion, prévention et résilience sont des fonctions stratégiques globalement partagées. La différence principale réside dans la définition de la dissuasion: elle peut être nucléaire ou conventionnelle. C’est bien la combinaison des deux qui est facteur de puissance, sachant que la dissuasion nucléaire existe soit au niveau national, soit au niveau de l’OTAN.

Si certains pays considèrent que leurs intérêts nationaux se limitent à leurs frontières, d’autres comme la France développent des capacités de projection. Ainsi Andrew Dorman précise que c’est parce que la France manifeste dans son Livre blanc une ambition régionale voire mondiale, qu’elle conserve l’aptitude à projeter une puissance militaire encore considérable (Ministère de la Défense, 2013 : 88).

Il y a bien une problématique autour de la description ou non des intérêts nationaux. La défense ne pouvant être déléguée, il doit être cependant possible de converger vers une définition partagée des intérêts au niveau européen à partir du moment où ils respectent les principes de subsidiarité aux niveaux de la sécurité du citoyen et de l’inviolabilité des frontières.

Cependant, la divergence apparaît sur la défense des intérêts hors des frontières nationales puis de celles de l’Union. Seuls les pays à vocation régionale ou plus, partagent le souci de défendre leurs intérêts partout dans le monde. Étrangement pour les autres, ne serait-ce que la protection de leurs propres citoyens à l’étranger, celle-ci ne semble pas prise en compte.

18 “preventing, mitigating and managing crises and conflicts that endanger the security of Germany and its allies”.
19 “It builds upon the set of so-called constitutional interests listed in Article 5 of the Constitution, namely the existence of the independent Polish state within its inviolable borders, the freedom and security of its citizens, the sustainable development of the societal and economic potential (with the constitutional emphasis on the national heritage), and the protection of the environment.”
20 “the ability to deliver quite considerable military power at a distance from France”.

20
**Les zones d’intérêt**

La prise en compte de l’environnement international dépend de la volonté de chacun des États à s’engager à l’extérieur de ses frontières pour y défendre ses intérêts et ceux de la communauté internationale.

Tous les États reconnaissent les effets de la globalisation, le déclin de l’influence du clan occidental avec l’émergence de nouvelles puissances (BRICS, Iran, Indonésie, Pakistan, Afrique du sud, Turquie, Nigéria) ainsi que l’érosion de l’influence des organisations internationales et régionales. Cependant, s’ils s’accordent sur le principe de la nécessaire stabilité du voisinage immédiat de l’Europe, à savoir les voisinages sud et est, ils n’ont pas tous la même définition de leurs zones d’intérêt et ne sont pas toujours prêts pour autant à s’investir hors de leurs frontières.


Pour des raisons politiques, l’Allemagne, selon Barbara Kunz, ne tient pas à préciser ses priorités régionales et fonctionnelles.

Quant au Livre blanc finlandais, il indique que les événements au Moyen Orient ou en Afrique du Nord ne sont pas considérés comme ayant un impact fort et direct sur la sécurité du pays. Il limite ses zones d’intérêt à l’Europe du Nord et au voisinage européen, à savoir la zone de la Baltique et de l’Arctique, en estimant notamment que les vues actuelles de la Russie fragilisaient le développement de la sécurité européenne. La coopération entre la Russie et l’Union européenne dans le domaine des affaires étrangères et de la sécurité, reste, pour Tommi Koivula, un objectif important que son pays soutient.

De même, le comportement de la Russie et les conflits gelés menacent la sécurité polonaise, selon Ryszard Zięba. Celui-ci indique que, même si la Pologne a la volonté de jouer un rôle international, sa principale préoccupation reste la sécurité de ses frontières.

**Conclusion**

Bien que la conduite d’un exercice comparatif des stratégies nationales soit difficile à cause d’une différence de périmètre et de portée, les sept États qui ont été choisis pour l’étude, représentent cet...
intérêt d’avoir une approche différente concernant leur propre sécurité. Par exemple, l’emploi de leurs forces armées est basé sur des contraintes politiques spécifiques et une opinion publique plus ou moins favorable. De même, sur les sujets de défense, un rapport à la souveraineté variable mène certains d’entre eux à accepter plus facilement que d’autres une relation de dépendance vis-à-vis de leurs voisins, de l’OTAN ou de l’Union européenne.

Les grandes tendances observées dans l’appréciation des risques et des menaces montrent une convergence de vue. Cependant, les États divergent quand il s’agit de les classer par ordre de priorité et par zones d’intérêt. C’est sur ces divergences que l’étude va conclure par la nécessité de lancer des chantiers spécifiques pour que les États se convainquent qu’ils sont complémentaires dans une vision et une stratégie communes, basées sur des intérêts européens définis et agréés par tous.

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COMMON THREATS AGAINST COMMON INTERESTS: THE FUNDAMENT FOR A COMMON SECURITY STRATEGY

Ton VAN OSCH
Drs. Lieutenant-General (ret.)

There is a general understanding amongst EU Member States that the current European Security Strategy is outdated. High Representative and Vice President Frederica Mogherini wants to develop a new version in 2015, but she will find many hurdles on her way to consensus. The first hurdle will be to define common threats. But threats against what? For a common threat perspective there needs to be a shared view of goals and interests. If interests differ, threat perceptions will differ as well. This article tries to identify a common threat perspective through an analysis of national interests and perceived threats against such interests. It then identifies the commonalities and complementary or competing approaches to security. As a start, it focuses on French and Dutch national security strategy documents, the EU Treaty, EU security policy documents and adds personal views. When comparing the policy documents, this article not each time quotes the exact wording in the documents but only summarizes the main messages.

COMMON INTERESTS

Fundamental values of our societies

The best place to find common interests of EU Member States is the EU Treaty (including the UN Charter to which it refers). All Members agree that they want to be a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail, a society with common values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 1a). The most fundamental aim of the EU and thus of its Member States is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 2). This is what all Member States stand for. If we talk about our security, this is our common view on what we want to protect. But Member States did not give away the responsibility for security to the EU institutions. In Article 3a the Member States clearly state that the Union shall respect the essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State. National security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State. This article assumes that this will not change in the foreseeable future.

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1 This article has been written on the request of IRSEM. Copyright remains with A.G.D. van Osch, Sec Def Consult. The article or parts of the article can be freely quoted with reference to the author.
2 Lieutenant-General van Osch was the Military Representative from the Netherlands to NATO and the EU (2007-2010) and Director General of the EU Military Staff (2010-2013). He currently works as a lecturer and senior advisor.
3 This is the requested format by IRSEM in order to compare outcomes with other articles.
It can safely be assumed that in France and The Netherlands a combination of national documents (constitution and national security policy documents) fully support these most fundamental interests, though the wording sometimes differs.

Both countries translate these fundamental goals and interests into more concrete interests which need to be protected, like the security of national citizens (in French policy additional emphasis protection of citizens abroad), economic interests and essential infrastructure, including cyber infrastructure.

**International cooperation as a national security interest**

Both French and Dutch strategic policy documents stress the national dependency of global developments. For national security reasons it is essential that the country is embedded in international organizations. Both countries especially stress the importance of NATO and the EU.

NATO remains essential as a framework for political and military action especially for collective defence, the trans-Atlantic link and military interoperability, acknowledging that NATO also can do crisis management operations.

Still, both countries also mention the increasing potential of the EU for crisis management. They acknowledge that they share the majority of security interests with European partners and therefore give high priority to a European approach to security and defence. They see the EU as the framework which can best mobilise the whole range of civil and military instruments required to implement a global approach to crises.

Both countries also stress that there is no duplication between NATO and EU, but complementarity. They acknowledge the need for the US to shift security priority to the Pacific and therefore the need for Europe to better be able to take care of its own security or at least take a more fair share of the burden. Strengthening of the security capacities of the EU Member States will strengthen NATO as well, as long as the bulk of the military capabilities remain under Full Command of the Member States. This gives flexibility to use the forces under the umbrella of the organisation which is the best suited to coordinate in a specific crisis. It also avoids the risk that all countries invest in a common capability and can be blocked by only one country in using it.

It is interesting to see that over the last few decades at the policy level in France there has been a shift from European heavy to a more balanced approach between NATO and EU. The same happened in the Netherlands, but coming from a NATO heavy approach. The visions in the policy documents about the role of both organizations now come very close.

**Complementary interests**

Of course, each country also has goals and interests which specifically relate to the national position. But these not necessarily compete with each other. Both France and the Netherlands have different historical territorial responsibilities and interests overseas. Those could become competitive if they draw away security capacities from other interests. The French historic relations with countries in Africa lead to specific responsibilities, which relate to protection of French citizens abroad and a
feeling of responsibility for stability and the support to legitimate governments. There are also specific related issues like dependency of uranium, oil, gas from some North African and Sahel countries and the interest to control immigration, which also relate to the interest of internal security. But one could also give this kind of examples for the Netherlands, be it less in size and quantity. But if we consider that threats against such national interests indirectly can also have a negative impact on the other EU Member States, they become common interests. Negative consequences of immigration (legal and illegal) into France can also have a negative effect in the Netherlands. Problems of energy supply in France will have a negative impact on the French economy, but indirectly also on Dutch economy. Stability in Africa is also in the interest of the Netherlands and it fits under the broader umbrella of the common interest of international law and order. In short, even if some interests seem purely national interests, in most cases there is also indirectly a common interest. And because it is for all EU countries impossible to protect those interests in national isolation, it seems logical to bring them under a common security strategy, using a more general terminology like protection of EU citizens, control of immigration flows, protection of economic interests and international law and order.

COMPETING GOALS AND INTERESTS

Though France and The Netherlands have almost all interests in common, sometimes the reasons why we want to invest in the protection of these interests can differ. French policy stresses from the beginning the need for preservation of national independence and sovereignty. It acknowledges the need for international cooperation, but as a result of free choices in support of the national security strategy. Dutch policy stresses from the beginning that an open society such as the Netherlands is highly dependent on the rest of the world and thus accepts the need for international cooperation as an unavoidability. For the Netherlands it is not anymore a matter of choice but the only viable option and assesses that this is also the case for all other EU Member States. These different views can hamper international cooperation. France will try to get the most out of it, in support of the interest to increase influence on international decision making and to sustain its autonomous defence industrial base. The Netherlands will be open for international cooperation but might not feel to be seen as an equal partner. There is the perception in the Netherlands that if French policy makers say “buy European”, they mean “buy French”, while the Dutch will seek a fair share for the Dutch industry. It will not be difficult to find historic examples of international materiel development projects where this tension or at least the perception of this tension was one of the causes of failure.

COMMON THREAT PERCEPTIONS

Both countries recognise the same global strategic trends which have an impact on their security:

- The economic crisis in Europe and still rising economic trends in other countries like Brazil, India and China;
- Related declining Defence budgets in Europe far below the agreed 2% of the GDP, many even below 1%, while Defence budgets in countries like Russia and China still significantly increase;
The social unrest and internal conflicts in many Arabic countries, the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, the related increase of a terrorist threat, the relative inadequacy of instruments for global governance including the UN;

Changing dependencies on energy while the total demand is increasing;

The changing priority focus of the US, related to the changing dependency on energy, and especially related to a worsening security situation in East Asia and the Pacific.

The Netherlands adds climate change as a cause for several security risks, but both countries at least mention the related security consequences like social unrest, struggle for scarce water, refugees and migration.

Both countries mention directly or implicitly additional threats like piracy, cyber-attacks, risks to essential infrastructure, risks to the industrial, scientific and technological base, organised crime and crises resulting from natural, health and industrial accidental risks.

Given security developments in 2013 and 2014 both countries would of course certainly also mention the worsening hostile attitude of Russia and the increasing threat of Islamic State (IS) and related terrorist organisations.

Because France and The Netherlands are both surrounded by friendly States, there is not much difference in the way the countries prioritise the threats. One could argue that a difference is that France is also a Mediterranean country, with its specific threats in relation to immigration and import of Islamic radicalism. But this threat has already spread to other EU Member States, like the Netherlands. Between France and the Netherlands, there is at least not such a big difference like for instance between the Baltic States which more concentrate on a perceived threat coming from Russia and Italy which more focuses on instability and immigration coming from North Africa. But even then it must be clear to all EU Member States that a threat which can be detrimental to one of the Member States, will directly or indirectly have negative consequences for all. Consequently, the common EU threat perspective should be the sum of the external threats as perceived by Member States.

One could also argue that sometimes the same threat can lead to different threat perceptions. For example, the perception of the threat of Islamic radicalism seems to be higher in France than in the Netherlands. But this might have to do more with the fact that in France there was such a serious attack that the Government as a reaction brought a huge number of military in the streets to protect essential infrastructure and important public buildings. Politicians need to be seen as taking action. But this kind of threat is as realistic in France as it is in all countries which are part of the coalition against IS, which have Islamic minorities and returned IS fighters, so also in the Netherlands.

COMPETING THREAT PERCEPTIONS

There could potentially develop competing threat perceptions linked to different national territories overseas. Still, we can expect that if an overseas territory of an EU Member State will be threatened, other Member States would at least accept national action or would even support such action based on the broader common responsibilities for international rule of law and the protection of European
citizens. The article in the EU Treaty (Treaty of Lisbon, Section 2 Article 7) which covers the obligation of aid and assistance to a Member State which is attacked is even stronger than the description in article 5 of the NATO Treaty, though it is not clear whether this EU obligation can be extended to national territories outside Europe.

**DIFFERENT PRESENTATIONS OF THE THREATS**

The French and Dutch strategic documents differ in the way they present the threats in categories. The French White Paper for example presents the bulk of the threats within the categories of “Threats related to power”, “Risks related to weakness” and “Threats and risks intensified by globalisation”. The Dutch International Security Strategy puts the threats and risks in categories which link to the cause of the threats, like shifting power blocks, weaknesses of the multilateral global order, changing balance of economic strength, increasing dependency on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and its vulnerability, new weapons related to technological innovation, weapons of mass destruction and rocket technology, climate change, scarcity of natural resources, failed states. But the final result is that under the different categories, both countries identify the same kind of threats. It should not be difficult to find consensus on the format if there are no differences of opinion about the content.

**COMMON APPROACHES TO SECURITY AND PRIORITIES**

As France and The Netherlands at large share the same interests and identify the same kind of risks and threats, it is not surprising that their approach to national security is largely the same as well.

- Both countries give their forces as a priority task the defence of the national territory (France adds its national citizens) and the integrity of the Alliance (though wording differs and it is assumed that both countries would also include non-Nato EU Member States);
- Both give high priority to international law and order, though The Netherlands puts more emphasis on it (as its prosperity is fully dependent on international trade);
- Both stress the importance of economic security. There is a direct relation between a strong economy and strong security capabilities;
- Both countries have grown to a same view on the importance of NATO and EU for security and their complementarity and add that they want to see a stronger European approach to security which will also strengthen NATO;
- Both acknowledge the importance of having a synchronised approach of military and civil instruments towards the same political security objectives (comprehensive approach);
- The Netherlands explicitly and France implicitly (through the identification of threats) give a high priority to the regions in the direct neighbourhood of Europe;
COMPLEMENTARY APPROACHES

There are some differences between the national approaches to security, but most of them are a matter of complementarity, or are just differences in wording and/or emphasis, so not a matter of disagreement. For example:

- France adds as high priority tasks nuclear deterrence and intervention by the armed forces and stresses that these are essential capacities in relation to the defence of the national integrity. This not needs to be in contradiction with Dutch views. French nuclear deterrence can add to the uncertainties of potential aggressors against EU Member States and French interventions abroad can be in support of the same security interests of The Netherlands;

- The Netherlands puts more emphasis than France on prevention, disarmament and armament control and seeks to strengthen governmental capacities through involvement of the private sector. France at least not excludes these approaches.

COMPETING APPROACHES TO SECURITY

The main differences are linked to the French interest to protect its sovereignty and autonomy and the Dutch perception that The Netherlands basically already lost its autonomy. These different perceptions could delay progress in the development of a common strategy. For France, the investments in international security capabilities are a way to preserve its sovereignty. French input in NATO and EU and other international security organisations should be such that it guarantees sufficient influence on decision making which helps to secure France's autonomy. The Dutch approach to security starts with the thought of interdependency and the unavoidable need to have international cooperation. The Dutch level of investment in common security will therefore at best be based on solidarity and burden sharing. Dutch politicians and policy makers feel less responsible for the end result. If you would ask Dutch politicians, they would deny this, but reality is that political discussions in the Netherlands are more about the feasibility of national contributions than about the viability of international objectives. One of the reasons is that the national contribution due to a lack of sustainability will be shorter than the international operation will last. If you not feel responsible for the international end result, you feel less involved and this will also have an effect on national public support.

The difference in thinking about national sovereignty and autonomy also becomes clear in international capacity building. France wants to preserve all the critical industrial sectors that make the French industrial and technological base an instrument for preserving France’s strategic autonomy. The Netherlands already lost this industrial Defence autonomy. The Dutch are interested in European cooperation for reasons of efficiency and, like France, they want that the national industry benefits from it. But the pressure in France is higher to produce in France, then only European efficiency. This is one of the reasons which explain why international materiel cooperation is so difficult. It would only improve if all EU Member States seek to find European autonomy, instead of national autonomy, if all Member States take a fair share of the common burden and receive a fair share of the benefits.

5 Very good examples are the No Fly Zone+ above Libya and EUTM Mali, for which France felt responsible and The Netherlands was only showing the flag without significant military effect.
**LEVEL OF EU AMBITION**

Though both countries stress the need for international cooperation, they in their national strategy documents do not define what should be the ambition of the EU. They implicitly do for NATO, because they mention collective defence as a key role. This NATO scenario for a large part determines what should be the minimum military capacity of the Alliance. It is less clear for the EU. The current ambition is based on the thought that the EU should be able to independently solve a crisis in its direct neighbourhood. The used example for the current European Security Strategy was Bosnia in Herzegovina in the 90’s with IFOR doing a peace making enforcing operation with about 60,000 troops. If the idea is still that the EU should be able to solve crises in its direct neighbourhood without the support of the US, there are four reasons why the EU ambition should get an update. First, there is the fact that the EU currently is not able to fulfil its existing ambition, because the Member States lack much of the strategic enablers which until now always have been delivered by the US. Second, the current ambition of 60,000 troops has not been translated into the fact that it demands a significantly higher number of troops to sustain such an operation, also if in a next phase it would be succeeded by a peace keeping operation with half the number of troops. Experts understand that for sustainability it would require about three to four times the number of troops actually in the field. Third, several existing or potential threats would most likely demand a higher amount of troops than the current ambition of 60,000. Four, the current ambition does not cover the increased number of threats in the direct neighbourhood of the EU. Every individual reason demands an upgrade of the common capacity of the Member States.

**CONCLUSIONS**

France and the Netherlands largely share the same kind of interests and identified the same kind of risks and threats. It therefore is not a surprise that they largely have the same approach to security and defence in which they both stress the need for international cooperation and strengthening of the European approach to security and defence.

The main differences relate to the fact that France sees its investment in international cooperation as a free choice and a way to guarantee influence on the international decision making and thus its national sovereignty and autonomy. In the view of other countries, French interests seem to prevail above common interests. This thought can hamper international cooperation with countries like the Netherlands which already lost their autonomy and seek international cooperation as equal partners. This difference could only be overcome if all Member States emphasise the need for an EU capacity to independently solve crises in its direct neighbourhood (except collective defence which remains to be a priority task for NATO). This will only be possible through international cooperation between EU Member States in which every country takes a fair share of the burden and receives a fair share of the benefits.

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6 This does not exclude that NATO can also do other kind of operations.
7 Though the option of Common Defence is mentioned in the EU Treaty (Chapter 2, Section 1, Art. 11, and same chapter, Section 2, art. 28A) both countries seem to accept that NATO is the primary organisation to cover this option.
A new European Strategy will need to continue to acknowledge the national sovereignty of its Member States. If not, there will be no consensus. Even in Dutch political and public perception the term sovereignty remains to be essential, more or less denying the European interdependencies. A solution could be that the new European Strategy indeed continues to acknowledge the national sovereignty of Member States, but also stresses that sovereignty is not only about the power to independently decide. It is also about the power to effectively act. If we can only effectively act through international cooperation you could argue that the European capacity to act in support of our common security objectives adds to national sovereignty as well.

Though both countries not mention the EU ambition in their strategic documents, this will of course be an essential topic in an updated European Security Strategy. If the EU ambition in numbers remains as it is (which is agreed by all Member States, so also by France and the Netherlands), it still would demand increased investments of Member States in order to have sufficient strategic enablers and sustainability. If the EU ambition in tasks remains the same (which is also agreed by all Member States), the EU ambition in numbers would also need an upgrade given the increased complexity and increased number of crisis in the direct neighbourhood of the EU.

Looking at interests, risks and threats, it should be possible to find a common formulation, at least between France and the Netherlands. Most of the arguments can be related to the other EU Member States as well. There will of course be more hurdles on the way to a new Strategy. There are for example also cultural and constitutional differences on the role of Armed Forces and differences in national decision making on the use of Armed Forces. But if at the end all Member States acknowledge that they have most security interests in common and thus also the threats against those interests, it must be possible to overcome all hurdles towards a common security strategy. It might be more urgent than we currently perceive and therefore essential for the protection of the society we want to be.

**BIBLIOGRAPHIE**


CROSSED ANALYSIS OF THE FRENCH AND FINNISH WHITE PAPERS

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INTRODUCTION

This article compares the latest French and Finnish White Papers on defence and security with particular emphasis on the way the two documents evaluate national security risks, threats and interests. The guiding idea is to scrutinize the two papers from three perspectives. On the one hand, the idea will be to search for common or shared issues and perspectives as they appear or can be interpreted in the respective documents. Secondly, things that are complementary between the two White Papers will also be highlighted. Finally, attention will be given to issues or perspectives in which the two are possibly in opposition.

A number of common qualities characterize the two White Papers’ overall approaches and methodology but there are also differences between the two texts. Naturally, as both papers are a continuation is a series of national White Books, they both seek to give special attention to topics in which significant changes have occurred since the publication of their previous versions. In addition to analyzing the changes and trends in the global security environment, both draw national conclusions based on them and give guidance to the future development of their armed forces. However a certain difference of emphasis can be observed as the French paper constitutes a concrete basis for the Military Programmatic Law whereas the Finnish paper’s link to the concrete future development of her armed forces is less direct.

The French White Paper was published 29 April 2013, six months before the beginning of the events place Maidan in Kiev. Its publication took place five years since the last White Paper was published. Even if the timeframe of the White Paper extends to the next fifteen years, it was decided to revise the national strategy regularly, every five years. As was the case for the three previous versions, the White Paper provided the basis for the establishment of a Military Programmatic Law which was adopted in December 2013.

Then again, the Finnish government has published Security and Defence Policy Reports, or White Papers roughly every fourth year since 1995. The latest Report, Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012 was published in March, 2013. Institutionally, the Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012 lays the foundation for guiding Finland’s security policy and strengthening its action in promoting her interests and goals in the changing international situation. The focus of the Report extends into the 2020s. The following analysis builds on the two documents but some interpretation by the author(s) is also involved.
RECENT MAJOR CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The French White Paper identifies four major changes in the current international security environment: (1) the global economic downturn and, consequently, the financial constraints most countries have to deal with since 2008, (2) the Arab revolutions, (3) the “pivot” of the United States (U.S.) to Asia, and (4) the multifaceted crisis the EU is currently facing. France considers these four changes to be a risk and a threat to a stable international security environment.

In its analysis of the current state of the international security, the Finnish White Paper shares this overall assessment in many respects, even though with slightly different emphasis. In particular, the shifting US focus to East Asia is pointed out as one of the key changes in the international system. However, the strategic shift is not seen as implying that the United States is about to abandon its commitments to Europe or its role as the ultimate guarantor of European security (Finnish Ministry of Defence, 2012 : 29). However, it is recognized that the emerging economies, particularly China, are increasing their political clout by means of their strong economic growth and that while the United States will continue to be the most influential country in global politics, it has lost some of its stature.

Like its French counterpart, the Finnish paper discusses the economic downturn too but it approaches the topic above all in the European Union and Eurozone framework. Indeed, the current state of the EU and the Eurozone crisis EU is portrayed as weakening Europe in relation to the countries experiencing more rapid economic growth. However, it is noteworthy that the Finnish paper speaks less about the impact of the Arab revolutions, indicating that the events in the Middle East and North Africa are not seen as having such a strong and direct relevance for Finnish security.

All in all, even though various geographical and thematic issue-areas are given different weights in the two papers, one can judge that both White Papers share a relatively similar view of the recent major changes in the international system. Partially, these similarities in the understanding of the major forces in play on the systemic level may be due to the unifying effects of the European security culture. Partially the similarities may be explained with the two countries’ open economies with strong links to global trade.

MAIN OBJECTIVES IN SECURITY AND DEFENCE

The geographical and political characteristics of the two countries come more into play when one scrutinizes their main objectives in security and defence as portrayed in their White Papers.

In its White Paper, France currently estimates that the state is not facing “any direct, explicit conventional military threat against its territory” (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 13). However, a specific characteristic of the French White Paper is the broad notion of security, which is seen to extend beyond national borders. It is stated that external security is as important as internal security for preserving the national sovereignty of France. This, in turn, explains why France aims for protecting its territory and its nationals at home and abroad in order to guarantee the continuity of the Nation’s essential functions. Together with its partners and allies, France seeks for securing Europe, stabilising the EU’s near environment and safeguarding the North Atlantic space. The White Paper additionally underlines the French objective to contribute to stability and peace in the world,
in particular in the Middle East and the Arabo-Persian Gulf. France thereby aims to safeguard its vital interests whose protection, in turn, is crucial for guaranteeing as well its national interests. In order to do so, France relies on nuclear deterrence, and is – if necessary – also willing to deploy its armed forces in crisis situations outside the French national territory. This approach to defence underlines once more that internal and external security are highly interdependent for France.

The absence of a specific or immediate security threat applies also to the Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012. However, the document assesses that unforeseeable developments in the operating environment and uncertainty may also cause negative security impacts on Finland as it is increasingly dependent on international well-being, stability and security. Therefore, Finland’s security challenges arise above all from a wider international setting, constituting a similarity to the French conception of a link between internal and external security (Finnish Ministry of Defence, 2012: 26). Yet, a key difference to the French is that in most cases Finland does not perceive itself to be a stand-alone actor on global or even regional scale, but prefers to act in various multinational frameworks.

Moreover, as already mentioned, there are differences in the regional focuses of the two countries. If the French paper discusses large areas in Africa and in the Middle East and the wider Euro-Atlantic region as its primary goals of stability, the Finnish paper limits the emphasis to its Northern European and EU neighborhood. In Northern Europe, the Nordic countries are pointed out as important and natural reference group for Finland. Finland promotes the development of Nordic cooperation in foreign, security and defence policy as well, with the Nordic Defence Cooperation NORDEFCO being the platform for regional defence cooperation. Another region where Finland seeks to enhance security is the Arctic area, the significance of which is increasing both economically and in terms of security policy. There, Finland seeks to maintain close and wide-ranging relationships in its neighbourhood, and to actively participate in establishing and developing cooperative structures in the area.

Finland highlights also the importance of the cohesion of the European Union and comprehensive EU policies vis-à-vis its strategic partners, such as China, the United States and Russia. In essence then, while France perceives its role as guiding the EU and its Common Foreign and Security Policy, Finland underlines the benefits of European cohesion vis-à-vis third parties.

As a militarily non-aligned country, Finland will continue to see to its own defence. The defence solution is built on a territorial defence system covering the entire area of the country and general conscription will remain one of its cornerstones. However, multinational defence cooperation is estimated to have an increasing role too. Even though Finland is not a member of a military alliance, she cooperates with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and maintains the option of applying for NATO membership. Finland also underlines the security political role of the European Union by emphasising the mutual assistance clause included in the Treaty of Lisbon (TEU Art 42(7)), which deals with the incident of a single Member State becoming the victim of armed attack. In the Finnish view, the clause should be vitalised with concrete discussions by the EU Member States about its practical implementation.

The Finnish emphasis on territorial defence and conscription system can be contrasted with the French preparedness to deploy its armed forces in crisis situations outside the French national territory. In a larger sense, this may indicate different perceptions as to the role of the armed forces
and to the different national thresholds of using military force. Indeed, expectations on an armed force based on reservist and conscripts are likely to be different when compared with professional and deployable military. Naturally, the two countries’ historical commitments to overseas areas vary too.

**GLOBAL RISKS AND THREATS: NATIONAL PRIORITIES**

When one turns to look into the two countries’ perceptions of global risks and threats they seem to be in a logical relationship with the two countries’ assessments of their security goals.

Overall, The French White Paper perceives three types of global risks and threats: (1) risks related to weakness (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 38), (2) threats related to power, and (3) risks and threats that are intensified by globalisation. Risks related to weakness include but are not limited to the threat posed by weak and failed states, e.g. in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Weak and failed states are considered to be “incapable of exercising their sovereign responsibilities, the very foundations of the international order”. Thus, the risk exists that the unstable security environment in weak and failed states may spill over to other societies. For France, this situation is a strategic challenge since “many of the States concerned are on Europe’s doorstep, in Africa, a continent which is now at a crossroads”.

Threats related to power, in turn, are multiple, and include *inter alia* the risk of resurgence of conflicts between states. This risk is mainly due to “the large and rapid increase in military spending and conventional arsenals in some regions of the world”, e.g. in Russia. For France, the threat of resurging conflicts is particularly high in Asia where military spending has doubled over the past decade, thus allowing for the modernisation of equipment and forces. Additionally, the French White Paper identifies risks related to regional destabilisation, taking the example of the Middle East where “conflicts [...] have their own dynamic, but [...] cannot be understood in isolation from each other”. This threat is further increased in the presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD): “Iran’s race to acquire nuclear military capability [thus] engenders a risk of proliferation, [and] concentrates risks of serious conflict that would have a global impact on the planet”.

Both the first and the second type of global risks and threats, i.e. those related to weakness and those related to power, tend to be intensified by globalisation. According to France, this is mainly due to an ever increasing flow of people, goods and services, which, in turn, results from the dynamics of globalisation. Within these three types of risks and threats, the priorities of France are as follows: (1) an aggression by another state against French territory, (2) terrorist attacks, (3) cyber attacks, (4) attacks on the French scientific and technical potential, (5) organised crime, (6) natural, health, technical, industrial and accidental risks as well as (7) attacks on French nationals abroad.

The previous description reveals that the French White Paper has not only a national but also a regional and an international dimension, therefore focusing on the French overseas collectivities and departments as well as security and defence issues linked to Africa, the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America, for instance. This, in turn, underlines that France perceives internal and external security as being highly interdependent.
In its turn, also the Finnish paper devotes considerable attention to growing interdependence and globalization. It is noteworthy that generally a more positive tone towards these phenomena is assumed. However, attention is also drawn to the way they pose entirely new challenges to the way communities, states and nations organize their mutual relationships and adapt to the requirements posed by sustainable development. The Finnish paper emphasizes that its setting requires progressively more international cooperation, credible international institutions as well as an active foreign, security and defence policy (Finnish Ministry of Defence, 2012 : 19).

Overall, while the threat of large-scale armed aggression has diminished, according to Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012 military forces can still be employed in a limited fashion in regional and internal conflicts, and as an instrument of power projection. Simultaneously, the options for non-state actors are multiplying due to advances in technology, and through the progressively more vulnerable societies.

The Report estimates that Russia’s views affect the development of European security and that it is particularly important for Finland to assess Russia’s political development and the goals of its international action. Preserving its influence in its neighbourhood is an essential element of its great-power status, which is also echoed in EU-Russian and NATO-Russia relationships. While Russia’s input in global governance is uneven, for example in environmental and development questions, Russia’s foreign and security policy guidelines, its societal development and the state and development prospects of the major military power are issues that interest Finland. It is in Finland’s interest that Russia increasingly commits to European development, international collaboration and integrates into the structures of the global economy. The development of the EU-Russian cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy is also an important goal which Finland supports.

A second issue-area of specific concern is again the state of the European Union, the cohesion and credibility as a leading actor of which is sapped by the protracted economic recession. The weakening of the Union’s internal unity, its experiencing more discord or losing its capacity would impact the EU’s global role and also Finland’s international standing. The importance of the EU cohesion is accentuated in the EU’s external relations. From the Finnish standpoint cohesive action is particularly important in EU-Russian relations.

**Conclusions**

After this brief overlook into the French and Finnish White Papers, one can now return to the guiding theme of this article: what is common, what can be complementary and what is in opposition?

To begin with, there is a lot of common ground. Overall, France and Finland share like-mindedness on the main characteristics of the current international system and on the security framework to adopt. Due to their different sizes and geographical locations, they may perceive threats and priorities differently and may adopt distinct ways to assure their own security. However, these differences are more complementary than opposed from the European security point of view.

When one turns the attention to the complementary issues in the two White papers, certain geographical characteristics come into play. While the French White Paper underlines the French objective to contribute to stability and peace in particular in the Middle East and the Arabo-Persian
Gulf, the Finnish emphasis is to work in its immediate geographic neighbourhood of Baltic and Arctic area and to commit Russia to European development and to international collaboration. Diverse as these objectives are, they both seek to promote to global and regional security. Also, both White Papers recognize the role of multinational defence cooperation and regional security cooperation within Europe even though with different emphases.

Then again, particular national perspectives are evident. Partly, they stem from the size of the countries in comparison but also due to perceptions of history and one’s geopolitical environment and possibly due to the structure of the respective armed forces. Perhaps the key difference can be read between the lines in the two White Books. The tone of the French paper conveys a self-perception of a big power - emphasis to remain a global actor permanent seat at the UN Security Council, the maintenance of independent nuclear deterrence, maintenance of the French strategic autonomy in guaranteeing international stability, ability to protect national interests not just on the French soil but also abroad and preparedness to engage independently in crises.

In essence then, the level of ambition is considerable in the French White Book. This ambition is also demonstrated by the large French definition of her geographical sphere of action, her willingness to lead in NATO and in European Security and Defence Policy.

On the other hand, a very different kind of actor “talks” in the Finnish White Paper. It typically emphasises international cooperation, the role of credible international institutions along with an active foreign, security and defence policy. However, along with this internationalism and praise of the benefits of globalization, it also sends a signal of a hedgehog: an emphasis on national defence, subscription to the doctrines of total and territorial defence, accompanied with an almost dogmatic belief to conscription system characterize the overall series of the Finnish White Books. These factors differentiate Finland not just from France but from most other European countries.

In conclusion then, the two studies White Papers share a lot in their assessments of the key global trend and their overall perceptions of threats and security goals. Yet, equally evident is that the two papers reflect strongly national perceptions of the surrounding world, influenced by many unique characteristics but above all geopolitical environment and history.
THE GERMAN APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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INTRODUCTION

While strategy implies the definition of general objectives for foreign policy, the purpose of military doctrine consists of defining under what conditions and circumstances states resort to using their military power and how they do this.

Strategy must by definition be based on an analysis of states’ (security) environment and an assessment of risks and threats emanating from that environment. Yet, although France and Germany basically share the same security environment due to their geographical proximity, the two countries’ approaches to security and defence policy are essentially different. This is not least obvious in analyzing the fundamental documents intended to summarize a country’s general approach to security, i.e. White Papers.

When it comes to such official “doctrine”, the situation is very different in France and Germany. France has published a new White Paper on Defence in 2013. The German White Paper, in turn, dates back to 2006. Yet, the situation is evolving: Berlin is currently discussing a potential new role for the country in the world, in light of what is perceived as its growing responsibility. Moreover, the German Minister of Defence has recently announced that a new White Paper is to be published by mid-2016.

And besides these planned updates in terms of analysis, also processes of German security policy are currently under review: a commission of government party Members of Parliament and experts headed by former Defence Minister Volker Rühe is preparing proposals for the Bundestag’s future role in German troop deployments.

The remainder of this paper will be dedicated to a brief summary and analysis of the German and French White Papers (and auxiliary documents), intended to outline similarities and differences between the two approaches.

THE GERMAN APPROACH

Germany does not have a national security strategy. Calls for establishing such a strategy were in the past rejected by the federal government, meaning that the current situation is the result of a deliberate choice. Identifying a German “military doctrine” or the like consequently amounts to a much harder task than e.g. in France. Axiomatic statements on German security and defence policy

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2 See the Deutscher Bundestag. The Commission will publish a report in May 2015 outlining its proposals. Radical changes in the German decision-making process are nevertheless not to be expected.
3 E.g. by the conservative member of the Bundestag Roderich Kiesewetter.
are nevertheless to be found in a number of documents: the 2006 White Paper and the 2011 Defence Policy Guidelines.

The current White Paper, the second post-Cold War edition after 1994, was published in October 2006 and must therefore be considered outdated in many respects: not only has the security environment evolved considerably in the more than eight years since it was written (notably on the southern rim of the Mediterranean, but also the 2008 Georgian war took for instance place after its publication), the Paper also dates from before both the Treaty of Lisbon and the far-reaching changes it brought about for CSDP and NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept. Moreover, the reform of the German armed forces was implemented after the White Paper came out. Back in 2006, the White Paper was essentially drafted by the Ministry of Defence’s Planning Unit, while no wider debate about its content was intended during the process. It was adopted by the government in late October 2006 and subsequently made public. Besides the sections devoted to the future of the German Bundeswehr, the analyses and stipulations it contains are hardly surprising and reflect the standard (post-modernist) discourse on security affairs: multilateralism and values; globalization and an ever more complex security environment, interdependence and non-traditional threats i.a. emanating from a lack of governance; the emphasis on NATO as the key security actor while simultaneously stressing the EU’s relevance; and networked security (German Ministry of Defence, 2006). Yet, although more than ten years old, these ideas still constitute the framework within which German officials describe their country’s foreign and security policy.

A more recent source for the official German security environment analysis are the 2011 “Defence Policy Guidelines,” a 17-pages-document intended to set the strategic framework for the mission and the tasks of the Bundeswehr as an element of the whole-of-government approach to security. They describe the security objectives and security interests of the Federal Republic of Germany. They are based on an assessment of the current situation and also include current and likely future developments (German Ministry of Defence, 2011).

As far as the security environment in which Germany evolves is concerned, the 2011 document concludes that

[a] direct territorial threat to Germany involving conventional military means remains an unlikely event. Over the past few years the strategic security environment has continued to change. Globalisation has led to power shifts between states and groups of states as well as to the rise of new regional powers. Today, risks and threats are emerging above all from failing and failed states, acts of international terrorism, terrorist regimes and dictatorships, turmoil when these break up, criminal networks, climatic and natural disasters, from migration developments, from the scarcity of or shortages in the supply of natural resources and raw materials, from epidemics and pandemics, as well as from possible threats to critical infrastructure such as information technology.

Within the overall context of the country’s security environment – and following the assessment that a direct territorial threat is unlikely –, the guidelines identify a number of German security interests:

preventing, mitigating and managing crises and conflicts that endanger the security of Germany and its allies;
advocating and implementing positions on foreign and security policy in an assertive and credible way;

strengthening transatlantic and European security and partnership;

advocating the universality of human rights and principles of democracy, promoting global respect for international law and reducing the gap between the rich and the poor regions of the world; facilitating free and unrestricted world trade as well as free access to the high seas and to natural resources.

The Guidelines do not get more specific than these statements, as this would normally be the kind of information comprised in a White Paper. Aware that the country’s “doctrinal” documents are outdated, Ursula von der Leyen – the German minister of defence – announced the establishment of a new White Paper during her speech at the “Bundeswehr-Tagung” in October 2014 (Von der Leyen, 2015). She explicitly made the case for a new White Paper to be necessary because of changes in the security environment:

But [external] conditions have changed dramatically since the 2006 White Paper: from the suspension of compulsory military service to the Bundeswehr’s reorientation; from cyber to hybrid warfare; from IS’ terror to Ebola, from the Arab Spring to the Kremlin’s power politics; from NATO’s Strategic Concept to the Common European Security and Defence Policy’s ambitions 4.

This assessment is consistent with numerous other statements to that effect, by both Defence Minister von der Leyen and other high-ranking German officials. Foreign Minister Frank-Walther Steinmeier, von der Leyen and Head of State Joachim Gauck gave speeches at the 2014 Munich Security conference that all went into the same direction. Likewise, the Foreign Ministry’s now concluded “Review 2014” project reached similar conclusions 5.

In his opening statements in Munich 2014, on “Germany’s role in the world: Reflections on responsibility, norms and alliances,” President Gauck named a range of questions that set the tone for these reflections:

Are we doing what we could do to stabilise our neighbourhood, both in the East and in Africa? Are we doing what we have to in order to counter the threat of terrorism? And, in cases where we have found convincing reasons to join our allies in taking even military action, are we willing to bear our fair share of the risks? Are we doing what we should to attract new or reinvigorated major powers to the cause of creating a just world order for tomorrow? Do we even evince the interest in some parts of the world which is their due, given their importance? What role do we want to play in the crises afflicting distant parts of the globe? Are we playing an active enough role in that field in which the Federal Republic of Germany has developed such expertise? I am speaking, of course, of conflict prevention. In my opinion, Germany should make a more substantial

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4 Author’s translation in the text: „Aber die Rahmenbedingungen haben sich seit dem Weißbuch von 2006 dramatisch verändert: Von der Aussetzung der Wehrpflicht bis zur Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr; von Cyber bis hybrider Kriegsführung; vom Terror der IS bis zu Ebola; vom Arabischen Frühling bis zur Machtpolitik des Kreml; vom Strategischen Konzept der NATO bis zu den Ambitionen der Gemeinsamen Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik.“

5 See Review 2014 for an overview. The project’s final report may be downloaded at the same address.
contribution, and it should make it earlier and more decisively if it is to be a good partner.

Germany has long since demonstrated that it acts in an internationally responsible way. But it could – building on its experience in safeguarding human rights and the rule of law – take more resolute steps to uphold and help shape the order based on the European Union, NATO and the United Nations. At the same time, Germany must also be ready to do more to guarantee the security that others have provided it with for decades (Gauck, 2014: 6).

Much of the subsequent debate focused on Gauck’s statement on military force, which he qualified as the means of last resort, which Germany should not reject by automatism:

However, when the last resort – sending in the Bundeswehr – comes to be discussed, Germany should not say “no” on principle. Nor should it say “yes” unthinkingly (Gauck, 2014).

Both minister of defence von der Leyen and foreign minister Steinmeier echoed these statements in their respective speeches. Arguing that Germany was a “major economy and a country of significant size,” von der Leyen declared that “the Federal Government is prepared to enhance our international responsibility” (Von der Leyen, 2014). Foreign minister Steinmeier, in turn, explained that

Germany must be ready for earlier, more decisive and more substantive engagement in the foreign and security policy sphere. Assuming responsibility in this sphere must always mean something concrete. It must amount to more than rhetorical outrage or the mere issue of grades for the efforts and activities of others (Steinmeier, 2014).

Notably the formula of “earlier, more decisive and more substantive engagement” has also made into the Review 2014’s final report.

These assessments will now need to be translated into the new White Paper (bearing in mind that two different ministries are in charge of the Review and the latter). The process leading up to its publication officially started on February 17, 2015. The White Paper is to be prepared by four expert panels on, respectively, “perspectives of security and defence policy”; “perspectives for partnerships and alliances”; “perspectives for the national framework of action” and “perspectives for the Bundeswehr.” Moreover, the general public will be invited to take part in an “unprecedented manner”, while international experts’ as well as partners countries’ and allies’ perspectives will also be taken into account. Although the document’s “executive character” is not to be questioned, members of Parliament will also contribute.

Whether the new White Paper will provide more than a description of Germany’s (and Europe’s) security environment and the commitment to specific values remains to be seen. Clearly formulated interests and concrete regional or functional priorities – not to mention a hierarchy of interests and priorities – are traditionally absent from German security policy. A number of truisms are of course correct, but these are no explicitly formulated strategic backbone when Berlin is to take decisions: the high relevance of economic interests, greater attention devoted to the East than to the South and of course a general reluctance toward military intervention.

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6 See the [German Ministry of Defence’s website dedicated to the new White Paper](http://example.com).
THE FRENCH APPROACH

France’s most recent White Paper was published in 2013, when the current edition replaced the 2008 version. Ordered by incoming President François Hollande in 2012, it was prepared by a Commission made up of representatives from various ministries, the armed forces and experts – including two foreigners. Although the initial plan merely consisted of updating the 2008 edition, the far-reaching evolutions in France’s security environment, but also the economic and financial crisis, eventually led to the drafting of a new document.

The 2013 French White Paper describes the international system as “genuinely multipolar, but also more fragmented”, which – absent effective global governance – implies the necessity of a more “regional approach to crisis management” (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 31). It then moves to a sophisticated distinction of “threats related to power,” “risks of weakness” and “threats and risks intensified by globalization”. The first essentially refers to “traditional” conflict among states as well as nuclear proliferation, and the White Paper notably concludes that “Russia is equipping itself with the economic and military clout that will enable it to engage in power politics” (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 36). “Risks of weakness,” in turn, emanate from failed states and the absence of governance. In this context, the White Paper notes “the multiplier effects of globalisation, which shrinks and unifies the strategic landscape and brings closer both threats related to power and risks of weakness” (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 40).

In its analysis of France’s strategic environment, the 2013 White Paper sets out with the assessment that

[w]ithout wishing to underestimate the potential of certain states for doing harm, or ignoring the risk of a strategic shift, France no longer faces any direct, explicit conventional military threat against its territory (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 13).

Yet, in light of the rise of new major powers and the simultaneous financial crises, the “United States and Europe have seen a reduction of their room for manoeuvre” (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 27). The situation in Arab countries, in the Middle East and notably the outcomes of the so-called Arab spring are also deemed to be of primary relevance. The longest passage, however, deals with the “strategic development of the United States,” where the White Paper notes that the U.S. “refocuses its geopolitical priorities” – in other words, what is generally termed the “Pacific Pivot” or “Rebalancing” (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 28). For the French White Paper,

[t]his change of circumstances in the United States and Europe has implications for crisis management policies and for the institutions responsible for international security (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 29).

Against the backdrop of the above described evolutions within the international system, the analysis concludes that

[t]he strategic implications of these changes impact profoundly on the security of France and its EU partners. Although the spectre of a major conflagration in Europe has receded,

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7 For details on the Commission and the working process, see the Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité, where the text of the 2013 White Paper may also be downloaded (including in an official English translation).
Europeans cannot afford to ignore the unstable world around them and to which they are inextricably linked. Both stakeholders in and major beneficiaries of the globalization process, they have to deal with a systematic increase in major risks and the vulnerability of the European Union to threats from beyond its borders. For example, a major crisis in Asia would have considerable economic, commercial and financial consequences for Europe (French Ministry of Defence, 2013: 30).

Within the context of the international security environment outlined above, France’s armed forces need to take on three principal tasks: protection, deterrence and interventions. These all contribute to the five strategic priorities for French foreign and security policy determined by the White Paper, namely to:

- Protect the national territory and French nationals abroad, and guarantee the continuity of the Nation’s essential functions;
- Guarantee the security of Europe and the North Atlantic space, with our partners and allies;
- Stabilize Europe’s near environment, with our partners and allies;
- Contribute to the stability of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf;
- Contribute to peace in the world.

In regional terms, France has a number of regions it defines as “priority areas to its defence and security”, namely “the regions on the fringes of Europe, the Mediterranean basin, part of Africa (from the Sahel to Equatorial Africa), the Arabo-Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean” (French Ministry of Defence, 2013: 79). In Africa in particular, the colonial past is a factor, which is why “[t]he Sahel, from Mauritania to the Horn of Africa, together with part of sub-Saharan Africa, are also regions of priority interest for France due to a common history, the presence of French nationals, the issues at stake and the threats confronting them” (French Ministry of Defence, 2013: 54). The permanently based French troops in Africa, the so-called dispositif prépositionné, is one of the concrete underpinnings of this regional priority (along with France’s military presence in other regions of the world).

Within the above described context, “strategic autonomy” is France’s key foreign and security policy objective. Closely linked to this notion is also the force de frappe. Against this backdrop, the White Paper unequivocally insists on France’s status as a nuclear power and states that “[n]uclear deterrence is the ultimate guarantee of our sovereignty” (French Ministry of Defence, 2013: 20).

**Comparative Analysis**

A comparison of the German and French approaches reveals that differences are not so much in substance, but rather in terms of ambitions and what may be labelled strategic maturity. The two White Papers are thus anything but incompatible, given that overall assessments of the situation are largely congruent. The German White Paper as well as the 2011 Defence Policy Guidelines are thus largely compatible with their French counterpart. This conclusion also remains valid when looking at other sources (given that the German White Paper is outdated), at least as far as the overall assessment is concerned. The reasons given by Defence Minister von der Leyen for drafting a new White Paper do indeed go well together with the picture painted by the 2013 French White Paper.
That said, however, the German White Paper contains no systematic analysis of the international system and its evolution and no information on regional priorities, nor does it provide a hierarchy of objectives and the role various components of the country’s security and defence policy (such as, for instance, the armament industry) are to play with respect to specific overall objectives. Notably compared to France, German strategic visions and threat perception thus remain rather vague and difficult to translate into concrete defence policies. The Franco-German relationship is hence characterized by both divergence and convergence, albeit at different levels: convergence as far as the overall assessment is concerned, yet divergence as far as concrete action is concerned. Many of the recent Franco-German hiccups over military interventions are to be explained by that fact: Paris and Berlin do simply not hold the same views on when and where to intervene, and neither do they necessarily agree on the best format for such intervention (CSDP, NATO, unilaterally...). In many cases, the disagreement is not even about different ideas on interventions, but rather between French convictions that intervention is necessary and German beliefs that it is not.

A comparative analysis of French and German doctrine also reveals different views on the preferred institutional setting of European security policy: while the German document stresses NATO’s core relevance (“the centrepiece of our defence efforts” according to the 2011 Defence Policy Guidelines), the French text insists on CSDP and the perspective of a full-fledged European defence. Moreover, Germany’s attachment to multilateralism – for instance Berlin’s insisting on a UN mandate – is not necessarily shared by France.

Another fundamental difference between the two countries pertains to nuclear weapons. While France is a nuclear power, Germany is not. And unwilling to buy French arguments on the force de frappe’s usefulness, Berlin is highly supportive of global nuclear disarmament, sometimes at the cost of a clash with Paris like in the run-up to NATO’s 2010 Lisbon Summit were Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy had to meet on the fringes of the event to find a last-minute compromise (Traynor, 2010).

Finally, it may perhaps be worth noting that in France, the White Paper is much more an element of the country’s strategic culture than it is in Germany. In a way, the French Livre Blanc is the very expression of French strategic culture and the result of a long-standing intellectual tradition in approaching international politics. In Germany, the White Paper has at least so far been just another official document (the new process leading up to the 2016 edition may perhaps bring about change). For that reason, comparing the two countries’ White Paper poses not only difficulties in terms of content, but also in standing and relevance for the respective country’s actual security policy.

**CONCLUSION: FRANCE AND GERMANY AS EUROPEAN POWERS**

The rhetoric on close friendship and cooperation notwithstanding, Paris and Berlin sometimes seem to live in almost different worlds as far as security is concerned. As has indeed often been noted, France and Germany are in fact rarely on the same page when it comes to the fundamentals of security and defence matters. Similarities at a declaratory level notwithstanding, it must not be
overlooked that France and Germany continue to hold different views on many security related issues when it comes to taking concrete action.

France and Germany certainly differ in their overall ambitions for European defence, yet they usually get along rather well when it comes to technical details within the existing frameworks. France thinks much bigger in terms of the continent’s security architecture but has never managed to convince Germany to join in its efforts, yet the two countries nonetheless share common objectives within the framework of existing NATO and CSDP structures. When it comes to shaping the institutional framework of European defence, the problem, in a Franco-German context, does thus not so much consist of different visions. Rather, France has a vision that Germany does not share. While France continues to pursue the *Europe de la défense*, Germany is utterly status-quo oriented, merely willing to address issues that appear as small technicalities in comparison to much bolder French visions. Preserving the transatlantic link is one of Berlin’s key objectives, which it does not want to endanger by too much European defence. And many in Berlin indeed suspect France of wanting to undermine that transatlantic link through the *Europe de la défense*.

The same applies to France’s regional priorities, notably in Africa: again, Germany does not always share these priorities, without, however, holding other priorities (in a military sense, at least). Paris and Berlin thus do not debate over whether Europe should intervene in Africa or elsewhere. Rather, most of the time, the question is whether to intervene in Africa or not (with, again, suspicions held in Berlin that France is merely attempting to Europeanize its own national interests).

Very importantly, however, France and Germany generally share their assessment of the security situation. Talking to officials on both sides, the list of risks and threats is essentially similar. Both Paris and Berlin e.g. understand the gravity in what is happening in Ukraine. It is thus rather the conclusions drawn from this assessment that can differ, as well as the priorities they define in regional, but also functional terms.
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VERS UNE NOUVELLE STRATEGIE EUROPEENNE DE SECURITE

“POLAND AND FRANCE: A CROSS-ANALYSIS OF SECURITY THREATS AND NATIONAL INTERESTS”

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INTRODUCTION: TWO WHITE PAPERS ON DEFENCE AND SECURITY

France and Poland published their national White Papers (WP) in April 2013 and May 2013 respectively. These WPs define both countries’ national security policies, by considering the most recent changes in the international security environment. While this was the fourth time France had released a WP on national security and defence, it was only Poland’s first. Poland’s 2013 WP announces the replacement of several documents, including inter alia the 2007 National security strategy of the Republic of Poland and the 2009 Defence strategy of the Republic of Poland.

This may explain the differences in the methodological approach France and Poland have adopted: whereas the French WP shows a high degree of practicality which, in turn, provided the basis for the “Military Programming Law”, Poland’s WP mainly contains the state’s perspective on current national security matters. The scope of the analyses is consequently also different: while Poland mainly focuses on security, France places a greater emphasis on defence issues.

On the basis of the two WPs, this article aims to conduct a cross-analysis of security threats and national interests, and to draw conclusions on both states’ strategic objectives and practices. The article will identify the similarities, complementarities and differences regarding the national interests of France and Poland, and their risk and threat perceptions. This analysis will then demonstrate that both countries, in spite of their different security and defence priorities (which, in turn, will be accounted for by historical factors and national interests), share a largely similar perception of the challenges of the changing international security environment. This research is therefore relevant to current debates on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), since similar threat perceptions may facilitate, and hence increase, bilateral and multilateral cooperation. This is particularly significant since France and Poland are not only members of the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), but also constitute the Weimar Triangle, together with Germany.

POLISH NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Introduction

Generally, The White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland is the culmination of about two years of work by the National Security Strategic Review (NSSR). It is an intellectually curious

1 The Weimar Triangle is loose grouping of France, Germany and Poland, established in the German city of Weimar on 28 August 1991.

46
document, which presents a holistic and comprehensive review of Poland’s national security. The document contains rather academic instructions on how to create a comprehensive and integrated national security system, in which the so-called next “hard security matters”, including national defence and protection of the country are linked to the socio-economic security and their relations to other areas of security. In this sense, the document is important and interesting for future work on the new national security strategy of the Republic of Poland. Experience of working in the NSSR showed the difficulty and slowness of revising a realistic security paradigm that traditionally favours military force as the main guarantor of security.

The practises of the state’s security policy, unfortunately, are still dominated up by the old Roman principle *si vis pacem para bellum* (“if one seeks peace, prepare for war”). It results not only from the Polish tradition of wars with its neighbours and the struggle for independence, but primarily due to the Polish political elite’s obsessive perception of a Russian threat. This is despite of the fact that the Poles now live in the most secure international environment in their history. Russian violations of its neighbours’ sovereignty, such as in the Georgian-Russian war in 2008 and its current interference in Ukraine, only partially justify the Polish authorities’ preference for a militarised security policy. In Warsaw, these acts are seen as a possible precursor of Russia's aggression towards Poland itself and so constitute a major threat. It is this which overall determines the purpose of Poland’s security and defence policies.

**Polish national perspective of the security environment**

The WP examines the Poland’s security environment at three levels: global, regional and national (homeland) (Polish Ministry of Defence, The National Security Bureau, 2013 : 128-144). Concerning homeland security, in its framework the WP excludes internal military threats (rebellions, coups) but indicates a risk of the proliferation of armed organised crime, especially transnational, paramilitary or internal terrorist groups. The main domestic risks are seen to be espionage, organised crime and especially transnational, paramilitary or internal terrorist groups. The main domestic risks are seen to be espionage, organised crime and internal terrorist groups.

**The global dimension**

The WP notes on the global level the following phenomena: the positive and negative effects of globalisation; the changing role of major international actors, including the gradual decline in the USA’s “superpower” status and the EU's crisis (despite still being the second “world-power”); emerging powers such as China, Brazil, India and Russia; the increasing significance of regional powers such as Iran, Indonesia, Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey and Nigeria; the emergence of threats to international security due to so-called “failed states”; the erosion of international agreements and organisations; and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Global challenges and transnational threats include terrorism, cyber threats and international organised crime and corruption, as well as economic crises, demographic change, climate change and the problems of access to rare natural resources. In addition to the aforementioned new, non-military threats, the Polish WP draws attention to traditional threats, in the form of external (international) and internal military conflicts and crises. This includes political and social change in the Arab world (the “Arab spring”), Iran, conflicts in South Asia (Afghanistan, the nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan,
which in the event of war over Kashmir could threaten the outbreak of a conflict between China and India) and disputes in the Korean peninsula. The Polish WP terms the global situation as “co-dependent instability”, due to how crises move from one region to another (sometimes very distant), and the WP states that in the globalised world, this trend will gain momentum.

The regional dimension

Poland, like France, is situated in a central, stable part of Europe, near other NATO nations and European Union member states. However, on the periphery of the continent several armed conflicts (albeit of a limited nature) have appeared and may yet still appear, adversely affecting Poland’s security. Such a conflict arose in the spring of 2014, as a result of Russia’s interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine, which had chosen a political course of association with the EU after President Poroshenko signed the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement in June 2014. Currently, the main guarantor of security in an integrated Europe, including Poland, is the North Atlantic Alliance, which is led by the USA’s strategic (politicono-military and economic) presence in European affairs, and supplemented by a crisis-weakened European Union (through its Common Security and Defence Policy). However, there is major uncertainty due to the US’s apparent transfer of strategic interest towards the Asia-Pacific region, and hence the reduction of its quantitative and qualitative military involvement in Europe.

An important external factor influencing Poland’s security is Russia’s ambition to play the role of a global power, as well as a regional power within the European continent, as the US presence declines. The security of Poland to a large extent depends on the development of relations between Russia and the West. Today, it is difficult to clearly define its perspective. It is to be seen whether Russia will continue to attempt to restore its former status as a ‘great power’, by ignoring the interests of the others, especially its neighbours. Alternately, it could steer a course towards cooperation in building common security. However presently, especially after its interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs, Russia seems more likely to be following the former course, which is unfavourable to Poland.

Poland also declares a commitment to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was marginalised in the 90s. Poland believes the OSCE to have a role in the efforts to create a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community, as was announced in 2010 at the summit of the organization in Astana. More in rhetoric than in practice, even since its accession to NATO, Polish security policy still places the OSCE in an important position (Zieba, 2013 : 274-282).

The WP emphasises the detrimental effect of the outbreak of tensions and conflicts in Europe to its security, and lists of four frozen conflicts, localised in the region of the Black Sea and the Caspian: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria. Other risk factors included separatist tendencies and ethnic and religious tensions, not only in Eastern Europe (North Caucasus), but also in Western Europe (Spain, Scotland, Northern Ireland). The militarised Kaliningrad region and authoritarian Belarus which border Poland are given as further sources of uncertainties. The WP also highlights the continuing source of tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, which justifies the need to maintain an international presence there, to support stabilisation and reconstruct the region (Polish Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 127).
The WP draws attention to the two types of direct military threats to Poland. The first takes the form of strategic military pressure used by international entities as part of their current, day-to-day policy, without crossing the threshold of war. This can be achieved by a steep development of military capabilities that disrupt the existing balance of forces, the demonstration of force in the form of military exercises or blackmail via a threat of an armed conflict. The second consists of a real armed conflict in the form of *ateritorial* conflicts (where the attacker does not intend to occupy the territory), or less likely, a large-scale war (Polish Ministry of Defence, 2013: 128). It should be added that the Russian support of separatists in Crimea and the eastern regions of Ukraine in 2014 is not covered by the Polish WP classification of military threats, given the publication of the WP preceded the events. By using unmarked military troops, prior to the masterful annexation of Crimea, Russia introduced a new type of military operation and so a new threat to international security, which can be called neither *ateritorial* nor large-scale war. Poland perceives the political and military interference of Russia in Ukrainian affairs as a direct threat to the security of other post-Soviet states, followed by Poland itself.

**Main objectives in security**

On the base of the historical experience which has determined the Polish strategic culture, the diagnoses of Poland’s strategic potential, and the provisions of the Polish Constitution, the WP formulates a catalogue of national interests and strategic objectives in the field of security. It builds upon the set of so-called constitutional interests listed in Article 5 of the Constitution, namely the existence of the independent Polish state within its inviolable borders, the freedom and security of its citizens, the sustainable development of the societal and economic potential (with the constitutional emphasis on the national heritage), and the protection of the environment.

The constitution provides the basis for identifying the following **national security interests**:

- The development of effective national security potential (readiness and capability to deter, defend and protect);
- Membership of credible international security systems;
- Freedom of citizens to exercise human rights and liberties, without detriment to the security of others or the security of the state;
- Individual protection of citizens and collective protection of population against natural or manmade threats, as well as against any violation, loss or degradation of the (both material and immaterial) assets at their disposal;
- Safe conditions for developing the country’s socio-economic potential;
- Adequate socio-economic support for security, corresponding to needs and capabilities.

The Polish WP does not distinguish between the goals of security and defence. Instead it provides a general, integrated and broad definition of security. The outcome of this definition is an extensive list of strategic security objectives which are formulated transparent general and opaque manner. It covers twelve operational objectives and eleven preparatory ones (Polish Ministry of Defence, 2013: 104-105).
Consequently, the WP leaves Poland’s national interests and strategic objectives somewhat ‘suspended in a vacuum’, and fails to provide practical details. In practice, the Poland’s main objectives in the field of security could be defined as:

1) Increasing the contribution to the strengthening of NATO’s defence capabilities, and capacity building of the EU defence policy (CSDP);
2) Increasing its own national defence capabilities;
3) Active diplomacy to strengthen its own security and international security;
4) Building, maintenance and improvement of an integrated national security system.

**French National Perspectives on International Security**

**Recent major changes in the international security environment**

The French and the Polish White Papers identify four major changes in the current international security environment: (1) the global economic downturn, and consequently the financial constraints imposed upon most countries since 2008, (2) the Arab revolutions, (3) the “pivot” of the United States (U.S.) towards Asia, and (4) the multifaceted crisis which the EU is currently facing. France and Poland both consider these four changes to pose a risk and a threat to a stable international security environment.

**The main objectives of security and defence**

France currently estimates that the state is not facing “any direct, explicit conventional military threat against its territory” (French Ministry of Defence, 2013: 13). France is, therefore, also thinking of “security” in the broader sense, i.e. both within and beyond its borders. It assumes that external security is as important as internal security for preserving its national sovereignty. This, in turn, explains why France aims to protect its territory and its nationals at home and abroad, in order to guarantee the continuity of the nation’s essential functions (French Ministry of Defence, 2013: 47). Together with its partners and allies, France seeks to secure Europe, stabilising the EU’s near environment and safeguarding the North Atlantic region (French Ministry of Defence, 2013: 51-53). The White Paper additionally underlines the French objective to contribute to stability and peace in the world (French Ministry of Defence, 2013: 56), in particular in the Middle East and the Arabo-Persian Gulf (French Ministry of Defence, 2013: 55). France thereby aims to safeguard its vital interests, whose protection its national interests depend upon. In order to do so, France relies on nuclear deterrence, and is, if necessary, also willing to deploy its armed forces in crisis situations outside French national territory. This approach to defence underlines once more that internal and external security are highly interdependent for France.
Global risks and threats: national priorities

Overall, France perceives three types of global risk and threat: (1) risks related to weakness (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 38), (2) threats related to power (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 32), and (3) risks and threats that are intensified by globalisation (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 40).

Risks related to weakness include, but are not limited to, the threat posed by weak and failed states, e.g. in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Weak and failed states are considered to be “incapable of exercising their sovereign responsibilities, the very foundations of the international order” (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 38). Thus, the unstable security environment in weak and failed states risks spilling over into other societies (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 38). For France, this situation is a strategic challenge since “many of the states concerned are on Europe’s doorstep, in Africa, a continent which is now at a crossroads” (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 39).

Threats related to power, in turn, are multiple, and include inter alia the risk of a resurgence of interstate conflicts. This risk is mainly due to “the large and rapid increase in military spending and conventional arsenals in some regions of the world”, e.g. in Russia (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 33). For France, the threat of resurging conflicts is particularly high in Asia, where military spending has doubled over the past decade, thus allowing for the modernisation of equipment and forces (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 34-35). Additionally, the French White Paper identifies risks related to regional destabilisation, taking the example of the Middle East where “conflicts [...] have their own dynamic, but [...] cannot be understood in isolation from each other” (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 55). This threat is further increased by the presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), for example “Iran’s race to acquire nuclear military capability [thus] engenders a risk of proliferation, [and] concentrates risks of serious conflict that would have a global impact on the planet” (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 55).

Both the first and the second type of global risks and treats, i.e. those related to weakness and those related to power, tend to be intensified by globalisation. According to France, this is mainly due to an ever increasing flow of people, goods and services, which, in turn, results from the dynamics of globalisation. Within these three types of risks and threats, the priorities of France are as follows: (1) an aggression by another state against French territory, (2) terrorist attacks, (3) cyber attacks, (4) attacks on the French scientific and technical potential, (5) organised crime, (6) natural, health, technical, industrial and accidental risks as well as (7) attacks on French nationals abroad.

Overall, the 2013 White Paper identifies France’s security threats, as well as its national and vital interests in the field of defence. The WP has not only a national but also a regional and international dimension, focusing therefore on the French overseas communities and departments, as well as security and defence issues linked to Africa, the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America, for instance. This, in turn, underlines that France perceives internal and external security as being highly interdependent.

CROSS-ANALYSIS: TENDENCIES IN FRANCE AND POLAND

A comparative analysis of the two WPs is not an easy task, due to the different approaches, scopes and targets. However, they demonstrate that France and Poland have like-mindedness on the
characteristics of the current international system and on the security framework. The main difference remains in the perception and the prioritisation of risks and threats, which is mainly due to historical factors and national interests.

**Like-mindedness on the current international system**

Even if the analysis is outdated, due to the recent events in Syria, Iraq and Ukraine, the WPs provide a similar analysis on the recent major changes of the international system. Four such changes include: 1) the international economic and financial crisis since 2008, 2) revolutions in the Arab world, 3) the US strategic pivot to Asia, and 4) the EU multifaceted crisis.

The two countries agree on the following main risks and threats. Firstly, nuclear proliferation is a serious concern, the current situation showing a lack of compliance with the NPT Treaty. Ballistic missiles pose a similarly real threat. Significant and rapid increases in military spending and conventional arsenals in many regions of the world, especially in Russia, the Middle East and Asia, will change the top rankings of national defence budgets. The development of offensive computing capabilities by certain states will oblige others to develop cyber-defence capabilities. The consequences of states-failure are grave sources of destabilisation. All threats can be intensified by globalisation, especially terrorism and organized crime, energy issues (energetic blackmail, lack of raw materials), trafficking of any kind, piracy, technological and cyber risks and natural and health risks. Finally, the effects of the climate change have started to cause problems.

Regarding NATO, France and Poland express their full commitment to the organisation. They want to reinforce collective defence and deterrence functions of the Alliance, and to intensify cooperation between NATO and the EU to make them complementary.

Concerning the European Union, France and Poland are willing to deepen the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), to give to the EU a European strategic vision, to support the European cooperation process in terms of industrial strategies on defence and in terms of military capabilities, and to reinforce the relations between Russia and the EU. Regarding the last item, even if the final purpose still exists, for the time being relations have been frozen.

**But divergence on national interests**

If France and Poland share a similar analysis on the characteristics of the international system and on the security framework to adopt, they have different priorities, corresponding with their national interests.

The perception of the threat is shaped by their own history and geography. Traditionally, Poland has always been threatened by its Eastern neighbourhood and seems to have a perpetual perception of insecurity with its borders. Currently, the guarantee of national security is Poland’s strategic priority, which is concerned by the Russian threat and the frozen conflicts in its near neighbourhood.
Poland prioritises threats to national security at the expense of paying attention to international instability sources, namely those threats which may affect the country within its borders. Even if Poland seeks to play an international role, the protection of its internal security remains its preoccupation.

On the other hand, for France international stability is a condition of internal security: the guarantee of national sovereignty and the preservation of French strategic autonomy require continuity between internal and external security. As a consequence, France considers itself to be a European and a global actor, and does not perceive any direct or conventional threats within its borders. It must be ready to actively uphold international stability, in order to protect both its stature and its national interests. France cares about its neighbourhood security, such as in Eastern Europe, Russia, Middle East and the Maghreb, but also about sources of international insecurity all over the world, such as in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa, but also on the African continent as a whole, in the Persian Gulf and in the Asia-Pacific region.

**CONCLUSION**

This analysis demonstrates that both countries, in spite of a different prioritisation in the realm of security and defence, perceive the challenges of the changing international security environment in a rather similar way.

The process of development of the WPs differs. The Polish side is more academic and covers the largest scope of security. The French side is more practical and focuses mainly the defence aspects more than the security ones. However, we can conclude that both of them agree on the need to build a national, comprehensive and integrated security. This security must be global for the two countries, involving all of the western countries, through NATO and the EU's CSDP.

One big difference relies on the history. Compared to France, Poland is newcomer to NATO and the CSDP. For long periods of its history, Poland struggled for independence and still perceives a major and direct Russian threat to its territorial security, either by a demonstration of force or a real armed

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2 NATO March 1999 and EU May 2004
conflict. Inversely, France does not perceive any direct territorial threat and so believes that its national sovereignty must be protected in the broadest sense, both within and beyond its borders.

As a consequence, Poland is mainly concerned by its eastern neighbourhood while France considers the southern neighbourhood to be as important as the eastern one.

There is clearly a place for complementary efforts, not necessarily going as far as a complete division of labour, but through a level of well-balanced contribution between the two actors. As Poland and France are strong supporters and the main actors of NATO and CSDP, this sharing of responsibilities can be achieved through them, without forgetting the possible leverage offered by the Weimar triangle.

Nevertheless, the current events in Ukraine must not hide the other threats, mainly in North Africa and the Middle East, which also directly concern Polish and French security. However, given the temptation for introversion, the balancing of efforts against multi-form and global threats is currently the most important challenge for the two countries.
THE SPANISH AND FRENCH NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES: CONVERGING PATHS

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In the spring of 2013, the French government approved the White Paper on National Security and Defence 2013 for France (WPNSD) where a strategic analysis for the next 15 years is undertaken, and it extracts consequences to elaborate a new defence and security policy for its country. Only a few weeks later, the Spanish government published its National Security Strategy 2013 (NSS) with the aim of orienting the action of the Spanish nation to give an answer to the challenges in the current environment. Their almost simultaneous publication enables to conduct a comparative study between both documents to determine common points, in addition to the specifics of each nation.

SPAIN’S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2013

Elaborated by the Department of National Security (DNS) of the Cabinet of the Spanish President, on the 31st of May, 2013, the Spanish Council of Ministers approved the NSS replacing the one passed under the previous legislative term of office under the heading “Spanish Security Strategy”. Subtitled “A shared Project”, the NSS establishes an integral outlook of security as it includes guidelines to efficiently reallocate all the available resources of the Nation in order to reach every national objective within the international system.

The NSS defines itself as “the fundamental statement of National Security as State Policy. It contains guidelines in order to efficiently reallocate all the available resources of the Nation in order to preserve its National Security. In particular, it diagnoses our security environment, specifies the risks and threats which Spain faces in a constantly changing world, defines the strategic lines of action, and shapes a new National Security System”. This definition serves as table of contents of the governmental strategic document. Furthermore, the unified action, anticipation and prevention, efficiency and sustainability in the use of resources, and resilience and recovery capability are included as informative principles of the Strategy.

In order to shape matters related to National Security (NS) as a real State policy, one of the priorities of the DNS during the drafting of the NSS was to obtain the greatest possible consensus with the main opposition political party, which in theory would mean to keep it safe from short-term changes. At the same time, during document’s elaborating process, and as it should be for a policy that implies a significant number of public actors, the active participation of all of them was sought, including that of the experts from the private sector and academia.

Since the publication of the NSS, fundamental breakthroughs have been observed in the Spanish National Security policy. In the first place, and in response to a recurring demand, the institutional structure of the NS system has been created, with the National Security Council (NSC) in its upper
vertex. The main purpose of this Council is to assist the President in the management of National Security Policies.

Up until now, the NSC has approved two sectorial strategies derived from the NSS, the Maritime Security Strategy, and the Cybersecurity Strategy, and in accordance, the respective Specialized Committees for each area have been implemented, as envisioned in the NSS.

Earlier this 2015, the Spanish government ratified the Bill for the Organic Law of National Security elaborated by the NSC. Eventually to be passed by the Spanish Parliament, this regulatory bill has two main objectives: first, to give strategic coherence to the State’s security policy, and second, to adapt the Spanish legal system to the new risks and threats in the environment.

**THE SPANISH APPROACH ABOUT ITS NATIONAL SECURITY**

**Geostrategic World Overview**

The NSS points out seven trends of change that our multi-polar world is suffering: (1) the transfers of power between States; (2) the growing strategic importance of the Asian-Pacific area; (3) the economic and political growth of new powers; (4) the transformations in the Arab world; (5) the adoption of a new strategic stance by the United States; (6) the growing role of new social groups and individuals; and (7) a greater interdependence at all levels.

**The Spanish concept of security. Strategic objectives.**

These global trends that shape the current world are promoting the emergence of new risks and threats that modern societies must face. Their complex nature prevents counteracting them with the tools that the Nations have traditionally had available. Thus, it is necessary for NS to have a wide and multidisciplinary approach that, on the one hand, overcomes the common notion of military defence, to now encompass aspects such as the economy, public health or the environment; and on the other hand, integrates all the tools that the State has in order to ensure its interests. The division between internal and external security disappears with this last feature, since the police functions now stretch outside the national borders, at the same time that the Armed Forces also carry out actions inside the national territory. Furthermore, in order to give an adequate response to transnational risks and threats, the cooperation with partners and allies seems crucial.

**Main areas of interest for Spain**

Spain presents itself to the world as a country with its own, clearly defined profile, and it directs its foreign action to search international stability, peace and security. Within this context, Europe and the Mediterranean are the major Spanish strategic priorities.

Spain’s interests will be better protected if the European Union is strengthened both in its internal and external dimensions. She defends herself stepping forward toward the European construction through the development of efficient economic and financial governance, and through advancing for political integration. As part of this effort, it’s necessary to develop the Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP) equipped with appropriate and credible capabilities. In addition, closer ties with Portugal and greater strategic cooperation with France are crucial for the security of neighbouring regions of Spain and Europe.

Likewise, a democratic, stable, and developed Mediterranean area is supported by Spain, since this will benefit the stability of the region as a whole. In this area, the Maghreb is of particular interest for Spain. In collaboration with the countries of the region, it is committed to provide a response to challenges common to both shores, such as promoting the Rule of Law and economic development or combating terrorism, the drug trade and other types of illegal international trafficking.

Furthermore, the NSS points out eight other priority interest areas for Spain: (1) Latin America – Brazil and Mexico are marked as its major strategic partners in that region; (2) the United States and the transatlantic relationship – one of its main allies and an essential and priority partner; (3) Africa – the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Gulf of Guinea are vital zones for Spanish security; (4) Asia – Spain seeks to work bilaterally and within the framework of the EU in this region; (5) Russia – the largest neighbour of the EU and an essential strategic actor, and of great importance in the energy market in Europe; (6) the United Nations (UN) – the most relevant organization for world cooperation, and for peacekeeping and international security, but it is an organization that requires deep reforms; (7) NATO – an organization critical for the security and defence of the region, which needs to adapt to the changing reality; (8) other multilateral forums – the OSCE, the G-20, and the Financial Stability Board.

The Spanish national interests

The 2011 version of the Spanish strategy set out a distinction between vital and strategic interests, however, this distinction disappears in the NSS 2013. Furthermore, “national interests” are not specified as such in the document, and consequently, they are apparently more difficult to identify at first sight. Nevertheless, Spain’s national interests may be extracted from the conceptualization that the NSS makes of National Security: “action of the State addressed to protect the freedom and wellbeing of its citizens, to guarantee the defence of Spain and its constitutional principles and values, in addition to contributing along with our partners and allies to international security in compliance with the commitments agreed upon”.

Risks and threats of national interest and its enhancers

Unlike the 2011 version, the current Spanish Strategy does not dedicate a specific chapter to the factors that could generate new risks or threats, or multiply and aggravate its effects – the so-called “enhancers” –, limiting to mention, among them, poverty, inequality, ideological extremisms, demographic imbalances, climatic change, or the generalization of the harmful use of new technologies.

Nevertheless, the new NSS does articulate the nine same risks and threats as the previous version – armed conflicts, terrorism, organized crime, economic and financial instability, energy vulnerability, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyberthreats, irregular migration flow, and emergencies and catastrophes – to which it adds three new ones – espionage, vulnerability of the maritime space and of critical infrastructures and essential services –.
Precisely tailored to face these twelve risks and threats, twelve priority areas for action are defined, and the main objective to reach and the lines of response are specified for each one of them. Combating terrorism and organized crime, cybersecurity, counterintelligence, energy security, management of migratory flows or protection from emergencies and disasters are cited, among others, as areas of action shaped by the Spanish government to cope with the specific dangers mentioned above. In this regard, it is well worth noting the explicit objective defined for National Defence, which has a special significance within the Ministry of Defence framework, is: “to face armed conflicts that may arise either as a result of the defence of interests or values exclusively national, or the defence of shared interests and values”.

The French National Security

As previously mentioned, only a few weeks before the publication of the NSS, the President of the Republic of France published the WPNSD, which defines the principles, priorities, frameworks of action, and the means that will ensure, on a medium and long term basis, the security of France and French citizens.

Geostrategic World Overview

The French strategy carries out an analysis of the current strategic context comparing it to that in 2008. Within a framework of global uncertainty, due mainly to the effect of globalization, the difficulty to extrapolate the tendencies observed in the past is ratified.

The WPNSD indicates that since 2008 two major events have taken place: the world financial crisis, converted into an economic one, and the events related to the so-called “Arab Spring”. However, the effects of the weakness of the European Union and the change of the strategic stance of the United States, which were already mentioned in the previous White Paper, have in fact been confirmed. These four “ruptures or evolutions” have profound implications for French national security and for that of its partners in the European Union.

The French concept of security and its strategic objectives

The continuous nature of the threats and risks identified, in addition to the conciliation of the concepts of internal and external security, forced France to adopt, in the White Paper of 2008, a wide concept of national security. In 2009, this concept was formally assumed by law. The idea is to give an integral approach to security, which goes beyond the protection of the territory when faced with threats coming from other nations, and that enables France to face all dangers that may affect the life of the nation, using the entire apparatus of the State –the armed forces, security forces, civil protection and municipal means.

For France, the European Union is a worldwide power, committed to the global institutional construction, which enhances its security and also its international responsibilities. Thus, the project of European integration is a major priority for France. The White Paper of 2013 emphasizes the need for the EU to become a major actor in crisis management and in international security. In order to do so, the French strategy states the need to draw up a “White Paper on Defence and Security of the
EU” that expresses the ambition shared by its members, as well as their common interests. The WPNSD suggests several specific objectives for the construction of a real “Europe for Defence” among which the following could be highlighted: the creation of an effective global capacity of intervention of 60,000 troops, the increase of the European capabilities of planning and control of military and civilian operations, or the revitalization of the European defence industry.

**Main areas of interest for France**

Along with its partners and allies, France looks to protect Europe through the stabilization of the neighbours close to the EU, and to safeguarding the North Atlantic space. For WPNSD, the role of Russia to consolidate stability on the Eastern margins of Europe and relations with Turkey deserve a special attention.

Based on the aforesaid and keeping in mind the areas of higher risk for the strategic interests of France and Europe, the WPNSD recommends that the French capabilities for the prevention of risks and for intervention mainly concentrate in the “geographic axis” that runs from the Atlantic and the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. In addition, the French Strategy keeps in mind the growing importance of Asia in international security issues as well as ensures a clear commitment to contribute to the stability of the Middle East and the Arab-Persian Gulf.

Equally, and in recognition of the traditional French relationship with some African countries, France appears decided to maintain its capacity of prevention and performance in the Sahel strip with the aim of fighting against illegal trafficking and terrorism.

**The French national interests**

Although the French strategy does not call them as such, it is possible to define the vital and strategic interests of the country. The first ones –pointed out as the foundations of the strategy– would be: to preserve the independence and sovereignty of the Nation, and to ensure the legitimacy of the actions at the national as well as the international level.

The strategic interests or priorities of the country are: (1) to protect the national territory and the French citizens in Europe as well as abroad; (2) to guarantee, along with its allies and partners, the European and Euro-Atlantic security –shared threats and risks–; (3) to stabilize, together with its allies and partners, the European neighbourhood, in particular to face the “risks of weakness”, against the crises that may affect the eastern proximity of Europe, the Mediterranean or Africa; (4) to participate in the stability of the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf; and (5) to contribute to world peace, in particular in the Indian Ocean, Asia, and South America.

**Risks and threats of national interest**

From an environment which is not necessarily more dangerous, but indeed more unstable and more unforeseeable, multifaceted dangers arise coming from three sources: “threats from strength”, “risks from weakness”, and “risks and threats amplified due to globalization”.

Regarding the first one, the WPNSD points out that they basically come from the recurrence of the conflicts among States, which increase due to the growing spread of weapons of mass destruction.
On the other hand, the “risks from weakness” come, although not exclusively, from the fragile or failed States incapable of exercising their sovereignty, and whose instability raises doubts about the foundations of international order. Simultaneously, the transformations derived from globalization intensify the effects of both types of threats and risks mentioned, mainly due to the increasing flow of people, goods, and services.

Within these three types of risks and threats, the WPNSD establishes the following priorities: (1) an aggression from another State against French territory; (2) terrorism; (3) cyberattacks; (4) attacks to French scientific and technical potentials; (5) organized crime; (6) accidental risks against public health; and (7) attacks against French citizens who live abroad.

COMPARING FRANCE AND SPAIN’S NATIONAL SECURITY

France and Spain are friend States, neighbours and members of NATO and the European Union, whose past, present and future are strongly interconnected. This fact determines that its respective security strategies share a significant number of features. Nevertheless, the current situation of one and the other country vary, and what is more important, the way they face challenges depends on their strategic culture and the idiosyncrasy of their respective citizens. Consequently, the WPNSD and the NSS are also different regarding relevant elements.

Main similarities

France and Spain share an analogous view of the world, characterized currently by the uncertainty in the strategic environment, the economic and financial crisis, the decline of Europe, the growth of Asia, and the change in the strategic stance of the United States. Challenges arising from these circumstances require of global solutions.

Both countries have a clear international vocation as they are conscious that in the current globalized world the relationships of all types are deeply interrelated. The economic activity is linked to the commercial trade with the rest of the world, and security no longer recognizes borders. Thus, from the political and security points of view, France and Spain share a view of integration in the regional as well as in the international context, with the determination of assuming their corresponding commitments as responsible partners of the main international organizations to which they belong.

Therefore, the approach towards international organizations is very similar from both sides, despite the fact that France’s status as permanent member of the UN Security Council imposes special obligations for this country in this particular forum. On this topic, both nations share the necessity of carrying out reforms so that UN can continue to be the most significant organisation for world cooperation and maintenance of international peace and security. By the same token, NATO is considered an essential dimension of defence Euro-Atlantic area and to preserve its effectiveness it should maintain appropriated capabilities.

The EU is not unaware to the strategic environment described in the French and Spanish security strategies and, given the crucial challenges that are arising, it must take the initiative and assume a heavier burden in the leadership of community policy as well as of international order. In order to do that, the Europeans have been requested to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSD) in
accordance with the needs of the global scenario in which the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) constitutes, without a doubt, a fundamental element. It must be recalled that the CSDP of the EU represents the most evident statement of the political will of its member States to assume that intended relevance in the world stage. For those reasons, France and Spain agree with the priority to build a European approach to defence and security.

Given the fact that France and Spain have a similar approach to the world’s strategic landscape, it seems logical that the risks and threats for both countries are not different in their essence. Thus, each and every one of the twelve risks and threats, or its enhancers, which are mentioned in the NSS, appears in greater or lesser degree in the WPNSD.

The “symptoms” are very similar, so obviously the lines and priorities of action largely coincide. France and Spain conceive their National Security through the weighted equilibrium of all the tools available, public as well as private. In other words, both nations have adopted an ample, multidisciplinary, dynamic and integral concept of their national security that will enable the assessment of all the dimensions of the dangers to security and, if necessary, mobilize the entire machinery of the State to face them.

In addition, similar analysis of global risks, threats and trends is the basis to define a common ground for comprehensive responses. Therefore, dissuasion, prevention or resilience are common strategic functions or courses of actions for France and Spain.

Concerning specific geographic areas, the Sahel, from Mauritania to the Horn of Africa, and Equatorial Africa, including the Gulf of Guinea are regions of absolute interest for France and Spain. Terrorism, organized crime and other dangers place this region as a priority for both countries. The participation of French and Spanish military capabilities in ongoing international operations in some African countries is a good evidence of this importance.

Essential differences

Every State is subject to its own history, public opinion and particular interests and values. For this reason, each country is unique and their security documents must show the inherent personality of the nation. Hence, and despite the similarities indicated above, some differences can be seen between the French and Spanish strategic documents.

Those distinctions stem from two sources. First, the aim and scope differ. The Spanish document must be precisely framed in the security realm. It provides a general overview of the means, ways and objectives for the national security, but institutions and tools for particular areas of concern should be developed in a second stage. However, the French paper is focused not only in the security area but in defence one, as its title reveals. Consequently and even though the integral approach that both strategies have adopted entails the assimilation of the Defence sector at a high level in National Security, the WPNSD and the NSS have very different approaches in this case. France devotes a chapter exclusively to the means to be used, in particular to its Armed Forces as a fundamental element of intervention. Hence, the troops are fixed in a very restricted manner and the budget that the French armies will have during the coming years, which enables carrying out a stable design of the National Defence.
Nevertheless, in the case of the Spanish NSS, the content dedicated specifically to the National Defence is very brief. The objective that is entrusted to this security sector is to face armed conflicts that may arise as a consequence of the protection of interests or values exclusively national, as well as the defence of shared interests and values. However, although the NSS determines the strategic lines of action that respond to this objective, it does not formalize, unlike the WPNSD, the budgets nor the levels of military power, leaving them perhaps for a future second level strategy specifically for Defence.

Their respective strategic culture and selected forms of actions are the second source of distinction. For instance, just like other European citizens, Spanish people are very reluctant to the use of force and unwilling to expeditionary operations unless they are launched by humanitarian purposes. Therefore, government course of action must take into account this public opinion feeling. In this regard, the French paper enhances that its capability for intervention outside the national territory gives strategic depth to France’s security stance and it bolsters the credibility of its deterrence capability.

Obviously, the fact that France is a nuclear power has also important implications for the national security. Since France developed nuclear armaments in 1960, this capacity has constituted one of the main pillars of French security and defence. Even within the framework of extreme circumstances of self-defence, the nuclear umbrella provides France autonomy for decision and for freedom of action that we, in Spain, do not have. This circumstance implies that the design of the conventional military means is different in France from Spain, besides forcing the French government to allocate substantial resources for its maintenance –estimated in the 12% of the total defence budget–. On the other hand, these nuclear capacities enable our neighbour country to participate more directly in international initiatives for non-proliferation and disarmament.

CONCLUSIONS

The NSS and the WPNSD have in common a number of important subjects which facilitate the implementation of specific cooperation measures between both countries in the security and defence framework. In particular, France and Spain share similar ideas about the future of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy and the measures to be taken so that it can reach the desired level of ambition.

However, each nation has its own interests to defend, and its foreign policy is the outcome of its strategic culture. Different priorities and ways to take action by governments and public opinions will be paramount barriers to break through.
VERS UNE NOUVELLE STRATEGIE EUROPEENNE DE SECURITE

FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE WHITE PAPERS

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INTRODUCTION

In October 2010 the United Kingdom’s new coalition government published a National Security Strategy (NSS) and a day later a Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) (HM Government : 2010). Between them, the two documents are the equivalent of the 2013 French Defence White Paper (French Ministry of Defence, 2013). In fact, at one point in their development, the two British documents were going to be published as a single document. On current plans a new SDSR and possibly a further NSS will be produced towards the beginning of the next parliament with publication envisaged either towards the end of 2015 or early 2016.

Previous UK national security strategies and defence reviews

The 2010 NSS was the third variant of a national security strategy in little more than two years. The preceding Labour government had launched the United Kingdom’s first national security strategy in 2008 (Cabinet Office, 2008), some 7 years after the 9/11 attacks on the United States, 5 years after the invasion of Iraq by the US led coalition and 3 years after the 7/7 bombings in London. This first variant of an NSS identified a series of threats to the United Kingdom but chose neither to rank them in terms of scale of potential damage nor likelihood of their occurrence. The follow on ‘so what?’ question was almost entirely ignored with the Prime Minister of the time, Gordon Brown, merely announcing funding to support service families in purchasing their own homes. Moreover, the first NSS was almost entirely managed by the Cabinet Office with little input from the other departments of state with the result that there were a number of errors contained within the report. Not surprisingly the first edition was replaced a little over a year later in June 2009 by an “updated” version (Cabinet Office, 2009). Again the world was painted as a dangerous place, the scale and likelihood of potential catastrophes was ignored but this time the other departments of state were engaged with and contributed to the review. Again little action or funding followed the new NSS.

In terms of defence reviews a number of analysts and commentators point to the 12 year gap between the 1998 Strategic Defence Review and the 2010 SDSR (Cabinet Office, 1998). This is then used to partly explain the preceding defence failings. In reality, there were a number of interim white papers. The 2002 “SDR: New Chapter” provided the first official response to the 9/11 attacks (Cabinet Office, 2002) whilst this white paper highlighted some changes, in particular, to homeland defence and security, the real change within it was linguistic. Unlike the 1998 white paper, the 2002 update reflected the United Kingdom’s commitment to the whole “Revolution in Military Affairs” debate and pushed the defence planning assumptions beyond the so-called “arc of concern” that stretched from North Africa to the Middle East to a global view. Like its predecessor, the 2002 paper stressed that the United Kingdom’s armed forces should go to the crisis before it came to the United
Kingdom. This was expanded to include concern for the so-called ungoverned spaces. This update was superseded by the two part “Delivering Security in a Changing World” published in 2003 and 2004 (Cabinet Office, 2003, 2004). These two white papers made the assumption that the United Kingdom, alongside the United States, would be involved in a series of short, swift wars the aftermath of which would be handed over to their allies to police and administer. They thus built on the quick initial phases of both Iraq and Afghanistan and were overtaken by the subsequent longevity of the campaigns that ultimately resulted. The 2003 and 2004 papers also concluded that the United Kingdom would not engage in any large scale operations (defined as a divisional level operation or its equivalent) without the express involvement of the United States.

**Analysis of the UK 2010 White Papers**

The 2010 NSS/SDSR take a risk based approach to national security and set out the fiscal realities in which the coalition government found itself. It argued that:

> The UK is well placed to benefit from the world of the future. The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom is: to use all our national capabilities to build Britain’s prosperity, extend our nation’s influence in the world and strengthen our security … (Cabinet Office, 2010 : 9).

It identified terrorism from home and abroad as the principal threat to the United Kingdom (Cabinet Office, 2010 : 9). It went on to state:

> This Strategy outlines the international context in which we can best pursue our interests through a commitment to collective security via a rules-based international system and our key alliances, notably with the United States of America (US); through an open global economy that drives wealth creation across the world; and through effective and reformed international institutions including the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), as the anchor of transatlantic security, and our vital partnerships in the European Union (EU) (Cabinet Office, 2010 : 10).

It concluded that the United Kingdom “face no major state threat at present and no existential threat to our security, freedom or prosperity” (Cabinet Office, 2010 : 15). It placed emphasis on the financial crisis that had preceded it and the global impact that it had had (Cabinet Office, 2010 : 15). Looking ahead it assumed that by 2030 the world would be increasingly multipolar – highlighting the rise of China and India - and that the G20 has effectively replaced the G8 as the main forum for international economic cooperation and therefore the key for the United Kingdom was retaining and maximising its influence in the various international forum (Cabinet Office, 2010 : 15). It placed emphasis on the speed of technological advance, pointed to some potential transformational areas highlighting how these could represent both opportunities and threats. In part 2 the NSS sought to define ‘Britain’s distinctive role’ emphasising the United Kingdom’s economic position as the world’s 6th largest economy, its disproportionate global reach, the advantage that the English language gives and the United Kingdom’s ‘enlightened national interest’ which focused on values and institutions (Cabinet Office, 2010 : 21-23). Part 3 identified the various risks to the United Kingdom defined in terms of three tiers (Cabinet Office, 2010 : 23). At the highest level (Tier 1) terrorism, cyber space, major accident and an international military crisis between states that drew the UK in were identified (Cabinet Office, 2010 : 27). Part 4 outlined the United Kingdom’s response, emphasising that ‘a whole
of government approach’ was needed and emphasised the United Kingdom’s new national security infrastructure.

The 2010 SDSR then outlined the various national security tasks and planning guidelines and what this meant for defence. It accepted a series of capability reductions. These included the short term acceptance that risks would be accepted in some areas (such as the decision to scrap the UK’s new maritime patrol aircraft and take its existing aircraft carriers out of service a decade before their replacements were completed). It focused on delivering revamped armed forces by 2020 assuming that the United Kingdom would avoid becoming involved in any further conflicts except in the event of national emergency.

**ANALYSIS OF THE FRENCH WHITE PAPER**

The French white paper represents a lucid, well thought through and carefully crafted white paper. The conclusions it draws about France’s place in the world and the potential challenges that France and, by implication her allies and partners, will face are logical. The white paper sets out to look to 2025 thus covering a reasonable forward projection whilst remaining within the political realities of government politics. It rightly highlights the many advantages that France has as a result of its history, geography, economic position and multi-cultural heritage.

It points out that France has the world’s second largest diplomatic presence overseas and that some 2 million French people live abroad (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 14). The white paper emphasises that whilst France is a true multi-cultural nation it also points that as the birthplace of the 1789 ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen’ France is to remain true to its ‘best values’ (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 14). In support of this it stresses sovereignty and the importance of autonomy including the preservation of a nuclear capability as the ultimate guarantee of sovereignty (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 20).

The white paper makes the assumption that there will not be any state on state conflict, at least in the short term and instead focuses on a series of non-state challenges (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 13). It emphasises the rise of Brazil, China and India. It stresses sovereignty and the importance of autonomy including the preservation of a nuclear capability as the ultimate guarantee of sovereignty (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 27). It rightly points out how recent events including the Arab Spring, the Syrian civil war and the US pivot to Asia are bringing about change in the international system and with this a greater expectation by the US on its allies will carry a greater burden (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 27-30).

The force levels reflect an expeditionary focus with the ability to deliver quite considerable military power at a distance from France (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 88). These forces cover a wide range of the military spectrum although there are gaps and some areas where the level of capability is limited. For example, the retention and maintenance of a single aircraft carrier is both indicative of the reach of French forces and the challenge sustaining such forces is.
In many respects they are very similar in thinking and approach. It would almost be possible to substitute France with United Kingdom throughout chapter 1 of the French paper and the United Kingdom would agree almost entirely with the analysis contained within chapter 2 with the odd nuanced difference. This is perhaps not surprising because in many ways the national interests of France and the United Kingdom are very similar. Both, are European powers with a global outlook and interests. Stability in Europe remains a paramount concern both to allow trade in Europe and to allow them to focus beyond Europe. Both have a legacy of empire and its associated responsibilities, both are members of the UN Security Council, both have a nuclear capability and both have an interest in preserving the international system in its current form. Both also face the challenges that globalization has brought, both have a capability to project military power at distance and both face challenges abroad and at home. As a consequence, both are involved in a network of alliances, partnerships and other groupings ranging from NATO and the European Union to partnerships with former colonial territories and others.

There are, however, a number of important differences between the documents. The first is one of timing, the United Kingdom’s papers were written with the 2008 financial crisis as their immediate background and an assumption that the second decade of the 21st century looked as though it might be more peaceful if the United Kingdom opted to engage only in wars of necessity rather than so-called “wars of choice” (Cabinet Office, 2010 : 9). Thus, there is an explicit assumption that the United Kingdom could embrace a greater element of risk by temporarily reducing or losing some capabilities – such as maritime patrol aircraft – whilst the British armed forces planned to adapt themselves with 2020 as their aiming point. By way of contrast, the French 2013 paper was written with the Syrian civil war and the emergence of the Islamic State as a backdrop and recent experience of operations in Libya and Mali. It would, therefore, be reasonable to suppose that if the United Kingdom papers had been written in 2013 then the level of acceptable risk and the defence planning assumptions would have been somewhat different. In this respect the next NSS/SDSR due in 2015-6 is likely to be far more circumspect in its language especially given the Russian annexation of the Crimea and the spread of the Syrian civil war into the territory of a number of its’ neighbours, most notably Iraq.

The second difference is that the 2013 French white paper is a far more complete document with far greater elite buy-in. This is, at least in part, a reflection of a more considered and less rushed process. In formulating the 2010 NSS/SDSR papers the new coalition government in the United Kingdom found itself confronted with severe time constraints (Cornish, Dorman, 2011 : 335-353). Government spending in the United Kingdom is planned over a three year cycle. For the new government the next Spending Review, as it is known, was due in the autumn of 2010 and therefore the NSS/SDSR were undertaken within this timeframe so that the national security and defence budgets for the following three years could be set (HM Treasury, 2010). As a consequence, the level of external consultation with parliament, industry, the think-tanks and wider academia was far more circumspect than either the French case of the earlier 1998 Strategic Defence Review. It also meant that in a number of areas the 2010 SDSR reflected work in progress with reforms to defence acquisition, the Ministry of Defence more generally, reservists and the British Army’s 2020 developed and espoused in
subsequent publications over the following two years\(^1\). Here again, with the next NSS/SDSR review already set for the next parliament there is, at least in theory, the potential for far wider engagement more akin to the French model. That said. It is unlikely that parliament will ever have the degree of influence that the French National Assembly has had.

The third difference is one of tone and detail. The French white paper is far more comfortable with speaking about French interests and values. The tone of the British papers is almost apologetic. This reinforces the underlying message of greater self-confidence emanating from the French white paper. The British papers appear to reflect the immediate shock of the 2008 Financial Crisis and the questioning of the way ahead.

Fourth, both the French and the British white papers emphasise alliances and partnerships. There is a degree of difference over which allies and partners comes first. Both acknowledge the other as the second most important partner because of mutual interests. However they vary in their principal partner (for the United Kingdom it remains the United States and for France it is Germany) (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 22). Both highlight the role of NATO and the European Union although, perhaps unsurprisingly, the French emphasis on the EU is stronger. There is also far greater emphasis on other allies and partners in the British papers.

Fifth, in the French white paper there is a far stronger emphasis on ‘strategic autonomy’ compared to the United Kingdom. In part successive British governments have accepted that for the United Kingdom autonomy relates to scale and distance involved in an operation. The 2003 white paper accepted that the United Kingdom would no longer be able engage in any large-scale operations (defined as divisional plus) except in conjunction with the United States.

Sixth, the strategic priorities are quite similar including a focus on the North Africa-Middle East area. In the French case the risks and threats are defined within the context of a series of concentric circles that reflect French interests. This idea of concentric circles does not feature in the British white papers but did feature in the 1993 Defence White paper (Ministry of Defence, 1993).

Seventh, in terms of overall force composition the major difference is in the nuclear area where the French maintain both a submarine and air launched delivery systems whilst the United Kingdom relies solely on a submarine based force (French Ministry of Defence, 2013 : 73). The French nuclear forces are not officially integrated into NATO’s integrated military structure although there is some expectation from some of the other members that the French nuclear deterrent also extends to them. In contrast, the UK’s nuclear capabilities are officially allocated to NATO ‘except in the case of a national emergency’ which their potential use would appear to be. Here French autonomy plays a much larger role and there appears to be a far greater awareness in the French white paper about the rule for their nuclear deterrent forces. There are also differences in emphasis between strike assets and enabling assets with the French tending to retain a greater proportion of the former and the United Kingdom the latter. This is probably, in part, a reflection of the UK’s involvement in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan where these enablers played a major role.

Eighth, both papers also emphasised transformation and the need for ongoing change. In the UK case there is more detail but both share a similar view about the required pace of change. For both nations there is an emphasis on cost control and free resources for future investment.

\(^1\) See [Army 2020](#), accessed 18 March 2015.
Lastly, both lack detail on reservists. In the British case this was resolved with the subsequent report on reservists. In the French case the comparative lack of detail is more striking and perhaps reflects less of a role for reservists in France.
CONCLUSION : VERS UNE CONVERGENCE EUROPEENNE

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Directeur du domaine Politiques de défense comparées

« Se reposer ou être libre, il faut choisir ». Périclès

De l’analyse des six contributions, il ressort un certain nombre de points positifs et négatifs : il y a bien une convergence de vue sur la perception de la menace, qui peut conduire à la définition d’intérêts européens et, tout naturellement par la suite, amener les États à la rédaction d’une stratégie commune voire un livre blanc européen. Cependant, avant d’arriver à ce résultat, il faudra résoudre les sujets de tensions en cessant de les esquiver, comme c’est le cas aujourd’hui.

Après avoir détaillé les points de convergence et de divergence, ce chapitre conclut l’étude en estimant que les fondements d’un travail commun sont présents, pour peu que la future stratégie européenne de sécurité soit accompagnée d’une volonté politique de mise en œuvre.

LES POINTS DE CONVERGENCE ET DE DIVERGENCE

Ce qui est commun

L’appréciation de la situation sécuritaire et des grandes tendances stratégiques est largement partagée par les pays. Elle peut faire l’objet d’un consensus au niveau européen.

Même si la notion d’intérêt national est encore difficile à appréhender dans un pays comme l’Allemagne, il est toutefois nécessaire de conduire un exercice de définition des intérêts européens. Complémentaires des intérêts nationaux, qui concernent en premier lieu la protection des citoyens et de leur territoire, ils ont toute leur place et permettraient de lever certains soupçons. Des pays sont encore perçus comme voulant privilégier uniquement leurs intérêts nationaux : ainsi, Barbara Kunz rapporte que Berlin a tendance à voir l’action de la France en Afrique comme voulant « européaniser ses propres intérêts nationaux ».

Les intérêts européens étant définis sur une évaluation commune de la situation sécuritaire, permettraient alors l’établissement de priorités au niveau collectif, la définition d’un niveau d’ambition commun et des modes d’action complémentaires et plus efficaces.

La principale garantie de la sécurité en Europe reste aujourd’hui l’Alliance atlantique mais d’aucuns reconnaissent la diminution de l’intérêt des États-Unis pour ce continent et la nécessité de renforcer la PSDC. La responsabilisation de l’UE en matière de sécurité et de défense passe par le

1 “with, again, suspicions held in Berlin that France is merely attempting to Europeanize its own national interests”
développement d'un niveau d'autonomie stratégique, d'indépendance et de complémentarité vis-à-vis des USA. Une telle approche favoriserait un meilleur partage des rôles avec les Etats-Unis et ferait les Européens deviendraient des interlocuteurs fiables.

**Ce qui peut être complémentaire**


La menace devenant de plus en plus globale et partagée, la réponse doit être européenne avec des niveaux d'investissement adaptés à chaque Etat en fonction de ses propres capacités. Sans rentrer dans une logique de spécialisation, les Etats du sud de l'Europe feront plus d'efforts que les autres sur la problématique de l'immigration illégale et les engagements en Afrique, sans que cela dédouane les autres membres de l'Union. De même, les Etats de l'Europe orientale feront plus d'efforts que les autres pour faire face aux conséquences de la crise ukrainienne.

Les zones d'intérêt des Etats divergent. Une des conséquences est que les citoyens européens dans le monde ne bénéficient pas de la même attention de la part de leur capitale. S'ils n'en n'ont pas les moyens ou s'ils ne s'en préoccupent pas, c'est au niveau européen que la protection des citoyens hors d'Europe peut être prise en compte. Or près de 7 millions de citoyens de l'UE voyagent ou résident dans un pays tiers. La France a déjà organisé à plusieurs reprises des évacuations de ressortissants européens, sans distinction de nationalité, comme ce fut le cas en Libye. Une décision récente du Conseil va dans le bon sens, l'approbation de la directive relative à la protection consulaire des citoyens de l'Union qui résident ou voyagent hors de l'UE². Elle précise comment les citoyens de l'Union peuvent bénéficier d'une aide fournie par l'ambassade ou le consulat d'autres États membres de l'UE.

Les tailles des pays et leurs niveaux d’ambition étant différents, les types d'engagement peuvent être adaptés d'une manière plus qualitative et complémentaire. Les nouveaux instruments du traité de Lisbonne, CSP ou article 44, le permettent.

La solidarité entre les Etats européens est nécessaire et a été bien développée dans le traité de Lisbonne. Cependant les articles qui s’y rapportent n’ont pas encore fait l’objet de développement. Il est nécessaire d’y travailler. Ainsi, la mise en œuvre de la clause d’assistance mutuelle, plus restrictive que l’article 5 de l’OTAN, doit être crédible pour tous les pays, principalement ceux qui ne font pas partie de l’Alliance atlantique, à savoir la Finlande, la Suède, l’Autriche, l’Irlande, Malte et Chypre. Ce sont des mécanismes de sécurité qui doivent devenir opérationnels afin de rassurer les États dont l’intégrité semble menacée.

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² COUNCIL DIRECTIVE on the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries and repealing Decision 95/553/EC, 31 mars 2015
Concernant les alliances et les partenariats, s’il y a beaucoup de points communs sur la nécessité de les développer, les degrés d’engagement et les priorités ne sont pas les mêmes. Le Royaume-Uni met un fort accent sur le lien transatlantique et l’OTAN, les autres pays cherchant plus à équilibrer leur positionnement entre les deux organisations, UE et Alliance atlantique. La complémentarité entre les deux organisations doit être rappelée à chaque instant et faire l’objet d’actions concrètes.

**Ce qui oppose et nécessite un dialogue**

Très souvent, la tentation est d’éviter les sujets de tension afin de pouvoir progresser. Or, si les Européens s’accordent sur l’idée d’un livre blanc commun, il sera difficile de le finaliser sans avoir abordé ces sujets.

Avant la crise ukrainienne, la Pologne faisait la promotion de l’Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (OSCE) comme pouvant avoir un rôle dans les efforts de création d’une « communauté de sécurité euro-atlantique et euro-asiatique » 3. La politique de la porte ouverte nécessite de continuer à développer la réflexion sur ce sujet, même si les conditions actuelles ne sont pas remplies.

La dissuasion nucléaire reste un motif de désaccord. Certains pays s’affichent clairement pour une dénuclearisation de l’Europe : à ce titre, l’Allemagne y est profondément attachée, ce qui donne lieu régulièrement à des tensions, à l’image de ce qui s’est passé pendant les discussions préalables au sommet de l’OTAN à Lisbonne en 2010. Même les approches britannique et française sur la dissuasion ne sont pas les mêmes : Les forces nucléaires britanniques sont officiellement intégrées à l’OTAN alors que ce n’est pas le cas pour la France. Un vrai débat sur l’avenir et la place de la dissuasion nucléaire doit être lancé aux niveaux national et européen.

Le sujet de la préservation de l’autonomie et de la souveraineté nationales est difficile et doit faire l’objet d’un débat. En effet, si les États n’arrivent pas à converger vers une notion de souveraineté européenne dite « partagée » comme c’est le cas au niveau économique, il est impossible de progresser vers un livre blanc européen. De même, la notion de subsidiarité entre l’Union et les États membres doit être déclinée afin de faire respecter le fait que la sécurité du citoyen est d’abord une responsabilité nationale.

Les approches nationales sur le rôle des armées, et plus spécifiquement sur l’utilisation de la force, doivent faire l’objet de travaux approfondis afin de réduire les restrictions d’emploi ou caveats et d’obtenir une meilleure efficacité au niveau des opérations multinationales.

Les initiatives au niveau bilatéral ou régional ne doivent pas ralentir la construction européenne, ce que l’on peut entrevoir par exemple à travers l’évolution du traité de Lancaster House entre la France et le Royaume-Uni: ce dernier maintient que son partenaire privilégié reste les États-Unis et perçoit toujours la France comme voulant continuer à privilégier l’UE par rapport à l’OTAN.

Les opinions publiques, si elles sont de plus en plus sensibilisées à la détérioration de l’environnement sécuritaire de l’Europe, ont des réactions divergentes sur les modes d’action à envisager. Si le terme d’armée européenne est parfaitement compréhensible pour l’opinion publique,

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3 Zięba R. : “Poland believes the OSCE to have a role in the efforts to create a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community”
VERS UNE NOUVELLE STRATEGIE EUROPEENNE DE SECURITE

celle-ci ne soutient l’idée que mollement (Eurobaromètre, 2014). Elle reste méfiante face à une politique de sécurité et de défense commune trop complexe et peu visible. Un document pédagogique apportant des réponses claires au besoin de sécurité des citoyens est nécessaire.

CONCLUSION

Une stratégie de sécurité européenne est l’expression conjuguée de la volonté politique des Etats et de leurs opinions publiques. Elle peut s’appuyer sur des valeurs communes, une appréciation partagée des risques et des menaces et des intérêts qui se déclinent au niveau européen.

Les bases d’un travail commun sont présentes mais il ne faut pas craindre d’aborder les sujets de discorde qui ont été souvent écartés par crainte de rupture, principalement la notion de souveraineté, la protection des citoyens européens dans le monde, les missions des forces armées, les règles d’engagement et la dissuasion nucléaire.

Les derniers mots sont laissés à Barbara Kunz qui cite le Président Gauck sur le rôle futur de l’Allemagne : « Faisons-nous ce que nous pouvons pour stabiliser notre voisinage, à la fois à l’est et au sud en Afrique ? Faisons-nous ce que nous pouvons pour lutter contre le terrorisme ? Avons-nous la volonté de soutenir nos alliés et de partager les risques avec eux ? ». Ces questions peuvent être adressées à tous les Etat-membres sans exception, donc à l’Europe.

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4 46% favorable, 47% opposé.
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VERS UNE NOUVELLE STRATÉGIE EUROPÉENNE DE SÉCURITÉ

La révision de la stratégie européenne de sécurité de 2003 s’est imposée d’elle-même ces derniers mois aux État-membres. L’aggravation récente de la situation sécuritaire en Europe et dans son environnement immédiat a convaincu de la nécessité de revoir cette stratégie. Le Conseil européen de juin 2015 a mandaté la haute représentante pour élaborer une « stratégie globale de l’UE concernant les questions de politique étrangère et de sécurité ». Du côté des États membres, plusieurs initiatives ont été lancées. Celle du triangle de Weimar regroupant l’Allemagne, la France et la Pologne, soutient l’idée de la création d’une nouvelle stratégie devant préciser les intérêts européens, un niveau d’ambition, une évaluation des risques et des menaces, ainsi que la définition des moyens et des instruments nécessaires pour y répondre.

Afin d’amener une contribution à l’élaboration de cette nouvelle stratégie, l’IRSEM s’est adressé à des collaborateurs de six États européens pour identifier des pistes de rapprochement entre leur stratégie nationale et le Livre blanc français de 2013, sur la base des analyses comparées de la menace et des intérêts nationaux. Ces travaux, qui ont associé des pays représentatifs de la diversité européenne par leur histoire, leur géographie et leur statut, ont été menés fin 2014 et début 2015.

Sur la base des approches comparées entre la France et six États européens, cette étude conclut qu’il existe bien une convergence de vue sur la perception de la menace pouvant conduire à la définition d’intérêts européens et, tout naturellement par la suite, amener les États à la rédaction d’une nouvelle stratégie de sécurité européenne, voire d’un Livre blanc européen. Il faudra cependant cesser d’esquiver les sujets de tensions, à savoir principalement la place de la souveraineté nationale, l’emploi des forces armées et l’avenir de la dissuasion nucléaire.