THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE EU’S EXTERNAL ACTION:
IMPLEMENTING THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Major General Maurice de LANGLOIS
Andreas CAPSTACK
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE EU’S EXTERNAL ACTION:
IMPLEMENTING THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Major General Maurice de LANGLOIS
Andreas CAPSTACK

DISCLAIMER
The opinions expressed in this document are the author’s alone.
They do not in any way reflect the official stance of the Ministry of Defence.
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE EU’S EXTERNAL ACTION

> LABORATOIRES DE L’IRSEM

22. Les principes fondamentaux de la pensée stratégique russe
   Elena MORENKOVA-PERRIER

21. L’Asie du XXIe siècle ressemble-t-elle à l’Europe d’avant 1914 ?
   Pierre GROSSER

   David DELFOLIE

19. Penser le sentiment de confiance dans l’armée : pour un programme de recherche
   Olivia LEBOYER

18. La réforme des systèmes de sécurité : quel différentiel français ?
   Sophie DAGAND et Frédéric RAMEL (dir.)

17. Environmental Securitization within the United Nations: a Political Ecology Perspective
   Lucile MARTENS

16. La coopération internationale et bilatérale en matière de cybersécurité : enjeux et rivalités
   Alix DESFORGES

15. De l’asymétrie capacitaire à l’asymétrie des buts de guerre : repenser le rapport de force dans les conflits irréguliers
   Sarah GUILLET
The Institute for Strategic Research of the Ecole Militaire (IRSEM) aims to promote research undertaken on defence issues and provide encouragement to a new generation of researchers. The documents produced and the activities organized by the Institute can be found on its website:

- www.defense.gouv.fr/irsem
- http://tinyurl.com/ke3p8l7
- @IRSEM1
- http://tinyurl.com/nr8qkz8
AUTHORS’ BIOGRAPHIES

Major General Maurice de LANGLOIS is a graduate of Saint Cyr Military Academy. His military career has brought him to Germany, Africa and France. He played a major role in NATO operations in the Former Yugoslavia. Having held several Army staff positions in Paris, he went on to join the team that would set up the European Defence Agency in Brussels, followed by an appointment as Deputy French Military Representative to the European Union Military Committee. In September 2012, he was appointed Research Director for Comparative Defence Policies at the Institute for Strategic Research, Ecole Militaire.

Andreas CAPSTACK obtained a BA in Philosophy, Politics and Economics at the University of Oxford, and is currently enrolled in a master’s programme in International Security at Sciences Po Paris. Prior to the Institute for Strategic Research of the Ecole Militaire (IRSEM), he worked as a research assistant at the Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS) and the Global Policy Institute (GPI). At the GPI, Andreas published the paper The EU in the future of British security: Why a safer UK needs a stronger Europe.
# Table of Contents

- Introduction ........................................................................................................ 8
- Implementing the Comprehensive Approach ....................................................... 9
- The role of military force in the EU’s external action ........................................... 14
  1. What is the military for? ...................................................................................... 14
  2. National perspectives ......................................................................................... 15
     Relation to NATO ................................................................................................. 15
     The use of force .................................................................................................. 18
     Geographic focus ................................................................................................. 19
- The Military Relations within the EU .................................................................. 21
  1. Strategic level ..................................................................................................... 22
     Military-military relationships ............................................................................ 22
     Civilian-military relationships ........................................................................... 23
  2. Operational level ................................................................................................ 26
     Military-military relationships ............................................................................ 26
     Civil-military relationships ................................................................................. 27
- The Military Relations with the external actors .................................................... 29
  1. Strategic level ..................................................................................................... 29
     Military-military relationships ............................................................................ 29
     Civilian-military relationships ........................................................................... 30
  2. Operational level ................................................................................................ 30
     Military-military relationships ............................................................................ 30
     Civilian-military relationships ........................................................................... 31
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE EU’S EXTERNAL ACTION

- Recommendations on the role of the military ................................................................. 33
  1. Permanent OHQ and Crisis Platform........................................................................... 33
  2. EEAS Collocation......................................................................................................... 33
  3. Joint Education ............................................................................................................ 33
  4. Military Liaison Officers and Experts.......................................................................... 34
  5. Military-NGO Cooperation ......................................................................................... 34
  6. Cultural and linguistic knowledge ............................................................................... 34
  7. HR/VP Relationship with the Commission .................................................................. 34
  8. Stronger EUSRs .......................................................................................................... 35

- Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 36

- Appendix 1: References.................................................................................................. 38
- Appendix 2: List of abbreviations ..................................................................................... 42
INTRODUCTION

It is well established that military force in isolation is insufficient to successfully implement a security policy. Peace cannot be brought to a region by simply destroying an imminent armed threat; long-term regional stability requires economic aid, institution building and political reform, in cooperation with local groups and specialised organisations. As the 2003 European Security Strategy suggests, “we need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post-crisis situations”.

This paper will explain the weakness of the contribution of the military to CSDP, mainly due to a lack of consistency in the implementation of the EU’s external action. It will therefore propose ways in which EU could use its military capabilities to their full potential, through the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach.

Section 1 will begin explaining what the Comprehensive Approach (CA) is, and why it is crucial for the EU’s external action. Before the role of the military in the EU’s CA can be determined, the capabilities of the EU’s military forces must be explained. Section 2 will therefore describe the value of using military force in general and the perceptions of member states on the value and purpose of the EU’s military capabilities, and so establish how this military force could feasibly contribute to a CA. Sections 3 and 4 will describe the current relations of the EU’s military structures, internally and externally, with EU and non-EU actors, and explain the main obstructions which these relationships have faced so far.

Finally, based upon these obstructions, section 5 will make recommendations to improve the EU’s civil-military relations, and so allow the CA to be more fully implemented. So far there have been numerous studies into implementing the Comprehensive Approach, but many of the proposals have suffered from being vague, and therefore uncontroversial, for example by calling for “teamwork” and “coordination” without proposing a method of achieving these goals. Therefore, as far as possible this paper will make concrete and practical proposals, even if doing so makes them more open to objection. For this reason, the section will also consider the likely challenges in implementing the proposals.

---

2 Given the number of actors involved in the CA, this paper will just focus on the role of the military. However, this study must be followed by ones concerning the relationships between the various civilian actors within and outside the EU
IMPLEMENTING THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Since the early 2000s, this need to accompany military operations with coherent civilian actions, such as state-building, law enforcement and economic development, has featured in the rhetoric (and to varying degrees, the practise) of all major global security actors. This includes international security organisations, such as the EU, UN and NATO, as well as individual states, such as the UK⁴ and France⁵. This ‘attitude’ towards crisis management is referred to by many, particularly the EU⁶ and NATO⁷, as the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ (CA)⁸.

The CA has no universal definition, and its characterisation tends to differ according to the interests of who is describing it. The EU focuses most on using its diverse policies and tools “in a coherent and consistent manner”.⁹ On the other hand, NATO’s definition of the CA focuses on “cooperation with partner countries, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and local authorities”.¹⁰ Both of these aspects of the CA are vitally important, and so for the purposes of this paper, the CA will be defined as follows:

To promote security and prosperity in a region, an actor employs a Comprehensive Approach when, at all stages of its actions, it: 1) coherently and complementarily makes use of all of its relevant civilian and military instruments and policies and, 2) cooperates and coordinates with all other relevant civilian and military actors.¹¹

---

⁶ European Commission, 11 December 2013, “The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises”
⁸ French and British documents refer to the same principal with the terms ‘Global Approach’ and ‘Integrated Approach’ respectively.
⁹ EU Council, Foreign Affairs Committee (2014) “Council conclusions on the EU’s Comprehensive Approach”
¹¹ The main use of the CA by the EU, NATO and Western states is in external crises management, and therefore this is usually included in the definition, as it is here. However, the CA may also be a necessary guiding principle for other policies, for example combining military and civilian IT skills in cyber-defence.
The diagram below depicts the ‘patchwork’ of civilian, military and ‘dual’ actors who could play a role in a typical crisis management scenario. To follow the CA, the EU must be able to work effectively with all of the actors, as must its own sub-actors.

The first ‘maxim’ of the CA obviously does not apply to military organisations, such as NATO, who lack significant civilian capabilities. This means that they can only partially adopt the CA by cooperating with external actors. However, thanks to their mix of civilian and military resources, the EU and individual states can implement both aspects of the CA. The 2010 UK ‘Strategic Defence and Security Review’ refers to the first maxim by demanding cooperation between the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the Department for International Development (DFID)\(^\text{12}\). As a consequence of the above definition, a state or organisation will only be able to abide the first maxim if each of its civilian agencies and military abide by the second maxim. For example, the British government can only deploy its armed forces and DIFID ‘coherently’ if the two bodies are able to cooperate and coordinate amongst themselves.

Due to its breadth of intergovernmental and supranational capabilities, out of all international actors, the EU has arguably the greatest potential to implement the CA in its external action\(^\text{13}\). On the military side, in 2012 the EU member states spent in total €189.6 billion on defence\(^\text{14}\), more than any individual country other than the US\(^\text{15}\). The EU itself possesses 18 Battlegroups: “high readiness forces consisting of 1,500 personnel that can be deployed within 10 days”\(^\text{16}\), two of which are on standby at any one time for a period of six months. It also has its own military planning and supervision bodies in the form of the EU Military Staff (EUMS), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Political and Security Committee (PSC).

On the civilian side, in 2013 EU member states collectively provided €56.5 billion in overseas development aid\(^\text{17}\), far more than any individual state. Furthermore, the EU’s Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) has been allocated €19.6 billion of its budget to overseas development from 2014-2020\(^\text{18}\). The 11th European Development Fund (EDF) adds an extra €30.6 billion\(^\text{19}\) in development funds from outside the main budget, over the same period. The EU also contains institutions dedicated to justice, health, and environmental protection, all of which can play an important role in maintaining international security. All together, this gives the EU the unique characteristic of being an international organisation that enjoys the same breadth and scale of instruments and institutions as a highly developed state.

In addition to the national embassies of the 28 member states, the EU runs 139 Delegations around the world, which perform an analogous function. This number of missions endows the EU with one of the greatest diplomatic reaches out of any international actor. The EU also enjoys strong ties and history of cooperation with the UN and African Union (AU), the latter which relies on substantial EU funding\(^\text{20}\). The Union’s traditionally civilian image and human rights-based rhetoric

\(^\text{13}\) This is clearly dependent on the EU having something which could be reasonably called a ‘foreign policy’, a matter which will be discussed later.
\(^\text{15}\) SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2014)
\(^\text{16}\) EEAS, “About CSDP - Military Headline Goals”
\(^\text{17}\) EU Council, (19 May 2014) “Council conclusions on Annual Report 2014 to the European Council on EU Development Aid Targets”
also gives it a somewhat ‘softer’ international reputation than that of individual states or NATO, which are seen to have a more openly interest-driven foreign policy21.

The EU has already been attempting to implement the CA in its foreign policy for several years. The Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force at the end of 2009, states that “the Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect.”22

The Treaty facilitated cooperation in foreign policy between the civilian and military structures within the EU by the abolition of the pillar system, which had previously kept the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) separate from its policing and economic functions. After Lisbon, the CFSP was to be implemented by the European External Action Service (EEAS), a new department which includes the Union’s military structures, as well as many civilian bodies from the Council and Commission. The Treaty also appointed an EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) to lead the EEAS and coordinate with external actors. The HR was also given the title of First-Vice-President of the European Commission and Chair of the Council’s Foreign Affairs Committee, in an attempt to bring the two institutions closer together.

The value of the CA in missions and operations (the former civilian, the latter military) is not only negatively demonstrated by the failure to bring stability to Libya and Iraq. It can also be shown positively, in the international attempts to end piracy off the coast of Africa. The EU’s Operation Atlanta, accompanied by NATO-led Operation Ocean Shield and contributions from individual states made up the military component of the anti-piracy action. In tandem, AU and EU actions on land aimed to tackle the causes of piracy by bringing security to the region. Although Somalia is clearly still not a safe or prosperous state, these coordinated international actions have led to a significant reduction in successful hijackings in the Gulf of Aden23, and have substantially strengthened Somali security forces. Therefore, Somalia is touted by the EU as one of the key examples of the CA in action24, representing what the CA can achieve, if followed correctly.

A fully-comprehensive external action would require all civilian and military EU bodies to work with a single purpose, in harmony with one another, regardless of organisational and cultural differences. However, this does not necessitate creating integrated civil-military bodies and chains of

21 This ‘soft’ image has been damaged by the recent crisis in Ukraine, for which the EU has been accused of bearing some responsibility by recklessly extending the Association-Agreement to Ukraine, attempting to expand its influence.
22 European Union, Treaty of Lisbon, (2007), Ch 1, Article 10A §3
24 EEAS, “European Union Naval Force Somalia: Operation Atlanta”
command, which is likely to be counterproductive to the CA. Complete integration between civilian and military departments would dilute and undermine each actor’s specialised expertise. Although total isolation makes military actions far less effective, the military requires an element of separation from civilian bodies to develop and maintain its unique skills and ethos.

Instead, the divisions between civilian and military bodies should be made as permeable as is necessary for their full synergy to be attained, while a distinction still exists to protect their strengths. Practically, this requires a better exchange of information and expertise, allowing each individual structure to benefit from the resources of the entire EU. A division of labour amongst institutions is also necessary to prevent duplication and so maximise the contribution of each actor. The CA also requires strong governance and clear dedicated chains of command, so that actions could be executed rapidly and confidently, with clearly defined mandates and responsibilities for each actor.

The diagram below illustrates the differences between three models of civilian and military chains of command. The first ‘stove piping’ model corresponds to an absence of the CA, whereby there is no cooperation or coordination between the civilian missions and military operations, apart from at the very top level. The second ‘monolith’ model represents an integrated civil-military chain of command. The third ‘ladder’ model shows the chains of command with the CA, with two distinct chains of command linked at all levels. The nature of these links will be discussed in section 5.

---

**3 approaches to EU Chains of Command**

1. Civil-military separation: *Stove-Piping*
   - CPCC
   - EUMS
   - OHQ
   - Force Commander
   - Civilian Mission
   - Military Operation

2. Integrative Approach: *Monolith*
   - CPCC
   - EUMS
   - OHQ
   - Force Commander
   - Civilian Mission
   - Military Operation

3. Comprehensive Approach: *Ladder*
   - CPCC
   - EUMS
   - OHQ
   - Force Commander
   - Civilian Mission
   - Military Operation

---

25 The CPCC is the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, a CSDP body which plans civilian operations, in a roughly analogous manner to the EUMS and military operations.
1. **What is the military for?**

Militaries possess several characteristics which make them a unique political tool. Most obviously, militaries are the only institutions that can be legally authorised to undertake international actions which involve the potential use of lethal force. This use of lethal force is often the only feasible way to compel hostile groups to comply with one’s political demands. Issues this contentious usually relate to top governmental priorities, such as national sovereignty or regime integrity. When confronted with an incompliant armed group, the fundamental goal of the military is to, as Clausewitz states, disarm them and so render them powerless to resist, while simultaneously preventing the adversary doing the same. On a practical level, this usually requires the military to be capable of securing territory and protecting population and infrastructure.

In order to achieve such tasks, militaries require highly advanced organisational capabilities and material assets, allowing for rapid, long-range deployment in dangerous environments. These capabilities also allow militaries to undertake several ‘secondary’ tasks, including search and rescue, law enforcement and humanitarian tasks, such as responding to natural disasters and delivering humanitarian aid. Militaries are also uniquely capable of providing training and support to other militaries. Military expertise and capabilities are often used by the EU in non-civilian missions.

The precise role of the EU’s military forces in actions was formulated in 1992 Petersberg Declaration. In addition to the clause of solidarity and the clause of mutual assistance of the Treaty of Lisbon, the three main military tasks to be undertaken on behalf of the EU included: “humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”. As the risk of armed attack from another state fell after the Cold War, these ‘softer’ security tasks became increasingly important for many Western states. In the ‘New Interventionism’ period in the early 1990s, UN and NATO forces found themselves on peacekeeping and stabilisation operations in the Balkans, Caribbean, Middle East, Africa and South East Asia.

---

26 The specification of ‘foreign’ armed groups is necessary to distinguish the military from law enforcement institutions, which are similarly authorised to use lethal force in certain situations, but exclusively against a government’s own population.
27 Clausewitz, C., 1832 “On War”
28 At the time the Declaration applied to the Western European Union, a European security organisation which was merged into the EU in 2011.
29 Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union
30 Western European Union Council of Ministers, 19 June 1992, “Petersberg Declaration”, Sect. II Para. 4
So far the EU has launched 9 dedicated military operations (5 of which are ongoing), along with 21 civilian missions. The 9 military operations include two training missions, the naval anti-piracy operation and 6 peacekeeping/stabilisation operations. The mandates of the stabilisation operations were to contribute to a stable and secure environment, either to facilitate humanitarian relief or to allow the implementation of peace treaties or elections. Such tasks fall well within the outlines of the Petersberg Declaration.

2. National perspectives

Due to the intergovernmental nature of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the deployment of EU military operations is entirely contingent upon the consensus of the 27 member states\textsuperscript{31}. Therefore, any proposals for the role of the EU’s military must take into account the political constraints imposed by the heterogeneous priorities and attitudes of the member states. Although European states share basic security interests, such as fighting terrorism and collective self-defence, their perspectives widely diverge on how, when and where the EU should use military force. As a consequence, there is disagreement on the use of military forces within the CSDP. The three main axes of this divergence concern 1) the level of support for integration in the CSDP, 2) the support for the use of force, and 3) the preferred geographical focus of the CSDP.

Relation to NATO

NATO contains 22 of the 28 EU member states and, due to the US’s membership, accounts for over 54\% of world defence expenditure\textsuperscript{32}, as well as enjoying over half a century of experience. Therefore, ‘Atlanticist’ EU member states view NATO as still the preferred choice for conducting multilateral military operations, and the EU’s CSDP as, at best, a supplement to NATO and, at worst, a redundant duplication. Therefore, they are resistant to consolidating and expanding the capacities of the CSDP to include ‘heavier’ military tasks, and prefer to promote transatlantic capabilities instead.

The UK epitomises the anti-European position, with a tradition of ‘splendid isolation’ from the affairs of the continent. The significant Europhobia amongst the public and political parties has led to the UK abstaining from other aspects of EU integration, such adopting the Euro, and the country therefore has a somewhat ‘mid-Atlantic’ identity. The population of the UK are also the least favourable in Europe towards the CSDP, with the 2014 Eurobarometer poll showing just over half of

\textsuperscript{31} Denmark is not included in the CSDP, having opted out of all EU security matters in 1992

\textsuperscript{32} SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2014)
the sampled population in favour of the CSDP (see graph below). Such tendencies are evident in the UK’s 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, which states the country should support EU military operations “only where it is clear that NATO is not planning to intervene”\(^{33}\).

Nevertheless, the UK does view the CSDP as having a purpose and has been one of the key supporters of the developing European military capabilities, albeit mainly as a way to increase the European share of the burden within NATO. In 1998 the UK and France issued the St. Malo declaration, which stated that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”\(^{34}\).

On the other end of the spectrum, several EU member states have a firm preference for European states acting alone, through the CSDP. They consider membership of NATO as a constraint on their autonomy, due to the preeminent position of the US and reservations about aspects of its foreign policy. The notorious American ‘pivot towards Asia’ has led many European states to question the reliability of America’s military commitment to Europe, and so fear that an excessive dependence on NATO risks Europe being left stranded. Therefore they hope to grant the EU military a larger role in Western military interventions and so promote independent European military cooperation.


\(^{34}\) Franco-British summit, (4 December 1998), “Joint declaration on European defence”
France has traditionally epitomised these ‘Europeanist’ tendencies. Charles de Gaulle, who famously dreamt of creating a Europe “from the Atlantic to the Urals”\(^{35}\) with greater autonomy from the US, withdrew France from NATO’s high command in 1966. French misgivings over American leadership were exacerbated by the American war in Vietnam, of which France was highly critical, having itself failed to maintain power in the region. After the 2003 Iraq War, which France again condemned, it resolved to strengthen autonomous European defence capabilities to balance against US hegemony. At the 2003 ‘Chocolate Summit’ France, Germany and Belgium proposed the creation of a permanent EU Operational Headquarters (OHQ) at Tervuren in Belgium. This was seen as a statement of intent for the EU’s CSDP to replace NATO as the primary European security organisation.

Nevertheless, in 2009 France rejoined NATO’s military structure and reinforced its presence in the different NATO HQs, justifying its high level of involvement in NATO operations, such as the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and Unified Protector in Libya in 2011. The Anglo-French Lancaster House bilateral defence agreement in 2010 demonstrates a growing French disillusionment with the slow progress of the CSDP, leading it to search for additional means of defence cooperation.

Other European states, such as Germany, Spain and Poland, support the CSDP, regarding cooperation as a “strategic goal in itself”\(^{36}\). In particular, Germany is firmly committed to multilateralism for historical reasons, fearing accusations of conducting an aggressive, interest-driven foreign policy. As can be seen in the 2014 Eurobarometer graph, the EU members most in favour of the CSDP are the Baltic States and Cyprus, all of which share a sense of existential risk from their far larger and stronger neighbours (Russia and Turkey respectively), and so see EU defence integration as a way of guaranteeing their territorial integrity.

---

\(^{35}\) Speaking 23 November 1959, in Strasbourg

The use of force

The second major axis of disagreement is over the importance of military use of force. More ‘activist’ states see military interventions in crises as vital to national security, for example to protect European citizens and economic interests and prevent terrorism. Therefore, they insist that the EU should be outwards looking, well equipped and ready to act.

On the other hand, other EU member states are more sceptical about the necessity of EU military interventions. Often they have a firm and proud tradition of pacifism or neutrality, and so are unwilling to engage their troops in conflicts unless there is an incontrovertible and ‘pure’ humanitarian justification. To avoid accusations of interest-based external action, such states prefer to respond to crises through international civilian organisations, relying on diplomatic mediation and supporting local actors. Germany is often depicted as one of the staunchest opponents to military intervention in the EU, for the same historical reasons that it favours multilateralism. However, the post-WWII maxim “Nie wieder Krieg” (“Never again war”) has been challenged by the opposing moral obligation of “Nie wieder Auschwitz”, placing the prevention of atrocities against civilians above its aversion to military force37. Therefore, with varying levels of enthusiasm, Germany has participated in multilateral EU and NATO operations in the Balkans, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan.

The divergence in willingness to use force consequently leads to disagreement on the role of the military within the EEAS. For the EU to be an active security actor, it must have the necessary military capabilities and formulate strategies defining how they should be used. As already stated, most types of overseas intervention can no longer be conducted by either civilian or military personnel alone. Therefore, the more active the EU intends to be as a security actor, the more vital the implementation of the CA becomes. If the military was to have a smaller role in the EU’s external action, it would reduce the necessity adopting a CA to facilitate civil-military cooperation. Similarly, if the EU accepted an overall diminished role in crisis management and mediation, undertaking smaller and less challenging missions and operations, the benefits of implementing the CA would obviously be similarly smaller.

Source: Santopinto, F. & Price, M., (2013), “National visions of EU Defence Policy: Common denominators and misunderstandings” p164. Being adverse to EU political integration can be seen as equivalent to preferring NATO over the CSDP. FR= France; GER= Germany; IT= Italy; PL= Poland; SP= Spain; SW= Sweden; UK= United Kingdom.

**Geographic focus**

There is broad consensus that the geographical focus of the EU’s defence policy should be the ‘Arc of Crisis’, which includes North Africa, the Balkans, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. However, this region covers such a large area that it is barely a single priority. EU member states have different priorities within the Arc, with France and Spain being most focused on North Africa, while Germany has usually attached far greater significance to security in the Balkans. Eastern European states, such as Poland and the Baltic States, see the greatest security threat as coming from Russia.

This geographical divergence has implications for the role of the military in the EU, with deterring against violations of sovereignty in the Eastern Europe requiring a very different scale of military force to on-going operations in the Sahel. However, the states whose main security concern is defence of their national borders from an armed attack are also largely those who see their territorial defence as being primarily guaranteed by NATO, rather than the EU. Therefore, they too can agree that the EU should focus on the Petersberg tasks in other regions, even if such actions are not their national priority.

---

These two axes of disagreement affect how active the EU’s military should be and so, for example, whether it could intervene militarily in a crisis in support of one side, or should be impartial and simply uphold ceasefires and protect civilians (or even do neither). This decision could be made either due to a preference for NATO or a general aversion to military force. However, the fact that the EU has conducted multiple military operations demonstrates there is a consensus that the EU does need some type of military capacity to allow for, at least, peacekeeping and post-crisis stabilisation. Until the launch of EUFOR RCA (Republic of Central Africa) beginning of 2014, the EU did not attempt the potentially ‘harder’ Petersberg task of ‘peacemaking’39, compelling a cessation in hostilities through the use of force.

The military capacities of the EU and its member states, such as Battlegroups mentioned in section 1, make the EU more than capable of increasing the ambition of its military actions. The crises in Chad in 2007, Mali in 2013, and the Central African Republic in 2014 closely corresponded to the situations envisaged for the deployment of EU Battlegroups, yet they remained inactive due to disagreement amongst member states, primarily for the aforementioned reasons. Even in Libya in 2011, the EU had the mechanisms and capabilities to implement UN resolution 1973, but was unable to do so, due to German opposition. As Joylon Howorth states, “it is difficult to over-state the extent to which Libya was precisely the type of mission for which the EU, ever since its collective defection in the Balkans in the early 1990s, had been preparing for”40. Instead, the military operation in Libya was left to NATO, while France intervened in Mali essentially unilaterally.

The political divergence over the deployment of the EU’s military forces presents a far greater handicap than a lack of manpower or equipment41: a tool’s value is determined by its actual ability to be used, not what it is capable of in an idealised world. There have been many proposals of how to overcome the political divergence in the EU, such as creating an EU ‘White Paper’ for defence and security42. However, such a document could only be produced once greater political harmony had already been reached. Many of the sources of political disagreement are deep-seated parts of national cultures which will take time to change, especially given the link between being able to set one’s own foreign policy and being a ‘sovereign state’. Therefore, how to create an integrated

39 EEAS, “About CSDP - Military Headline Goals”: at the 1999 European Council Meeting in Helsinki, member states pledged that “by the year 2003, ... [EU Member States] will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding” (Helsinki Annex IV).
41 This is not to say that the EU does not have material deficiencies, or that they are not important. In Libya, European states depended heavily on the US for smart munitions and air-to-air refueling.
European foreign policy will be considered as beyond the scope of this paper and the willpower to deploy EU military forces will be taken as it is. The EU’s areas of ‘overlapping consensus’ cover a military capable of undertaking the Petersberg Tasks, with the possible exception of peacemaking. Therefore, within this consensus there is still room for the relations between the military and other EU and non-EU bodies to be cultivated. The challenges in doing this will be discussed next.

➢ The Military Relations within the EU

![Diagram illustrating the range of actors with which the EU military must coordinate with, in the Comprehensive Approach, and their separation.]

To implement the CA, the EU must firstly coherently and complementarily make use of all of its relevant civilian and military instruments and policies. Despite the EU having professed a commitment to the CA for several years, this is far from being achieved. The interaction must occur at all levels, which for the sake of simplicity will be divided into two. The first is called the ‘strategic level’ and is the level at which the international environment is monitored and the EU’s response to
crises is planned and directed. The second is the ‘operational level’, at which the operations and missions are actually undertaken.

1. **Strategic level**

*Military-military relationships*

For the CA to be implemented, it is fundamental that the military bodies of the EU should have internal coherence, so that they can coordinate with other bodies in a consistent and logical manner. The EEAS includes the EU Military Staff, *“the source of the EU’s military expertise”*. The EUMS’s official responsibilities include *“early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks”*, as well as providing advice to the HR. However, the continual disagreement within the EU over the use of military force has restricted the number of EU-led military operations, limiting the operational experience and development of the EUMS. Furthermore, the lack of consensus on the role of the EU’s military forces makes member states reluctant to embrace their development and provide greater resources to structures such as the EUMS. Therefore, they remain small and uncontroversial.

The same disagreement has caused the EU, time after time, to be caught off guard by crises in strategically important areas, be it the Arab Spring or Ukrainian crisis. Without a firm idea of what the EU’s strategic interests are and how military force should be used to achieve them, military planning is often overly vague. The 2003 ESS comprises only 14 pages, which are mostly devoted to expressing ‘how’ the EU should implement its security policy but not ‘what’ it should do, mainly focusing on the importance of principles such as ‘multilateralism’, ‘prevention’ and ‘comprehensiveness’. Otherwise, when the EU has been able to formulate a precise and coherent strategy, such as the March 2011 ‘EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel’, political

---

43 For the purposes of this paper, ‘strategic’ will include all planning for military action, even in the absence of a crisis.

44 For the purposes of this paper, ‘operational’ will also include the tactical elements of military operations.


disagreements and administrative difficulties delayed the document implementation\(^{48}\), by which point the situation in the region had significantly deteriorated\(^{49}\).

Such confusion can be seen by differences between member states on the definition of key concepts, such as ‘crisis management’. The 2006 German Security White Paper mentions ‘crisis management’ over 50% of the time in conjunction with non-military ‘crisis prevention’, downplaying its military component\(^{50}\). On the other hand, the 2013 French White Paper recommends that the armed forces “must also be able to engage in crisis management operations aimed at restoring conditions for normal life and involving control of large areas over a long period”\(^{51}\). Such conceptual divergence reinforces difficulties in reaching consensus on what security tasks the EU should undertake, when there is not even agreement on what such tasks involve. For the EU to formulate a coherent strategy of how to use military force to achieve its political goals, the EU must not only reach an agreement on its goals are, but what those goals mean.

**Civilian-military relationships**

As the Commission stated in its Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council in December 2013, the CA requires that “all relevant EU actors are informed and engaged in the analysis and assessment of conflict and crisis situations and at all stages of the conflict cycle”\(^{52}\). If the planning and strategy-making of the EU is not comprehensive, the execution of the missions and operations will inevitably suffer. The different EU actors will have incoherent, contradictory or overlapping mandates, and forgo any potential synergy. This weakened the EU actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which consisted of a civilian police mission (EUPM) and military stabilisation mission (EUFOR Althea). The two actions were planned separately, demonstrating a distinct absence of comprehensiveness, and as a result the missions and operation had separate mandates, distinct chains of command and different reporting authorities\(^{53}\).

\(^{48}\) The first CSDP operation in accordance with the strategy, EUCAP Niger, was launched in August 2012, 18 months later.

\(^{49}\) European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs, 21 February 2014, “Report on the EU Comprehensive Approach and its implications for the coherence of EU external action”, p11


Since then, the EU has made progress in civil-military planning, underlining the concept of ‘Civil-Military Coordination’ (CMCO)\textsuperscript{54} and holding joint civil-military training exercises. However, there are still serious deficiencies in civil-military planning coordination. The problems stemming from national strategic divergence of member states which harm intra-military planning will similarly affect civil-military planning. However, there are also several specific institutional and cultural problems.

The EEAS currently has several civil-military points of contact, firstly in the form of joint planning bodies. In 2003 the EUMS created a ‘Civil-Military Planning Cell’, which assisted in planning and coordinating civilian and civil-military operations and developed expertise in managing the civilian/military interface\textsuperscript{55}. However, being based within the EUMS led many to regard the Cell as effectively a military unit, in which civilians were relegated to an inferior auxiliary role. This reduced the Cell’s intended contribution towards the CA\textsuperscript{56}.

To address these concerns, in 2011 the Civil-Military Cell was moved out of the EUMS and placed in the Crisis Management and Planning Directive (CMPD) that had been created in 2009. The CMPD is the largest permanent civil-military structure in the EEAS, consisting of about 60 people, and its responsibilities include planning and reviewing CSDP missions and operations and coordinating the development of civilian and military capabilities\textsuperscript{57}.

Since January 2007, the EUMS also contains an ‘activatable’ Operations Centre (OpCen), ready for activation for the conduct of autonomous operations. It is not a standing, fully manned Headquarters. It was activated for the first time in 23 March 2012, with the aim of coordinating and strengthening civil-military synergies between the three CSDP missions in the Horn of Africa. However, the 5 days which it requires for initial operating capability (that necessary for OpCen to run an operation) and 20 for full operating capability, is unacceptably slow, given how quickly crises can escalate\textsuperscript{58}.

In times of crisis, the EEAS convokes a ‘Crisis Platform’ to formulate and direct the EU’s response. The Crisis Platform is a temporary structure which includes a range of civilian and military actors from the CSDP and Commission, as well as input from international organisations and member states (see diagram below). In addition, the EU runs yearly ‘crisis management exercises’ (CMEs) to give the civilian and military actors of the CSDP more experience of working together in a simulated crisis.

\textsuperscript{54} EU Council, (2003), “Civil-Military Coordination’ (CMCO)”
\textsuperscript{55} EU Council, (December 2003), “Italian Presidency paper European defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations”
\textsuperscript{56} Norheim-Martinsen, P. M., (2010), “Managing the Civil-Military Interface in the EU: Creating an Organisation Fit for Purpose” p10
\textsuperscript{57} EEAS, “Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD)”
In addition to the formal contact, the EU has attempted to promote informal contact between the civilian and military structures of the EEAS, by basing all of the EU’s civilian and military crisis management structures (EUMS, CMPD, CPCC) in the Kortenberg Building in Brussels. However, the different departments are physically separated by being on different floors of the building, impeding interaction between the two bodies and prevented any meaningful change in organisational culture or an ‘esprit de corps’. Furthermore, for security reasons these crisis management departments were unable to move from the Kortenberg building to the ‘Triangle Building’ 500m away, where the rest of the EEAS has resided since 2012. This further restricts civil-military contact between the crisis management structures and other EEAS departments.

Civil-military socialisation is further impeded by the large imbalance in numbers within the EEAS, with around only 300 of the EEAS’ 3500 staff being members of the military. As a result, the military structures lack visibility. They exist as a microcosm, without substantial or regular contact with their civilian counterparts outside times of necessity or formal obligation. This in turn reduces the exchange of information between the two elements required to implement the CA.

Nevertheless, the lack of cohesion between the military and civilian elements of the CSDP, which are all ultimately under the responsibility of the HR and the Council, is less pronounced than the gulf between the EEAS and the Commission DGs. The HR is also a Vice President of the European Commission (one of eight), in theory to ‘bridge the gap’ between the two institutions. However, the HR has no formal power over the DGs, many of which perform functions which are integral to the CA. Furthermore, the HR does not regularly attend the College of Commissioners with the other VPs, weakening the HR’s visibility and informal influence within the Commission. This fragmentation of authority results in many cases of inefficiency and tension between the Commission and the EEAS.

2. Operational level

Military-military relationships

For the management of military operations, the EU uses one of five OHQs, based in France (Mont Valérien), Germany (Potsdam), the UK (Northwood), Greece (Larissa) and Italy (Rome). However, their similarly temporary nature prevents the staff forming a strong working relationships and ‘collective memory’.

‘On the ground’, the internal challenges faced by EU military forces are the practical consequences of taking military members from different states and requiring them to fight together, and are shared by most multinational forces. Soldiers speak different languages, have undergone different training and use different equipment. To remedy this, EU, NATO and individual pairs of nations have undergone great efforts to promote interoperability, standardisation and joint training.

However, some sources of incoherence within EU military forces cannot be simply solved with standardisation and training. As already mentioned, there are great rifts between the perspectives of the 28 member states on what military force should be used for, which have a tangible impact on tactical cohesion. States will restrict what their soldiers are allowed to do on the battlefield to suit their political objectives. For example, certain states which are less committed to using military force create ‘national caveats’, which allows their troops to ‘opt out’ of certain types of military activity. In the NATO operation in Afghanistan, Germany, whose population was hardly enthusiastic about the country’s participation, used national caveats to prevent the Bundeswehr from fighting at night or

---

in the more violent south of the country, so as to reduce to possibility of politically-unacceptable casualties. Even more critically, differing political commitments can cause forces to withdraw from missions prematurely, as was the case with Germany’s contribution to EUFOR DR Congo, who ‘cut and ran’, due to a decline in popularity for the mission\textsuperscript{62}.

Similarly to national caveats, states develop their own ‘rules of engagement’ (ROE), which govern how their troops are allowed to fight. Very often differing from the EU and NATO ROEs, these different ROEs promote an additional challenge for Force Commanders to overcome, and impose a handicap upon the operation.

However, the effect of national caveats and differing ROE is one of the more minor problems which diverging national strategies causes. Far more commonly, an uncommitted state would prevent an EU military operation altogether, or else shape it to a form which it finds acceptable, by reducing its scale and risk. For this reason, a state participating in EU military operations with caveats is nevertheless somewhat a sign of success. It means that an unwilling nation has been persuaded to contribute to an operation which they consider dangerous.

Civil-military relationships

In addition to planning operations and missions together, the CA requires that the various civilian and military organs of the EU to work in close cooperation during missions and operations. Similarly to intra-military cohesion, the cohesion between civilian and military actors is heavily determined by the level of coherence in the planning for a mission. The example of the EU missions in Bosnia demonstrates that if missions and operations are planned in relative isolation, coordination between them is rendered extremely difficult. However, even if the planning of missions and operations is comprehensive, the EU must ensure that the principles of coordination and cooperation continue ‘all the way to the ground’. A capacity for cooperation on the ground is vital for information to be exchanged quickly, and for decisions to be made in response to unexpected developments.

EU civilian missions and military operations have separate heads and chains of command. The civilian missions are managed by the Head of Mission, who reports to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) through the Civilian Planning Conduct Capability (CPCC); while military operations are run by a Force Commander, who reports to the PSC through the Operational Commander and the EU Military Committee (EUMC). EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) are designated to “provide the

EU with an active political presence in key countries and regions, acting as a “voice” and “face” for the EU and its policies". However, the EUSRs lack formal powers and so have to rely on charisma and persuasion to gain cooperation. Their precise role is not set out in the Treaty of the European Union, which merely states in article 33 “the Council may, on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, appoint a special representative with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues".

Due to overlapping mandates, in some regions there is more than one civilian representative. For example, in the current Horn of Africa mission, the EU has one regional EUSR (as well as one for the AU in Addis Ababa), six Heads of Delegations, three CSDP Heads of Mission or Operation, a Special Envoy and multiple regional offices. Due to the lack of a formal definition of roles and hierarchy, this sometimes results in “rivalries and overlapping responsibilities". This duplicity obscures the chain of command and reduces the authority of EUSRs to compel coordination. On the other hand, in the EU missions in Kosovo and the DRC, the absence of a central coordinating body caused a lack of coordination between the many agencies involved, and so similarly impeded coordination with the military operation, restricting the EUSR’s military information.

63 European External Action Service, “EU Special Representatives”
64 Treaty of the European Union, article 33
THE MILITARY RELATIONS WITH THE EXTERNAL ACTORS

The second element of the CA requires the EU to cooperate and coordinate with all other relevant civilian and military actors. Despite the range of expertise within the EU, it will always depend on working with outside organisations which possess special knowledge or skills, so as to ensure that its operations and missions are successful in the long run.

1. Strategic level

Military-military relationships

When planning for or responding to crises, the EUMS coordinates with other military organisations, particularly NATO. This takes place through reciprocal permanent military cells in the NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO) HQ (previously known as SHAPE), and the EUMS. However, this cross-representation between the EU and NATO has been largely ineffective. The EU cell at ACO consists currently of just a handful of officers, out of a total of 3000 working in the strategic command. This number is sufficient to act as a link between the two organisations, but not enough for the EU to have a meaningful visibility influence in the ACO.

For decades, political disputes between EU and NATO members have severely impeded the cooperation which the 2003 Berlin Plus Agreements were intended to facilitate. The disagreement between Turkey and Cyprus over the status of Northern Cyprus has prevented intelligence sharing between the two organisations. Meetings between the top political bodies, the EU’s PSC and NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC), only take place informally with a very limited agenda. At the military level, Turkey has prevented the Cypriot military representative from attending meetings between EU and NATO’s military committees when they take place in the NATO HQ. Therefore, negotiations between NATO and the EU are notoriously slow. To date, Berlin Plus arrangement has only ever been implemented once, when in 2003 the EU’s Operation Althea took over from NATO’s Stabilisation Force in Bosnia. This was only possible as Cyprus was not yet a member of the EU, having joined in 2004. However, the changeover still took more than eight months to plan and implement.

---

68 European parliament, Directorate-General For External Policies Of The Union, (2010), Consolidating the EU’s Crisis Management Structures: Civil-Military Coordination and the Future of the EU OHQ, p12
**Civilian-military relationships**

The planning-level relationship between the EU and external civilian organisations is similarly small-scale, relying on liaison officers and informal contacts. In the event of a crisis, some external actors, such as international organisations and individual states, are allowed to participate in the EU’s Crisis Platform. However, their role is restricted to providing information, and they are excluded by the actual decision making progress. It is not surprising that the EU would control the planning of its operations by itself, so as to best accommodate the interests of the member states.

**2. Operational level**

**Military-military relationships**

Due to the political impasse which has prevented the Battlegroups’ deployment, and the member states’ significant gaps in the military capacities such as logistics and ‘smart munitions’, EU military operations have always been small scale and often relied on the support of other military actors. When there are simultaneous non-EU military operations in the same theatre, the EU Force Commander is responsible for coordinating with them to ensure that the operations do not overlap and that they share relevant information.

In cooperation between simultaneous missions, the NATO-EU relationship is often beset with problems. When the two organisations are engaged simultaneously in the same region, such as in Kosovo or Afghanistan, they have struggled to share information, due to the lack of official communication\(^69\). Such difficulties are similarly a repercussion of the aforementioned political deadlock between the two organisations.

On the contrary, in the multinational anti-piracy missions off the Horn of Africa, the ‘Shared Awareness and Deconfliction’ (SHADE) mechanism was created to coordinate the actions of the EU’s Operation Atlanta, the Combined Maritime Force (CMF) and NATO’s Ocean Shield, as well as operations of individual states\(^70\). Due to the significant fall in reported cases of piracy, the operation,

---


\(^{70}\) EEAS, “EU 2014 Chairmanship Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia”
and SHADE itself, are widely seen as a success. In fact, the success of the coordination is inevitably somewhat due to the shared political goals of the participants in fighting piracy, as well as its large area of operation, which reduces interaction between the actors.

Finally, in its relations with the UN, the EU has most commonly defined the relationship by the ‘bridging model’. By this model, EU troops “intervene for a short period with a clearly defined endpoint in order to allow the UN to introduce a new operation and/or reorganise an existing one”, as was the case with Operation Artemis in the DRC. Alternatively, the ‘over-the-horizon model’ involves the EU reinforcing an existing UN mission. The coordination is conducted through liaison officers and contact groups. However, in the Horn of Africa there was reportedly little contact between EUCAP NESTOR and the UN’s UNODC anti-piracy project.

Civilian-military relationships

Despite the wide range of civilian tools available to the EU, its missions and operations will still rely on the expertise and instruments of other civilian actors, such as UN agencies, humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like Médecins sans frontières and the International Committee of the Red Cross and, crucially, local organisations who will have unmatchable regional expertise and connections.

Interaction between militaries and humanitarian NGOs is often tense. Firstly, NGOs have historically considered themselves neutral and impartial, with their only agenda being the alleviation of human suffering. Therefore, they often eschew working with militaries, seeing it as tantamount to ‘picking a side’ and violating their neutrality, or that doing so would ‘instrumentalise’ their work for military objectives, even if such cooperation would also benefit their humanitarian goals. Similarly, it is likely that many humanitarian workers involved in armed conflicts would have a fairly negative opinion of militaries, witnessing the suffering that armed groups can cause, i.e. sexual or physical abuse of the local population, and so be reluctant to cooperate with them.

---

71 Gros-Verheyde, N., 2 October 2013, « 0 bateau piraté au large de la Somalie en 2013. Pourvu que ça doure! », Bruxelles 2
72 European parliament, Directorate-General For External Policies Of The Union, (2010), Consolidating the EU’s Crisis Management Structures: Civil-Military Coordination and the Future of the EU OHQ, p17
75 UN, “Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN and Related Personnel”
For more pragmatic reasons, humanitarian workers have often avoided coordinating with the military or accepting its protection in conflict regions, as they felt that doing so would be seen by armed groups as a sign of alignment with the military and so place them at risk. The UN’s Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook furthermore prescribes that humanitarian convoys should only use military escorts as a “last resort”\(^\text{77}\). Therefore, in Afghanistan the UN refused American military protection until an attack on its HQ made it clear that they would be considered an enemy by the Taliban, under military protection or not.

In interactions with local groups, lack of language skills is an obvious yet significant stumbling block. The EU is linguistically equipped for its recent focus on Francophone Africa, where the mostly French-speaking troops were able to communicate and mix with the local populations. For example, in Chad in 2007, they held public meetings and even produced a local newspaper, to dispel the perceptions of EUFOR being a ‘foreign army’ occupying the country\(^\text{78}\). On the other hand, the Monitoring Mission in Indonesia in 2005 encountered difficulties due to a shortage of Indonesian speakers, impeding interaction with local organisations. Similarly, as the EU launched interventions further afield, a lack of cultural awareness became a larger impediment, particularly in Afghanistan which has had relatively little cultural exchange with Europe. Lack of cultural awareness reduces trust between EU staff and locals and can create tension and even alienation. In Indonesia, a lack of understanding of Sharia Law restricted the EU’s involvement in the drafting of the Law on Governance\(^\text{79}\).


**Recommendations on the Role of the Military**

Having described the main characteristics of the relationship between EU military forces and civilian and military internal and external actors, this section will propose some potential recommendations that aim to overcome these impediments.

The political divergence over the EU’s foreign policy presents the greatest handicap. One of the proposals of how to overcome the political divergence in the EU is to create an EU ‘White Paper’ for defence and security. But this cannot be reached without a pre-existing minimum of political harmony between the member states. The following recommendations would ideally be based on a more robust European foreign policy, but even with the CFSP in its current form they are still constructive.

1. **Permanent OHQ and Crisis Platform**

   The EU requires an independent, permanent civilian and military OHQ, which should be located in Brussels. The Crisis Platform should also be made permanent.

   The suggestion of a permanent OHQ would enable civilians and members of the military to develop a routine of working together, allowing them to respond cohesively and instantaneously to a crisis.

   A permanent version of the Crisis Platform would allow cooperation and joint planning from a range of civilian and military actors in the immediate aftermath of crises. This permanence would allow the delegations and representatives of different organisations greater experience of working together. A permanent Platform could also facilitate greater contact between the CSDP structures and the Commission, by working with the Commission’s Emergency Response Centre.

2. **EEAS Collocation**

   Greater civil-military contact must be established throughout the EEAS. This could be achieved through collocation of the EEAS’s civilian and military departments, in a single space.

3. **Joint Education**

   The EU should make the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) permanent, to establish a stronger EU civil-military institutional culture.
This would create a shared manner of thinking amongst the EU’s civilian and military staff, reducing disagreements and misunderstandings when responding to crises, ‘lubricating’ the EU’s response mechanisms. ESDC should conduct its activities in close coordination with the education systems of the Commission.

4. Military Liaison Officers and Experts

Military liaison officers and military experts should be placed in Commission DGs, while military bodies should accept representatives in return. EEAS should have more military expertise in its different departments and also place defence attachés in certain important EU Delegations.

Apart from giving EU departments access to outside expertise, this would create new cross-service professional relationships and greater shared understanding and trust. The military would also benefit from a greater presence and visibility in the EEAS.

5. Military-NGO Cooperation

The EU military should improve its cooperative relationship with International NGOs by imposing stricter and clearer rules of behaviour on itself, and offering joint training exercises. Humanitarian workers could likewise be offered the opportunity to gain experience of working alongside military forces through joint training exercises. DG ECHO has already funded seminars on NGO civil-military relationships and joint training exercises, both of which should be conducted in a more routine and structured manner and on a larger scale. As well delivering operational experience, such exercises would also promote inter-institutional relationships and understanding.

6. Cultural and linguistic knowledge

EU expeditionary forces should be offered regular language and cultural awareness classes.

The problems with cultural and linguistic knowledge amongst EU staff, which restrict interaction with local actors in the field, must primarily be solved through education. In tandem with the member states, the EEAS, through the ESDC, should offer regular language and cultural awareness classes, in accordance with the regions most likely to be future areas of intervention. During operations, more effort should be made to allow EU staff to socialise with the local population, to promote trust and understanding.

7. HR/VP Relationship with the Commission

---

The HR/VP should be given a much stronger and more clearly defined position within the Commission, with greater influence over the commissioners of the DGs which relate to the EEAS. The HR should also be required regularly attend the College of Commissioners.

Commission President Jean-Claude Junker has already expressed his support for such an empowerment of the HR/VP, stating that they must "act like a true European Minister of Foreign Affairs".

8. **Stronger EUSRs**

The EUSR should have greater and more formally defined responsibilities, including greater military advice and formal and regular contact with EU Force Commanders/EU Heads of mission. Their link to the Commission and HR should be similarly formalised.

The powers and duties of the EUSR should be generally codified so that their authority relies less on persuasion and charisma.

---

81 Junker, J., “My Priorities”
82 The head of mission is the chief of a CSDP civilian mission.
**CONCLUSION**

The role of the military in the EU’s External Action must be guided through the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach. Although the CA has no shortage of proponents, in practice it is still conspicuously absent. The EU is better placed than any other organisation in the world to adopt the CA, due to its large civilian capabilities and developing military ones, but it must find a way for its various structures to plan and act harmoniously together. Joint actions between civilians and the military are currently restricted by the strategic disaccord between member states, particularly concerning the extent to which the EU should act independently or as a complement to NATO, and the extent to which it should be prepared to use military force. However, there are nevertheless areas of *overlapping consensus* amongst member states, who agree that the EU has *some* military purpose, corresponding to the Petersberg tasks. Consequently, the EU is able (and arguably obliged) to contribute to the stabilisation of crises. This military role, although far smaller than what many European states have hoped for, is nevertheless sufficient to render the implementation of the CA within the CSDP crucial for the EU.

**Impediments to the EU’s implementation of the CSDP can be broadly attributed to four main causes.** On the strategic level, the EU firstly lacks permanent, well resourced and, most of all, connected civilian and military bodies to lead its crisis response. Secondly, the position High Representative is still insufficient to bridge the Commission/Council division, reducing the coherence of the EU’s external action. On the operational level, the problems of national caveats and differing rules of engagement are firstly compounded by lack of clear authority on the ground. Lastly, cooperation with non-EU actors is weakened by a lack of trust, understanding and adequate means of communication.

To fully remedy these impediments, a **common EU security strategy is clearly necessary**, but not sufficient. As Colin Gray stated, “just because a government drafts a document which proclaims the existence of a grand strategy, or a ‘Comprehensive Approach’, there is no guarantee that the baronies of officialdom will behave cohesively, coherently, and comprehensively. Strategy, grand or military, is never self-executing”⁸³. For this reason, the EU must ensure that the capabilities and responsibilities of its organs and staff are optimised to allow cooperation and coordination during all stages of missions and operations. This paper’s therefore makes eight recommendations, according to three main themes.

---

Firstly, the existing EU crisis-response structures should be made permanent. These include the EU civilian and military OHQ, the Crisis Platform and the EU Security and Defence College. This will give the EU greater experience of joint civil-military crisis planning and decrease the time needed for an EU crisis response.

Secondly, there needs to be greater contact between civilian and military staff, both within the EU and with other organisations. Staffs need the opportunity to work together over longer periods of time, in order to create shared understanding, information exchange and greater coordination. Within the EU, this can be achieved by the collocating exiting the EEAS and creating a network of military advisors within departments, so as to cultivate a routine of civil-military cooperation and professional relationships. The EU should encourage joint training programs and informative campaigns with external actors to gain trust and improve working practices.

Thirdly, reforms are needed to create stronger leadership for the EU’s External Action. The visibility and capabilities of the HR/VP and EUSRs should be increased and their mandates and responsibilities in the field should be clarified. This will accelerate the deployment of missions and facilitate flows of information.

Although each of these reforms has obstacles to overcome, they attempt to provide an idea of how the EU could use its military capabilities to their full potential within the external action. Given the current international security environment, there will be no shortage of regions which could benefit from EU security and humanitarian operations and missions in the near future. To avoid the mistakes of the past, the EU, and in particular its military structures, should make the Comprehensive Approach a guiding principle in its external action.
APPENDIX 1: REFERENCES


European Union, (2007), Treaty of Lisbon


SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2014)


## Appendix 2: List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACO</td>
<td>Allied Command Operations (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMPD</td>
<td>Crisis Management Planning Directorate (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning Conduct Capability (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Instrument (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEVCO</td>
<td>Development and Cooperation department (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDC</td>
<td>European Security and Defence College (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR (HR/VP)</td>
<td>High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy for the European Union (and Vice-President of the European Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins sans frontiers (Doctors Without Borders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>NATO Defence College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHQ</td>
<td>Operational Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US/USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>Vice President</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is well established that military force in isolation is insufficient to successfully implement a security policy. In other words, as Raymond Aron stated, “With the military you cannot achieve everything, but without the military you do nothing”. This paper explains the current weakness of the contribution of the military to CSDP and Comprehensive Approach. Such weaknesses are mainly due to a lack of permanent, well resourced and, most of all, connected civilian and military bodies to lead the EU crisis response. Secondly, the position of the High Representative is still insufficient to bridge the Commission/Council division, which reduces the coherence of the EU’s external action. The problems of national caveats, especially when to use force, and differing rules of engagement reduce the effectiveness of EU military operations. Lastly, cooperation with non-EU actors is weakened by a lack of trust, understanding and adequate means of communication. To fully overcome these impediments, this paper therefore makes some proposals. Firstly, the existing EU crisis-response structures should be made permanent. Secondly, there needs to be greater contact between civilian and military staff, both within the EU and with other organisations. Thirdly, the EU’s External Action requires stronger leadership: the visibility and capabilities of the HR/VP and the EU Special Representatives should be increased and their mandates and responsibilities should be clarified. This will accelerate the deployment of CSDP operations and facilitate flows of information.

Major General Maurice de LANGLOIS
Andreas CAPSTACK