RESEARCHING THE IMPOSSIBLE?
ASSESSING DIFFERENT WAYS
OF EU INFLUENCE ON U. S. POLICIES

Eva SCHERWITZ
RESEARCHING THE IMPOSSIBLE?
ASSESSING DIFFERENT WAYS OF EU INFLUENCE ON U.S. POLICIES

Dr. Eva SCHERWITZ
Institute of Political Science in Tübingen, Germany

To quote this paper:

RESEARCHING THE IMPOSSIBLE? ASSESING DIFFERENT WAYS OF EU INFLUENCE ON U.S. POLICIES

➤ PARIS PAPERS DE L’IRSEM

10- French adaptation strategies for arm export controls since the 1990s
Lucie BERAUD-SUDREAU

9- Germany and War: Understanding Strategic Culture under the Merkel Government
Sophia BECKER

8- War narratives in a world of global information Age: France and the war in Afghanistan
Barbara JANKOWSKI

7- Shielding the state: UAE military efforts to Counter Iran’s disruptive options in the Gulf
Victor GERVAIS

6- Defence and security industry: Which security industry are you speaking about?
Vincent BOULANIN

5- Strategic and tactical uses of ethnicity. Insights from the Azerbaijani question in Iran
Gilles RIAUX

4- Thinking strategically about sanctions: a research agenda
Olivier SCHMITT

3- The European Union in Columbia: Learning how to be a peace actor
Dorly CASTANEDA

2- Now or never: the way to a credible European Defense
Maya KANDEL, Jean-Paul PERRUCHE

1- Pakistan: Coercion and Capital in an « Insecurity State »
Amélie BLOM
ABOUT IRSEM

The Institute for Strategic Research of the Ecole Militaire (IRSEM) aims to promote research undertaken on defence issues and provide encouragement to a new generation of researchers. The documents produced and the activities organized by the Institute can be found on its website:

@ : www.defense.gouv.fr/irsem

: http://tinyurl.com/ke3p8l7

: @IRSEM1

: http://tinyurl.com/nr8qkz8

DISCLAIMER

The opinions expressed in this document are the author’s alone. They do not in any way reflect the official stance of the Ministry of Defence.
Abstract

This article deals with an issue so far neglected within transatlantic literature, namely the question of how the EU exerts influence on the US. After assessing the relationship of power and influence exertion, this text addresses the relevance of different influence paths (compulsory, institutional, structural, productive). Since the ability of setting international norms and standards receives special attention in the research literature on the EU’s external relations, the paper focuses on instances of EU influence in which the EU was able to implement foreign policy norms towards the US. In order to reach a broad picture of the ways in which the EU exerts influence, the article thus analyses two different issues of possible EU influence in detail. These are: the conflict over the Iranian nuclear program and the case of climate policy. Both issues are researched in a period of major EU-US distortions, namely within the presidency of George W. Bush. I conclude with a tabular evaluation of the various types of influence which demonstrates that the EU influences the US via each of the mentioned paths. It shows that the promotion of norms is relevant for each influence path.

Resume

Ce Paris Paper traite d’un enjeu largement ignoré dans le domaine des relations transatlantiques jusqu’à présent, c’est-à-dire la manière dont l’Union européenne exerce son influence sur les États-Unis. Après avoir évalué la relation entre le pouvoir et l’exercice de l’influence, cette étude examine la pertinence de différentes voies d’influence (contraignante, institutionnelle, structurelle, productive).

Alors que la littérature sur les relations extérieures de l’Union européenne met l’accent sur sa capacité à établir des normes et des standards à l’échelon international, ce Paris Paper cherche à identifier les moyens par lesquels l’UE a été capable de fixer des normes à l’égard des États-Unis.


L’étude se conclut par une évaluation tabulaire des différents types d’influence, qui démontre que l’Union européenne a exercé effectivement une influence sur les États-Unis dans chacune des voies évoquées et met particulièrement en lumière la pertinence de la fixation de normes.

Key words: transatlantic relations, normative power, EU foreign policy, influence
# Table of Contents

- Synthesis of the study ........................................................................................................... 6
- Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 7

I. Combining different influence paths — the analytical frame ................................................... 10

II. Third factors, methodology and criteria for EU influence ..................................................... 13

III. Two instances of EU influence ? .......................................................................................... 15

1. Conflict over the Iranian nuclear program .......................................................................... 15
2. Climate policy ..................................................................................................................... 15

IV. Tracing the paths of EU influence ......................................................................................... 17

1. Compulsory influence ........................................................................................................ 17
2. Institutional influence ......................................................................................................... 18
3. Structural influence ........................................................................................................... 19
4. Productive influence .......................................................................................................... 21

- Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 23
- References ............................................................................................................................ 26
SYNTHESIS OF THE STUDY

The aim of this study is to alternate the general focus of transatlantic relations literature which has largely concentrated on transatlantic differences and the US impact on the EU’s foreign policy decisions.

I am arguing that the EU’s impact on US policies has so far been underresearched. However, the adoption of a Common EU Foreign and Security Policy has produced an EU speaking with one voice in an ever growing number of policy fields. This article seeks to account for this development by shedding light on different ways in which a common EU foreign policy position influences the United States. The data for this study has been derived from several interviews conducted by the author with policy officials in April and May 2011 in Washington DC. It furthermore consists of official government documents, speeches and official interviews of US and EU functionaries as well as of newspaper analysis.

The interest of researching the ways of an EU influence on the US is evident: it may contribute to highlight the so far neglected side of the story of influence between two decisive partners in the international arena. By this, it may serve to better understand the current relationship of EU-US interaction and to eventually extract suitable ways of dealing with international problems. This may lead to a more fruitful relationship where each of the partners can act upon its specific strengths.

The general arguments of this article go as follows: The EU has been influencing the US in different policy fields, it has thereby employed different pathways of influence and the projection of norms has been a relevant factor in this process of influencing.

These arguments are tested in two different policy areas (security and climate policy) in a time of major transatlantic distortions, namely within the two presidencies of George W. Bush. An a priori openness to EU influence is thus less likely in this period of time.

My conclusions show that EU influence exertion works through different paths, in accordance with the specific policy field and its settings. However, not each of the paths has been relevant in each policy case. The article shows that the EU has been able to exert influence on a powerful partner, even in cases in which the US a priori seemed to be better off in terms of capacities and resources.

We can thus conclude that the EU may indeed have an impact on the US via promoting its norms towards the latter.

The article concludes with the finding that the research on how the EU influences the US has to be extended by further case studies in order to reach a deeper understanding of which pathways of influence are particularly promising to promote EU interests. Defining the preconditions for the successful employment of the influence paths may also be used to make EU-US interaction more predictable in cases of conflict or dissent between the two partners. A deeper understanding of how both actors interact in response to international challenges will require the inclusion of further policy areas. This may help to deduce suitable common strategies for the EU and the US to deal with international problems.
**INTRODUCTION**

When comparing the EU and the US, most analysts agree on decisive divergences in their conception and understanding as world powers. While the EU is often referred to as a regional soft, normative or civilian power, the US is still seen as the last remaining superpower, even if it shows symptoms of decline. With regard to the EU, the scientific debate around an EU as an emerging world actor has gained importance throughout the last decade sustained by the increasing common competences and policies in important foreign policy issues.

The most famous distinction between the EU and US type of power has been proposed by Kagan in 2003 introducing the mythological comparison of Venus EU and Mars US. This distinction has led many authors to define the EU as being inferior to and dependent on the US in decisive (particularly hard power) policy areas. The US is thus believed to define the locus of action for the EU: “America agrees to accord Europe a greater voice in step with its greater capability.” On the other hand, there is much theoretical thinking about a potential desire of the EU to counterbalance US supremacy, despite its obvious military inferiority. Authors have tentatively started debating possibilities of the EU to “rise” its influence on the US and have discussed possibilities of the EU of engaging the US “on a range of practical topics” after the US 2006 midterm elections. Strikingly, these ideas remain

---

somewhat fuzzy, since a detailed analysis\textsuperscript{11} of the actual EU influence on the US is still lacking in the existing literature. This article wishes to contribute to closing this research gap by addressing the following questions: Does the EU exert any influence on the US in different policy areas by setting its own foreign policy norms? How is this done and how significant are different paths of exerting influence on the US?

Within the literature dedicated to the external relations of the EU, the ‘normative power’ approach states that the EU is able to set international standards of behavior while interacting with third states which consequently may lead such third states to implement EU norms\textsuperscript{12}. However, the case of the EU-US relations is treated as a hard test case for the applicability of this approach\textsuperscript{13}. This article will therefore test in the context of two empirical cases, whether and how the EU has actually been able to enforce its norms upon the US.

In order to answer these questions, I have chosen research cases which have in common that the EU had established an official united position towards the US policy\textsuperscript{14}. Since this paper is focused on the question of how influence has been exerted, the criterion for my case selection is the assumption of the possibility of EU influence. I concentrate my analysis on both terms of the George W. Bush presidency from 2001-2009 by focusing on a potential change of behavior of the US administration. As the transatlantic relationship has been marked by strong political differences during this timeframe, I argue that this period is of special relevance for my analysis, since we cannot assume an a priori acceptance of the Bush administration regarding EU policies and EU demands. We can therefore conceive this period as being significant for the examination of the relevance of EU influence.

As for the case studies, I choose cases from two policy areas which represent important areas for future EU-US cooperation. These are: environmental and security policy. The former, since environmental policy is seen as one central field, in which the EU may test its capacities as a relatively new actor\textsuperscript{15}; security policy, since the US is still seen as the military superpower in this policy field, while the EU’s advantages rather lie in civilian crisis management. The dependency of the


\textsuperscript{14} This common position can be the result of the competence of one specific EU institution (e.g. EU-Commission) or of a specific cooperation among EU Member States (e.g. EU-3). I am aware that possible differences between EU-institutions and single EU Member States can equally affect the outcome of the common EU policy and will discuss this where necessary.

EU on the US in the field of security makes this a particular challenging area when analyzing EU influence.

I argue that the EU has been able to influence US policies in the following two cases:

- Climate policy: 2001-2009, including negotiations on the Kyoto protocol and the role of the EU-Emissions Trading System for the US.
- Conflict over the Iranian nuclear program: 2003-2006: Beginning of the active EU engagement on the issue to its referral to the UN-Security Council.

The following section will introduce my conception of power and the four different paths of influence available to the EU, which I derive from different forms of exerting power (1). I will then propose indicators for each influence path (2) and test their relevance within both case studies (3). The results of this test are combined in a table of influence paths in the end of the study (4). It shows that the EU is particularly successful in influencing the US through the social relations of EU-US interaction and that it successfully advances its norms within each of the two test cases.
I. COMBINING DIFFERENT INFLUENCE PATHS – THE ANALYTICAL FRAME

The question guiding the EU’s influence analysis is in which ways the EU (as a normative power) may have an impact on the US behavior by imposing its perception of “normality” towards the US’s perception. I thereby focus my analysis on just one aspect of the normative power literature, namely on the underresearched precise imposition of norms, independent of the question of whether the EU actually pursues these norms out of strategic or normative considerations.

In order to theoretically assess the effects of imposing EU norms, a conception of influence is needed:

My definition conceives influence as the transformation of power into tangible forms of impact. I therefore focus on the relational aspect of power and on the outcome of exerting this power. Within the literature, there is a wide-spread conception of different power forms. If I want to capture the EU’s way of exerting influence, I therefore need to include different power forms into my conception of the exertion of influence.

With reference to the divisions among three ‘dimensions’ of power or three ‘faces’ of power, I will on the one hand concentrate my analysis on coercive power understood as the possibility to intentionally make someone do what she otherwise would not have done. I will on the other hand consider the conception of power which focuses on the ability to exclude certain alternatives from decision-making, and I will include the “third” power face, which focuses on the power of influencing the thoughts and wishes of one’s counterpart, without the latter recognizing the exertion of power. In addition to this last conception, power may also be freely floating and be transferred.

---

16 Cf. in this context the Weberian understanding of power as the chance to impose one’s will on another within a social relationship even against resistance, independent of what this chance relies upon. (own translation following: WEBER, Max, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie, 5th edn (Tübingen: Mohr), 1980, p. 28.
Impact, understood as the tangible result of influencing, is treated as synonym for influence throughout my article.
22 Lukes, op.cit.
Researching the impossible? Assessing different ways of EU influence on U.S. policies

via discourse, by which in turn subjects are constituted\(^{23}\). Finally, power may lie in the (social) system which influences the positioning of actors within this system (see, world systems theory\(^{24}\)). All these different forms of power will need to be considered as forming the ground of my conception of exerting EU influence.

Finally, “authority” is often referred to as a concept closely related, but separated from power, meaning in very general terms that one actor follows the other out of obligation or duty, and by which the subordinated actor cedes some autonomy in order to profit from the social order of the ruler. The “consent” of the subordinated to the authority and the hierarchy within such a relationship are important elements of this notion of authority\(^{25}\). Although the hierarchy between the EU and the US has been referred to as decisive element shaping the relationship, the concept of authority will not be at the ground of my conception of exerting influence. In my reading, the distinction between power and authority relies on the reason why states accept a particular order introduced or promoted by another state. This motivation, however, will not be part of my analysis, since this article is not interested in the question why the US cedes to EU norms, but analyzes how this is reached by the EU. I therefore rely on an eclectic concept which brings together the major different conceptions of power referred to in the previous section:

I consequently base my argumentation on two analytical models which account for various kinds of power as they combine the aforementioned power forms\(^{26}\), or which distinguish between various paths of influence\(^{27}\). In analogy to the ‘types of power model’ by Barnett and Duvall, I distinguish between two dimensions in order to analyze the process of exerting EU influence: (1) The kind of power exertion, (2) the form of EU influence. The first dimension refers to the way of exerting power which then lead in my conception to different outcomes, and thus to different forms of influence. I argue that within the EU-US relationship power is exerted in two different ways. On the one hand, the EU exerts power via concrete EU actions and specific EU policies. On the other hand, power is exerted through the social structure of the EU-US interaction.

The second dimension designates the outcomes of the power exertion, thus the different forms of EU influence. Within this dimension, I distinguish on the one hand between a direct and specific way of influencing, in which the influence/impact on the US is a discernible consequence of EU power exertion. On the other hand, I speak of more indirect forms of influence, when the relationship between both partners is more detached. The adaptation of the aforementioned models to my research purpose leads to four plausible forms of EU influence (see table below):

(1) Exertion of power via EU-actions, specific EU policies forming the basis of influence

**Compulsory influence**: The US administration is directly influenced by EU-actions via coercion and incentives.

---


**Institutional influence**: The US administration is influenced indirectly via international institutions which mediate between both partners; the EU is able to enforce its own institutional rules.

(2) Exertion of influence via the social structures of EU-US interaction

**Structural influence**: The interaction structure allocates advantages to the EU position. This directly affects the range of possible actions of the US. The US administration (unconsciously) adapts its social interests to the new structural conditions.

**Productive influence**: A ‘contingently produced discourse’ emanating from the EU becomes dominant within the transatlantic interaction. The establishment of new meaning leads to a change of the reality perception in the US.

The foundation of these four influence forms are the underlying conceptions of the different ways of exerting power: Compulsory influence is related to Dahl’s conception of power; the fundamentals of institutional influence can be found in Barnett and Duvall’s institutional power; structural influence makes reference to elements found in the world systems theory; the bases of productive influence rely on the third face of Lukes (1972), as well as on Foucault’s conception of productive power and, particularly, his notion of discourses of normality shaping the (perceptions of the) interaction partner. However, in opposition to Lukes’ third face of power, the question of intentionality or the consciousness of being influenced do not play a role for the purpose of my study.

In addition, this analysis is not aimed at opposing these different conceptions of power but to use them as a basis in order to understand a variety of possible outcomes (influence forms) which are derived out of them. I am aware of the fact that in reality these different forms of influence may play together, but for the purpose of this article, I prefer to analytically distinguish between such different forms in order to generate a first understanding of the EU influence on the US.

In the following section I will set up the methodological approach of my analysis in order to later on relate in detail to the EU’s policy towards the US and assess the effect of the process of exerting EU influence on the US behavior.

---

29 BARNETT, DUVALL, op.cit. p.12, 2005.
II. THIRD FACTORS, METHODOLOGY AND CRITERIA FOR EU INFLUENCE

Throughout this paper, I do not argue in favour of a monocausal link between EU influence and US change of behavior. I will rather examine where EU influence has contributed to a certain change of behaviour within the US administration. While I am concentrating this analysis on the process as well as on the result of exerting EU influence, alternative explanatory factors for a change of US policies will be discussed as far as possible.

However, the relevance of alternative factors is already limited by the set-up of my study: The focus lies on the EU-US relationship and on specific issues regarding the interaction of both actors. I will put special emphasis on how the US is justifying its change of behaviour. If a third factor (beyond EU influence) is playing a decisive role for the US change of behavior, this will most likely be referred to in the individual background interviews with I have conducted with central actors of the conflict cases. Finally, since I will trace the process of the EU exerting influence on the US position, possibly missing or additional elements in the chain of events which characterize both cases will not remain unstudied throughout my case analysis.

Methodologically, my analysis of each influence path is thus guided by individual indicators which I derive from the defining elements of the different power types of Barnett and Duvall 2005. I use these indicators in order to trace the process of the EU’s exertion of different forms of influence. The study of the cases in terms of process tracing is directly derived out of the research question which aims at understanding how influence is exerted, since „process tracing is strong on questions of how
and interactions\(^{31}\). I will specifically concentrate on the kind of EU policies and the mechanisms of action which develop out of these policies.

The following section proposes specific criteria (nodal points) used in this article for tracing each influence path:

Intentionality, conflict of interests and change of behavior are the criteria developed by Dahl as proof for the exertion of power. These factors form the basis for Barnett and Duvall’s ‘compulsory power’\(^{32}\). Consequently, I argue that the EU is successful in exerting compulsory influence on the US if it holds clear positions which can be distinguished from those of the US. The US may then be induced or coerced by the EU to adapt to EU demands. EU coercion is based on material means (e.g. economic incentives) as well as on intangible means (e.g. the threat of damaging the reputation of the other). Regarding institutional influence, I pose the question as to whether the EU has been able to influence the rules of an institution mediating between the EU and the US. I will therefore account for the role of the EU within the institution by examining how far the EU influences rules or procedures of the respective institution. A further criterion is the adoption of or adaptation to these new/changed institutional rules by the US. Structural influence presupposes that the EU has obtained privileged capacities through its enhanced position within the EU-US relationship. The US then reproduces this privileged EU position, for example by recognizing the EU as a leader in a certain policy area\(^{33}\). If the US willingly adapts to guidelines or policies which emanate from enhanced EU capacities in a transatlantic issue, I will speak of structural influence. I will identify productive influence, if the transatlantic discursive space is marked by EU knowledge and systems of meaning which have been established by the EU. If I observe not only an adoption of, but also an adaptation to EU arguments by US actors, I identify this productive influence.

Last but not least, if I follow the normative power argumentation, by stating that the EU can exert influence on the US behavior by enforcing certain norms towards the US, my understanding of these norms needs to be specified. I understand norms as common and binding rules of behavior\(^{34}\). With specific regard to the two cases under analysis, I will argue that such norms are inscribed in the ‘Treaty of the functioning of the European Union’\(^{35}\). Part of the central norms of the EU’s foreign action is the devotion to multilateralism and to improving the world’s environmental conditions. I will assess in the following sections as to whether the EU has tried to push these norms (improvement of environmental/climate conditions and multilateralism) towards the US in two transatlantic case studies.


III. Two instances of EU influence?

The following brief introduction to the two case studies will illustrate my argument of a US policy change within the selected periods of observation which possibly has its origin in the exertion of EU influence. It thereby underlines why both case studies qualify as test cases of potential EU influence.

1. Conflict over the Iranian nuclear program

When the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declared in 2003 that Iran had not fulfilled its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the IAEA demanded comprehensive inspections of the Iranian nuclear plants. The necessity to act in the Iran case was agreed to, both by the EU and the US. However, while the EU worked on the engagement of Iran into a political dialogue structure, the US threatened with hard conflict solutions (sanctions) in case of Iranian non-compliance with the demands of the IAEA.

The conflict consisted of two stages. In the first period (October 2003-September 2005), the EU (EU-3 + Solana) negotiated independently agreements with Iran (cf. declaration of Teheran 2003, Paris Agreement 2004). The second period (October 2005-December 2006) contains the referral of the Iranian issue to the UN Security Council. This triggered the first UN Resolution on the suspension of the Iranian nuclear program which was based on an EU proposal.

The policy change of the US consists here in the US support of the EU policy approach on the Iranian issue. While the US opposed the ‘soft’ EU proposals in the beginning, it changed its attitude and ended up by actively supporting the EU-3 proceedings within the period of observation.

2. Climate policy

Within the broad area of international climate policy, I will focus in the following on the implications of the Kyoto process. Special attention will be drawn to the EU Emissions Trading System for CO₂ (EU-ETS) and its implications for US policy. In December 1997, the EU and the US had signed the Kyoto Protocol along with other industries. In this Protocol, the signatory states committed themselves to a

---

reduction of greenhouse gases. However, the perspectives for US ratification were uncertain from the beginning. A Senate Resolution of 1997 had made clear that a US participation in a binding agreement within the frame of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was not acceptable. In 2001, the Bush administration decided to not ratify the Protocol and to leave the Kyoto process. This paved the way for a leading position to be held by the EU in the following negotiations on climate change. It was due to the negotiation efforts of the EU that in 2005 the Protocol became acceptable to a crucial number of ratifying states in order to come into force. Laidi interprets the Protocol in this context as a ‘symbol of their [the EU’s] distinct political identity’. The EU engaged even more in the rapid implementation of the targets of greenhouse gas reductions and established inside its borders in 2005 the first Emissions Trading System for CO₂. Surprisingly, a hesitant change of political thinking and a deeper consideration of environmental issues consequently started to develop even within the US administration. This process was initiated in 2003 by a Pentagon Report on the security related dangers of global warming as well as in a commitment to the reduction of greenhouse gases by President Bush in 2008. Since 2007, several initiatives in Congress, supported by both parties, debated different climate change programs and discussed the introduction of a US-wide ETS. None of these initiatives has achieved the necessary majority of votes in Congress so far, but the EU ETS has so far served as an example for several regional greenhouse gas reduction initiatives in US Federal States. The following section draws attention to the importance of each influence path within the two cases.

40 Laidi, Zaki, op. cit, p.6.
IV. Tracing the Paths of EU Influence

1. Compulsory Influence

Elements of compulsory influence can be traced in the climate case. Strictly speaking, the Iran case lacks any element of explicit compulsion, although the EU disposed of certain compulsory means towards the US, such as its diplomatic advantage of direct contacts with the Iranian authorities and its economic relations with Iran. However, coercion was on the one hand not an adequate measure of influence in the sensitive field of security policy, on the other, it was not a necessary one, given the afore-mentioned diplomatic advantages of the EU. This is why compulsory influence – as defined above – is not measurable for the Iran case. Interestingly, though, in the Iranian case, the EU has used an indirect form of rhetorical pressure: By excluding openly options of “military intervention” or “regime change” as an unsustainable option for the Iranian conflict, U.K. Foreign Minister Straw said in this regard: “(...) but I don't see any circumstances in which military action would be justified against Iran full stop. I think I've made that clear.”41. This is just one example in which the EU clearly points to its different understanding of the conflict and thereby implicitly declares the US position as unacceptable. Since this rhetorical criticism, directed at openly ruling out the US position, can harm the US’s international reputation as an actor seeking unjustified solutions, such opposition towards the US can be interpreted as a way of rhetorical EU pressure in order to push the US to not consider further the described options. An indication for the argument that reputation of the US has indeed mattered, is the fact that in 2005 the US administration started the so called “olive branch tour” to the EU as a sign of reestablishing its harmed reputation in the EU42.

In the field of climate policy, the ability of the EU to impose its norms via incentives and coercion was very limited. Views on climate change remediation diverged dramatically between the EU and the US. Not only did the Bush administration insist on the US right to voluntarily reduce greenhouse gas emissions, it also made clear that a reduction of emissions had to include developing countries and that any measure that would threaten to hurt US industry would be unacceptable to the US43. A shift had nevertheless taken place from the first to the second term of George W. Bush, in which the Bush administration increasingly committed itself to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. I argue that one of the reasons for this shift was again the EU strategy to put ‘reputational’ pressure on the US. The EU intentionally used negative publicity in order to criticize the American opt-out from the Kyoto protocol publicly: ‘We can’t allow one country to kill a process to confront a major global

---

42 INTERVIEW, Washington, DC, April 28 2011.
problem like this. As a result, in the 2006 and 2007 EU-US summits, the US administration agreed to establish a High Level Dialogue on climate change, clean energy and sustainable development with the EU. An EU-US agreement on energy and climate protection was signed in 2007, however without including binding emissions reduction targets. Before, the EU had put overt pressure on the US by criticizing any insufficient engagement in the area of climate change as harmful for the entire negotiation process.

Thus, the increased engagement of the Bush administration with regard to climate issues can be interpreted as resulting from the pressure on its ‘climate reputation’ from inside and outside the US.

In the Kyoto case, this ‘reputational’ pressure resulted only in minor shifts in US policy. Neither the US ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, nor the EU goal of a comprehensive US climate legislation were achieved by the EU’s influence involving compulsion via putting pressure on the US reputation. Thus, compulsory influence has partly been successful as long as the EU possessed strong negotiation assets or other (reputational) means of exerting compulsion on the US. The analysis of the cases suggests however, that a US change of behavior seems to be triggered more reliably by using classical material assets of EU influence than by using the kind ‘reputational’ pressure of the climate case.

2. Institutional influence

As for the case of climate policy, the EU and the US both formed part of the institution UNFCCC. However, after having withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol, the US delegation adopted the role of an observer within the Conferences of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Protocol (COP-MOPs). I will therefore not consider elements of EU influence via the UNFCCC at this point. The Iran case represented a favorable institutional starting position for EU action. Since no member of the IAEA held a comparably strong negotiating position towards Iran, a great number of IAEA Resolutions were prepared by the EU. The EU was able to propose detailed drafts for the IAEA


Democrat Al Gore had received in 2006 international attention with his documentary ‘an inconvenient truth’ enlightening the US public on the dangers of greenhouse gas emissions.

I want to stress again that although the effects of reputational pressure are very much linked to productive influence, I have discussed them here in the context of compulsory influence, since intentional threats and obvious pressure have been involved in this type of exerting influence.


I refer here to the role of the EU in the enacting of the following Resolutions:


Resolutions since it had obtained a large amount of important information through its continuous bilateral negotiations and meetings with Iran. The US backed these proposals since alternative approaches did not achieve majorities on the Board of the IAEA\(^{49}\). The same holds for UN Resolutions 1696 and 1737\(^{50}\), which were based on EU proposals\(^{51}\). Not only had the EU-3\(^{52}\) become the general coordinator of the UN Resolutions, it also acted as an indispensable mediator within the UN Security Council. The EU-3 achieved a compromise on a dispute between the US and Russia over the implementation of a ban on travelling for the staff of the Iranian nuclear program. Thus, the EU-3 were able to use their favorable position within the IAEA and the Security Council in order to implement their own international propositions. This led to indirect pressure being put on the US not to deviate unilaterally from the agreed proposals. A hint that the EU was in fact exerting institutional influence on the US can be seen in that the US did not actively pursue counter proposals in opposition to the EU solutions. In turn, the US reacted with an adaptation to the measures for conflict solution which had been introduced by the EU via the IAEA / UN institutions\(^{53}\).

### 3. Structural influence

A structural change, in the sense of a changed position with enhanced capacities of the EU can be observed in each of the two cases.

Since the beginning of my period of observation, the EU had obtained a leading position within the Iranian conflict, since it disposed of the possibility of direct contacts with Iran. Lacking such direct diplomatic means of interaction with Iran, the US was not able to attain an independent negotiating position within the Iranian conflict. Thus, the events of 2003 worked as a window of opportunity which provided the EU with an outstanding position as a negotiating partner of Iran. This was further strengthened by the formation of EU-3 and their increasing recognition as a serious negotiating partner in- and outside the EU\(^{54}\). Consequently, the US became conscious of its dependence on the EU-3 as a mediator in the Iranian dispute. The US administration was furthermore not ignorant of the

---


\(^{53}\) Although not being a member of the Security Council, Germany was continuously involved in the negotiations regarding the UN Resolutions.

increasing international recognition of EU efforts regarding the Iranian dispute (by the other IAEA members). As soon as the negotiations and agreements between EU-3 and Iran appeared likely to be successful, the US thus changed its behavior and actively backed EU-led diplomatic talks with Iran.

The US therefore adapted its own behavior to the structural conditions of the Iranian conflict in that it gradually accepted the EU-3-led diplomacy as the following statement of George W. Bush indicates:

“I want to thank our friends for taking the lead and I will -- we will work with them to convince the mullahs that they need to give up their nuclear ambitions.”

The EU's newly acquired capacities as an indispensable international player also show in the Kyoto negotiations. Especially after the retreat of the US from the Kyoto process, the EU had gained an important role in combating climate change. In 2001, EU Environment Commissioner Wallström opined that the non-participation of the US in the Kyoto Protocol was a turning point in transatlantic relations: “I think something has changed today in the balance of power between the EU and the US.” This perception of an internationally prominent and leading EU, and a US increasingly isolating itself contributed to a self-confident criticism of President Bush by leading EU officials: “If one wants to be a world leader, one must know how to look after the entire earth and not only American industry.” In view of the changed EU role in international climate policy, the US administration faced difficulties in defending its position of refusing to act in the fight against climate change. One sign of a gradually increasing US consideration of the European demands on the issue of climate change was the 2008 announcement of President Bush to end the increase in US greenhouse gas emissions by 2025. The timing of this announcement is important, since it was held one day before a meeting with President Bush’s EU partners at the UNFCCC Major Economies Forum.

Further effects of the important EU position can be found in the fact that a number of US Federal States – such as California – engaged in bilateral partnerships with the EU. This engagement was followed by a common political declaration between EU Members and US Federal States on programs on emissions trading in the framework of the so called International Carbon Action Partnership.

The invigorated position of the EU as an international expert on climate policy issues also led to an increased interest for EU expertise in Congress and paved the way for several Congress initiatives in

---

60 This Partnership consists of countries and regional confederations which have introduced an Emissions Trading System or which aspire it. US regional confederations on Emissions trading such as the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) are members.
the direction of a comprehensive US climate policy. Although without success, these initiatives were inspired by the existing EU regulations on the EU-ETS. The advance of the EU in issues of climate policy was further discussed outside the US administration in scientific articles, newspapers and periodical analyses. Thus, the recognition of EU leadership and the alignment with EU guidelines happened at the US local and State level, in the academic debate and to some extent in the US Congress.

The criteria of structural influence proved to be significant in the case of Iran with a favorable EU negotiating position. The Kyoto negotiations showed that the acceptance of an EU ‘climate leadership’ resulted in a changed debate on environment policy within the US, but not in an effective change of policy at the level of the US administration or in an alignment with EU demands. One reason for this may be the outward opposition of parts of the American industrial sector to potential emissions caps.

4. Productive influence

The ways of exerting productive influence have varied between each of the cases as I will outline in this section.

In the Iran case, the EU was able to fix the norm of conflict resolution through dialogue. Moreover, it was able to advocate its strategy of positive incentives towards Iran. The adoption of EU argumentation by the US in relation to Iran reached its peak in the second term of George W. Bush, when the US not only actively supported the EU approach in the Iranian conflict but even considered reengaging in direct diplomacy with Iran. Both aspects illustrate a considerable change of US policy. The change in the tone of US language and argumentation became explicit in official US speeches characterized by the increasing commitment to cooperation with the international partners (especially EU-3) involving a ‘peaceful solution and diplomacy’. It is notable here, that the US administration did not use the latter notions anymore in order to characterize the EU-proceeding in the conflict, but increasingly used them for designating its own preferences:

---

“(…) President Bush has consistently emphasized that the United States is committed to a diplomatic solution to the nuclear challenge posed by the Iranian regime. (…) The United States is willing to exert strong leadership to give diplomacy its very best chance to succeed.”

Such sentences speak of a certain adoption of EU problem perceptions by the US president, the EU’s goal of a diplomatic solution becomes a US commitment. One could argue, however, that in the second period of the negotiations (2005-2006), the EU itself had to sacrifice precisely this norm of diplomacy for a harder policy - including the threat of sanctions. Even though hard sanctions as a ‘last resort’ have always formed part of the EU strategy to confront conflicts, this nevertheless implies that the EU’s problem perception had also shifted towards the US interpretation to some extent.

In the field of climate policy, the EU had put CO₂ emissions at the center of its problem perception. Out of this perception, it deduced the necessity of multilateral goals and binding measures in the fight for combating climate change. Due to the EU’s engagement in favor of the Kyoto Protocol, the debate on climate change has affected the international agenda. Thereby, the EU has reached an “(…) increasing political salience of issues, notably climate change”. Vogler derives from this a sort of “power of definition” owned by the EU: “The latter has been allowed to acquire a defining character for the EU in opposition to the United States”. I argue that this power of definition has had an impact on the US leading it to finally adopt the discourse on the threat of global warming and climate change. This US alignment holds true even with respect to the options of problem definition. A sign for a change in the US argumentation is found in the fact that the US administration changed its attitude from the initial remark “Kyoto is dead” towards an attitude which conceived the problems mentioned within the Protocol (especially related to CO₂) as actual problems. Thus, the denial of the connection between CO₂ emissions and climate change had become an increasingly vulnerable option for the US side – not least in a time where the Bush administration had to prepare for a presidential campaign with democrat opponent Kerry announcing a “day and night difference” to the Bush administration’s climate policy while promising the US approval of mandatory emissions targets and the introduction of a US cap-and-trade-system for CO₂. Besides this, it was also the EU’s standards for what could be considered a ‘responsible engagement’ of the US in dealing with anthropogenic climate change, which now characterized the transatlantic discourse.

With regard to productive influence, the Kyoto case has been an example of US alignment to EU perceptions. Yet, a precise change of legislation has not occurred. Change of US policy has happened rather indirectly on the level of political thinking. In the Iran case we have observed a temporary very
far-ranging alignment with EU solutions and norms. However, this alignment only lasted as long as the situation seemed to be favorable for the diplomatic approach of the EU.

**CONCLUSIONS**

The table below illustrates that the EU has effectively had an impact on the US via different paths of influence, even though not every influence path proved to be relevant in each case.

**Table 2: Effects of EU influence on US policies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>compulsory influence</th>
<th>institutional influence</th>
<th>structural influence</th>
<th>productive influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>(●)</td>
<td>(●)</td>
<td>(○)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyoto</td>
<td>(○)</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>(○)</td>
<td>(●)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s findings

Notes: Concerning the evaluation of the influence paths, the following determinants are used:
Influence path: (  ): not measurable; (-): barely applies; (○): partly applies; (●): broadly applies. This labeling refers to the confirmation of the methodological criteria, which have been referred to in section 2 for each influence form. I thereupon draw conclusions on the importance of each influence path.

In the following, I will draw attention to the particularities which the analysis has revealed for each influence path.

In sum, most of the criteria for structural influence have proven to be relevant within the test cases. However, the analysis has also shown that even if the EU possessed a structural leading position within the Kyoto case, we still cannot assert the influence criterion change of US behavior. The US recognized the leading role of the EU in climate change, a commitment to the Kyoto Protocol has however never occurred. Thus, the Kyoto case suggests that strong opposition (e.g. by industrial lobbyists) within the domestic debates of the negotiation partner may render structural influence impossible, even though the conditions for this influence path have been favorable.

The second influence path with a rather positive balance is the one of productive influence. I expected this influence path to be especially important in cases of material imbalance between the two actors, where the EU would thus need to resort to its ability to ‘influence meaning and perceptions’. With regard to the field of security policy (Iran), a field of clear imbalance in terms of military power assets, it is therefore especially interesting to observe that the EU was influencing the
US precisely not by productive influence, but rather through its structural and institutional positioning. In addition, both cases have revealed that the discursive US alignments have either been temporary or that they did not lead to a substantial change of policy within the period of observation. This indicates that the study of productive influence would profit from long-term research in order to trace a lasting change of perceptions and their translation into revised US policies.

In the case of compulsory influence it is remarkable that the EU used reputation as means of pressure. This might possibly be a specific element of EU-influence, since the EU, an internationally highly estimated (self-appointed) ‘moral instance’, was able to successfully threaten the US with damage to its image and reputation e.g. in the Kyoto case. The effect of this ‘reputational’ pressure bears resemblance to productive influence as it promotes a changed self-conception of the partner’s behavior by establishing new relations of meaning. Direct (material) pressure has been employed in neither of the cases. One important insight was that the compulsory option has been treated with caution and is rarely employed in the context of transatlantic interaction, even if the EU possesses certain means and resources of pressure. In this context the EU-3 has, for instance, not considered possibilities of simply resisting to further adopt its mediator role in case the US would insist on the hard sanctions, or even a military solution, towards Iran. The same is true for the Kyoto example where the EU could possibly have made its reduction of greenhouse gases dependent on further US concessions. Both actions would have affronted the US and even if their employment may not have led to the desired US change of behavior. Such condition-setting would have represented a possible form of exerting pressure on the US, which would have harmed the US to a certain extent (no negotiations with Iran, no CO₂ reductions leading to further harm to world climate). This suggests that the EU is reluctant to impose its norms on the US if this bears the risk of a direct confrontation with the latter.

Finally, the Iran case suggests that the EU uses institutional influence successfully in security issues in order to influence the US indirectly by using an institution as mediator for its policy solutions. The Iran case has thereby been a prime example on how the EU has successfully worked through the preparation of IAEA and, later, UN solutions in order to reach an international majority for its preferred solutions, focusing for a long time on dialogue and soft incentives for Iran. Further research needs to account for the potential of this influence path in further transatlantic policy fields.

In conclusion, these findings indicate that the successful employment of each influence path depends on the existence of additional factors. Thus, further research needs to consider the relevance of US domestic opposition to EU influence, the possibilities of the EU to employ ‘reputational’ pressure, the duration of the exertion of influence and the availability of several influence paths at a time.

The analysis further revealed that productive influence, in which EU norms determine the transatlantic discursive space, has been an important influence path in both cases (e.g. the EU successfully promoted its perception of anthropogenic CO₂ emissions as the decisive reason for global warming).

The past paragraphs have however shown that the EU has also successfully spread its norms via the other influence paths. In the case of compulsory influence, the EU established certain interpretations of behavior via ‘reputational’ pressure (e.g. the EU appealed to the responsibility of the US for climate change). These interpretations then affected the perceived US need for action; in the case of
in institutional influence, the EU established its own standards for confronting international problems by working through international institutions (e.g. positive incentives have been included in the IAEA Resolutions). Finally, structural influence was used by the EU to set own priorities by virtue of its position ‘at eye level’ (e.g. by its negotiating position within the Iran negotiations the EU was able to push its understanding of a multilateral, diplomatic incentive-based approach to the conflict).

Whether the EU has pursued these norms because of normative goals or because of strategic interests and whether the US has chosen to adapt to these norms out of calculations or conviction or even obligation has not been subject of this analysis. It can be asked whether the analysis of the motivation of the US to adopt a certain norm would be fruitful, since it is disputed whether norms and interests can be clearly separated (see Diez71 or Cox72). Furthermore, the assessment of the normative power argument, and thus, whether the EU particularly pursued its norms out of normative reasons in its relations towards the US, needs to be further clarified within the specific transatlantic context.

This article has shown that during a most critical time for the transatlantic relations the EU has been able to influence the US through different paths and that the promotion of its own foreign policy norms have played a central role for exerting this influence. The reflection on who is ‘better off” within the transatlantic relationship thus seems to lose ground to a new question in transatlantic relations: How can the EU and the US best make use of their intertwined net of influence paths in order to reach a productive and promising common position towards future challenges?

---


REFERENCES


RESEARCHING THE IMPOSSIBLE? ASSESSING DIFFERENT WAYS OF EU INFLUENCE ON U.S. POLICIES


INTERVIEW: Washington DC, United States, Interview of the author with a former representative of the US Department of State, April 28 2011.

JUDGMENTS of THE COURT of JUSTICE of THE EUROPEAN UNION,

‘Commission of the European Communities vs. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, C-466/98 ‚ 5 November, 2002.


researching the impossible? assessing different ways of EU influence on U.S. policies


This article deals with an issue so far neglected within transatlantic literature, namely the question of how the EU exerts influence on the U.S. In this context, the relevance of different influence paths (compulsory, institutional, structural, productive) is addressed. Since the ability of setting international norms and standards receives special attention in the research literature on the EU’s external relations, this issue is equally addressed in the paper. In order to get a broad picture of the ways the EU exerts influence, this article analyzes three different issues of possible EU influence. These are: the conflict over the Iranian nuclear program, the Open Skies negotiations, and the case of climate policy. All three issues are researched in a period of major EU-U.S. distortions, namely within the presidency of George W. Bush. I conclude with a tabular evaluation of the various types of influence which demonstrates that the EU influences the U.S. Via each of the mentioned paths. It further shows that the promotion of norms is relevant on each influence path.

Eva SCHERWITZ
Institute of Political Science in Tübingen, Germany