THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO CIVIL-MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND PERSPECTIVE

DR. CÉCILE WENDLING

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SYNOPSIS

Facing recurrent complex crises requiring an improved coordination of civilian and military, international and local actors, the comprehensive approach concept has appeared both within international organisations (Nato, EU etc) and within governments (the US, France, the UK etc). The issue concerns restoring security, governance and development through an inter-agency, inter-ministerial or even an inter-organisational approach.

The present study identifies the dilemmas of the comprehensive approach (the neutrality of humanitarian intervention versus the armed commitment of states, the explicit cooperations between international organisations versus implicit cooperation, etc). It anticipates the consequences of the comprehensive approach, foremost a strengthened position for the European Union and Nato, wielding management capabilities for civil and military crisis management, and the quest for legitimacy within Nato and the African Union. It qualifies the French position towards the concept. It analyses the operational impact of the comprehensive approach for the military. Finally, it reinforces the academic thinking on the comprehensive approach and presents new research topics in security studies.

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Previous publications:


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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ana</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Comprehensive approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>CICDE</td>
<td>Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations</td>
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<td>Cimic</td>
<td>Civil-military cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMCO</td>
<td>Civil Military Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMPD</td>
<td>Crisis Management Planning Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRCT</td>
<td>Crisis Response Coordination Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>DfID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (United Kingdom)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG ECHO</td>
<td>Office of humanitarian aid, European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dime</td>
<td>Diplomatic, informational, military and economic elements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dimefil</td>
<td>Diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement elements</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department for political affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department for peacekeeping operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBAO</td>
<td>Effects based approach to operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBO</td>
<td>Effects based operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>EISF</td>
<td>European Interagency Security Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eunavfor</td>
<td>European Union Naval Force Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fias</td>
<td>Force international d’assistance à la sécurité</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>British Foreign Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HTT</td>
<td>Human Terrain Team</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Both states and international organisations (the European Union, Nato, the UN, the African Union etc) make extensive use of the “comprehensive approach” since the early 2000s, including the terms “multidimensional approach”, or “integrated approach”, and these expressions largely sum up the idea of a better harmonisation and coordination of international, local, civilian and military actors when crises occur. In parallel, there is also talk of the “whole of government approach” (WGA or WHOGA), of “interagency approach”, of “networked security”, “multifunctional approach” and of “3D concept (diplomacy-development-defence)”, amongst others. Although the idea behind all these expressions conveys the idea that a one-dimensional approach proves counterproductive in tackling complex crises, it proves to be very difficult to find a single defini-

tion for the concept of comprehensive approach. Further, a number of acronyms are currently employed such as “Dime” (“diplomatic, informational, military and economic elements”) or “Dimefil” (“diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence and law enforcement elements) or “Midlife” (“military, intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, information, finance and economic elements”).

In all of these instances, the issue concerns combining civilian and military efforts to best manage a situation by including international and local actors. This multiple use of terms and acronyms makes it difficult to see clearly, as each actor will use them differently according to the context and its historical background. Also, some actors in crisis management use the comprehensive approach without naming it: “There is no single, coherent, or commonly agreed CA model. Moreover, strategies and model scans signify de facto a comprehensive approach without using the term. This complicates comparisons and creates terminological confusion. Besides, while most actors today acknowledge the necessity for better coordination and cooperation, their approaches diverge significantly regarding priorities, means and suggested end-states of crisis management.”

According to de Coning and Friis, several reasons explain why many actors take interest in the comprehensive approach even if they use different labels to describe it. Among these are the search for greater efficiency in crisis management in times of budgetary restrictions, a greater coherence in the actions of all in a common space (especially as some crises pose problems, such as Afghanistan today), an improved legitimacy of action for some actors (e.g. Nato), the ambition to reduce the number of failed states (such as Somalia) which represent a security threat today, and the political urgency for conflict settlement linked to the fact that citizens are increasingly

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unwilling to accept military casualties for extended periods of time.

There is a debate on the historical foundations of the expression. Some put the origin of the term in UN documents written in the late 1990s and present Kofi Annan as one of its promoters. Others mention a Danish influence in Nato, presented as the organisation having defined the expression, notably at the Bucharest summit in 2008. To some military representativess but also some humanitarian personnel, this is a new popular label to describe the links between civilians and the military which have always existed. We may for instance find historical references to “global action”, or “global maneuvers” at the source of the concept “comprehensive approach”. To others this is a new element that needs to be further conceptualised to fit into the doctrine. This process is underway in France in 2010 within the Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d’expérimentation (CICDE) to present a concept to the Army Chief of Staff but also to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where a task force is dedicated to establishing a “global response” by France in the management of complex crises. What is surprising, when looking at these concepts that are subject to debate in government ministries and within international organisations, is the scarcity of academic publications dealing directly with the topic. Although think tanks, NGOs etc. are working to develop their vision of the comprehensive approach, few academic books and articles are actually analysing what is currently happening around this fashionable concept on a practical level. It thus seems essential to delve further into the issue.

This study is divided into five chapters. The first examines the foundations of the comprehensive approach. It looks at the origins of the concept from a theoretical, historical but also a doctrinal, political and technological angle. The second part focuses on internatio-
nal organisations and their use of the concept (the EU, Nato, the UN, the OSCE, the AU, the OECD). It stresses that the European Union and the UN are the only organisations able to benefit from a dual competency in managing civilian and military crises. The third chapter presents the use of the comprehensive approach by states, using four examples: France, the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States. It focuses on the disparities in institutionalising the concept. The fourth chapter deals with the critical positioning of NGOs towards the introduction of the comprehensive approach. The fifth chapter concludes the study on the challenges linked to this new approach, both political, organisational and cultural, and attempts to formulate useful recommendations for the use of the comprehensive approach in future crisis management.

**On the origins of the comprehensive approach**

There is no universal comprehensive approach. Therefore it becomes important to revisit the origins of the comprehensive approach to understand where this persistent blur comes from and the different positions of the actors involved. In order to recreate the origins of the comprehensive approach several aspects will be examined: the theoretical origins, the historical origins (including the analysis of past events which may have triggered the concept’s attraction), the origins linked to the military doctrine (EBAO, global maneuver capability) and finally the origins at the more political level of the approach (“whole of government approach”) and the more technological designs of the approach (integrated computer systems with layer and filter). This will enable in conclusion of the first chapter to offer a definition of the comprehensive approach within the framework of the study.
The theoretical level

A review of the literature shows the difficulty of finding academic texts on the comprehensive approach, whereas ministries, international organisations and think tanks are very active on the subject. Nevertheless, the comprehensive approach refers to numerous related fields of the literature that seem important to mention here before examining the other theoretic origins of the concept.

The holistic approach and the systemic approach at the origins of the comprehensive approach

The documents presenting a theoretical approach of the concept in the chronological format sometimes put the comprehensive approach at the introduction of the holistic approach (notably in sociology, represented by Durkheim in France) and the systemic approach (mainly in the 1950s in the United States in economics, management studies, etc). Moreover, the appearance of the comprehensive approach in hard sciences is sometimes mentioned, in particular in ecology already in the 1980s. The objective here is not to go that far back to establish the origins of the concept, nor to include the hard sciences in the concept history, but to focus on the use of the concept in crisis management in the sense of conflicts in unstable states or major catastrophes – natural or industrial – or even terrorist attacks. Although some actors (e.g. in France) would like to restrict the comprehensive approach challenges to crises in failed states, others look upon the concept as a tool which may be used in crises such as major disasters (the UN) or in terrorism (the OSCE).

Human security and societal security

At the theoretical level when looking at the field of crisis management, there is first a link between the comprehensive approach and the development of the concept of human security. Indeed, with the change of security paradigm and the birth of the security-defence continuum, crisis management is no longer seen as a lethal...
battle to conquer a territory, but as the confrontation of partners-adversaries who have to find a means to restore peace. It is not only about intervening on ceasefire, but also integrating human aspects for returning to good governance, an administration, police structures and ensuring economic development. There is thus a link between the concept of human security and establishing the comprehensive approach.

In this context we may also examine the links between societal security and the comprehensive approach. Indeed, the comprehensive approach may be seen as a form of “securisation” of the phase of restoring political institutions and the return to an adequate level of development beyond the ceasefire aspect of crisis management. By integrating the poverty level, or the absence of justice in so-called societal threats, governments and international institutions which use the comprehensive approach securise (in the sense of the Copenhagen School) dimensions of the crisis that until then were only politicised. In other words, they introduce challenges into the security agenda which formerly were in political platforms. This may be interpreted as a seizure by some governments or international organisations of new dimensions of actions which by their “securisation” get more attention in the public arena and therefore greater public financing. It may also be a way for these actors to legitimise their existence, as we shall see.

The links between civilians and the military

Another theoretical link may be established with the literature dealing with the relationship between civilians and the military. However, it often views civil-military in the sense of Cimic more than from the perspective of the comprehensive approach. But the Cimic aspects which are more restricted to the operational framework of crisis management, should not be confused with the comprehen-
sive approach which represents a wider and more recent philosophy. The Cimic label corresponds to the arrangements implemented by the armed forces to obtain the neutrality of the population in a crisis area. This means first doing everything necessary on the military level to enable the best possible interaction. Conversely, the comprehensive approach is much more proactive and does not deal exclusively with the theatre of operations. It targets not only the neutrality of the population, but aims at winning the hearts and minds of the inhabitants of the theatre. It is about seducing the local population by rebuilding and restoring governance. Further, upstream from capitals or in international structures it is about designing an inter-agency, inter-ministerial or inter-organisational logic to best manage crises as they occur. The literature on organisational issues will therefore be included to comprehend the challenges linked to the comprehensive approach (cf. infra).

Although the comprehensive approach thus is removed from the Cimic approaches, we may nevertheless draw an important lesson from the literature on these aspects, namely what it has yielded on the issues occurring between civilians and the military in working together. A major difficulty brought up by the literature on the relationship between civilians and the military is that the latter are often disconcerted by the multitude of possible interlocutors on the civilian side, as they are used to precise and clear hierarchic lines of command. This makes the exchange between civilians and the military very complex and implementing the comprehensive approach thus becomes very tortuous. Another aspect of the Cimic literature which may certainly apply to the comprehensive approach is the issue of cultural differences between actors from civil society and those of the military.

Organisational issues in public policy

Organisational issues connected to the comprehensive approach are partly broached in the literature on public policy in terms of coordination challenges. There are indeed links between public policy works on the coordination between services and ministries and the

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“whole of government approach”, the more restricted but very present “inter-agency” or “inter-organisational” concepts when the organisational aspects of the comprehensive approach are discussed\(^\text{19}\). The comprehensive approach often collides with rival services. Christian Schnaubelt writes the following in his chapter on operationalising challenges of the comprehensive approach: “Turf battles and protection of personal and organisational prerogatives, as well as legitimate policy differences at the national and grand strategic levels, are certainly part of the explanation for the bureaucratic wrangling\(^\text{20}\)”. Case studies have been conducted, but mostly on the level of a ministry or the minister’s staff to understand the problems involved in implementing the comprehensive approach at the organisational or inter-organisational level\(^\text{21}\). We will adopt not a “micro” positioning – as is the case in these studies – but a “macro” positioning on the phenomenon.

**Peacebuilding and peacekeeping**

It is equally possible to make a link on the theoretical level with publications dealing with peacebuilding and peacekeeping, but this field goes well beyond the strict comprehensive approach challenges, by studying issues such as the efficiency of such operations. However, among the criteria identified in this type of literature, one may find the ambition to take a “comprehensive approach” and a “comprehensive evaluation”, which may be interpreted as premises of the comprehensive approach\(^\text{22}\). Moreover, it would seem that the comprehensive approach also revolutionises the field, for with this new concept there is no longer a strict separation between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as was often the case for this literature. Also, the comprehensive approach very much dissolves the distinction between conflict and post-conflict management actions\(^\text{23}\).


\(^{23}\) Telephone interview with Oliver BEHN, European Interagency security forum (EISF), Paris, le 30 June 2010.
**Nation building or stabilisation**

Another concept which is hard to leave aside when discussing the comprehensive approach is that of stabilisation, a concept which appeared in the extension of the literature on nation building\(^{24}\). The studies are based mainly on the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan in attempting to find factors of success and failure\(^{25}\). Among key success factors are again the unity of efforts between civilian and military actors, implementing multilateral actions bringing together international and local actors, reconstruction operations and training the local population (police forces, etc). There is thus a direct link between the works on the stabilisation concept and implementing the comprehensive approach. For this reason, this literature will be more abundantly used for reference in this study than others.

**Neo-institutionalist studies on international organisations and their interactions – the challenges of task-sharing**

Some elements of the literature on international organisations and their role in crisis management may also be taken into account when they study inter-organisational challenges and issues related to the effectiveness of multilateralism\(^{26}\). As indeed the comprehensive approach has the objective of bringing together different actors around a common goal of complex crisis management, the comprehensive approach poses the question of the links between international organisations when they intervene on a common territory, as in Afghanistan where Nato, the UN and the EU are present together. Within the institutionalist school in international relations, there are several authors writing on the relationship between the UN, the EU and Nato in implementing the comprehensive approach, e.g. Biermann or Hofmann\(^{27}\). The literature is more comprehensive on the

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\(^{24}\) DOBBINS, James, McGINN, John G., CRANE, Keith, JONES Seth G., LAL Rollie, RATHMELL, Andrew, SWANGER Rachel M., TIMILSINA? Anga R., America’s role in nation building, RAND, 2009.


Nato-EU relationship than on for instance that between Nato and the UN, reflecting the current level of cooperation between these organisations. This theoretical field of international relations will also be used to enable a macro-level study incorporating both the individual positioning of the actors, but also their interaction on the international stage.

In addition, these issues of interaction between international organisations bring us back to the challenges of task-sharing in a context of globalised governance. Given that numerous actors position themselves on the issue of peacekeeping and peacemaking, the challenge is to establish which actor is best suited for leadership in managing a complex crisis, but also how tasks ought to be distributed to ensure optimal efficiency on the ground. What about coordination between actors? This implies taking into account financial, technical and logistic concerns (on interoperability issues).

To conclude, no single theoretical academic field dedicated to the comprehensive approach may be found; instead the concept is at the intersection of several fields which will have to be considered in this Irsem study. The following section will delineate the historical context of the emergence of the comprehensive approach concept.

History

Historically, the origins may be traced to the first links developed between diplomatic and military circles, and during the 20th century in certain states with the end of conscription after the end of the cold war. Further, some major crises acted as a catalyzing force of the comprehensive approach (Bosnia, Kosovo). Finally, the current context of reform implementation – following the Lisbon Treaty and the new Nato strategic concept – reinforces the implementation of the comprehensive approach in official texts, within the new structures and on the ground, when crises occur.


**Some historic trends**

Some authors (e.g. Schnaubelt) situate the birth of the comprehensive approach at the early relationship between the military and diplomats as early as the late 17th century. They view the exchange between military and diplomatic personnel and the consideration of economic aspects as an embryonic integrated approach during military campaigns. Others prefer to quote Clausewitz who already cited the importance of the trinity uniting government, the military and the population.

Without going back as far, among the more recent elements mentioned by people interviewed for this study is notably the end of conscription. With the nascent perception of a partner-adversary relationship, armies had to rethink their links to civilian actors, in particular since as conscription disappeared they were no longer made up of civilian actors with multiple abilities, but of professional military staff in need of links with civilian actors with diversified competencies. This is at least the conclusion drawn by active French military staff. In terms of reserve officers, they view the comprehensive approach as a means of being useful to the army by putting their dual military and civilian competencies at its disposal.

**Crisis as a catalyst**

Among the hallmark crises which have contributed to implementing the comprehensive approach, the Kosovo crisis is often cited by the people interviewed. When this occurred, Nato both provided bombing of the territory and refugee camp management, which was a primer for humanitarian workers who were relieved of their habitual work, as it were. For the first time Nato and NGOs were operational on similar battlegrounds. Thus occurred the issue of their potential coordination. Further, the crisis in Kosovo offered the opportunity to publish official documents mentioning directly the comprehensive approach. This is the case for instance in UN Resolution 29.

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32 Telephone interview with Oliver BEHN, EISF, Paris, 30 June 2010.
1244 adopted on 10 June 1999 (article 17). The issue was predominantly to implement a greater degree of coordination between the UN, Nato, the EU and the OSCE.

Other crises are also brought forward, mainly Bosnia but also Angola, Somalia and Mozambique, which allegedly contributed in the late 1990s to make the UN aware of the necessity to design an integrated approach.

The 9/11 attacks also played a role, since they accelerated the military perception that western NGOs could be instrumental in improving world security and fighting terrorism. Considerable US financing fuelled humanitarian action, complementing military actions. In fact, NGOs then started to respond extensively to government calls for tender (e.g. in the US) and from international institutions to carry out missions to fight the development of terrorism in unstable zones. Thus was increasingly posed the problem of interaction between the agents of security, development and good governance in failed or unstable states.

Reforms as accelerators

Internal reforms within some organisations around key texts, such as the recent EU Lisbon Treaty signed in 2007 and the new strategic concept of Nato (November 2010) catalyzed the introduction of the comprehensive approach in official documents. In parallel, governments themselves started to insert the comprehensive approach into their doctrine. The concept seems to travel from one state to another, from one international organisation to the next. Already present in UN documents by the late 1990s, it appears within Nato and the EU. Thus a pendulum movement may be observed, as we shall see, between ad hoc attempts on the ground using the comprehensive approach in times of crisis (in Liberia for the UN, in Afghanistan for Nato) and doctrinal attempts to formalise the concept in documents adopted by the headquarters of international organisations or by state governments.

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34. Telephone interview with Oliver BEHN, Paris, 30 July 2010.
The role of multinational experiments (MNE)

International experiments within the MNE framework played a role in the mid-2000s. Through this means of exchange, the comprehensive approach concept was disseminated among numerous actors of the Atlantic alliance. This is one outcome of the study carried out by the FRS and US CREST on the new military concepts. It underlines the birth of a community of interests around the comprehensive approach.

In conclusion, historically speaking, there has been a convergence of several phenomena: the end of conscription on one hand, and the lessons learned from major crises on the other (Kosovo, Mozambique). This produced reforms within international institutions (EU, Nato) and new concepts progressively introduced on the government level (primarily in the United States and in European countries). The MNEs certainly contributed to the creation of a forum of exchange on the comprehensive approach, and to the emergence of a community of interests. The next section details the doctrinal origins of the comprehensive approach concept in Anglo-Saxon countries with the EBO, and the EBAO in France through the colonial experience.

On the military level

The origins of the comprehensive approach may be found on the doctrinal and military level on one hand through the Effects based operation (EBO) and the Effects based approach to operation (EBAO) mainly developed in the United States and in the UK, and on the other hand through the “global maneuver” essentially developed in France in the context of colonisation.

On the origins of the American and British doctrines: the links with Effects based operation (EBO) and the Effects based approach to operation (EBAO)

On the doctrinal and military level, some works associate Effects

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based operation (EBO\textsuperscript{36}) developed in the United States with the systems analysis, the Effects based approach to operation (EBAO\textsuperscript{37}) developed in the UK and by Nato, and the comprehensive approach as used by the United States, the United Kingdom or Nato\textsuperscript{38}. Indeed, both the EBO, the EBAO and the comprehensive approach are based on systemic methods of analysis attempting to integrate the complexity of crisis management. Reading for instance the official definition of the EBAO within Nato as stated in the Military Committee position paper (June 2006), there are some rather close links to the current definitions of the comprehensive approach: “The Effets Based Approach to Operations is the coherent and comprehensive application of various instruments of the Alliance combined with the practical cooperation with involved non-Nato actors, to create effects necessary to achieve planned objectives and ultimately the Nato end-state\textsuperscript{39}”.

Further, by distinguishing “kinetic” from “non-kinetic” aspects while bringing them together in texts conceptualising the EBO and the EBAO, progressively the need for a better cooperation between civilians and the military appears in the background, divided into “kinetic” actions for the military and “non-kinetic” actions for the civilians. An example of this link between the EBO, the EBAO and the comprehensive approach may also be found in many documents presenting the comprehensive approach. For instance, the Finnish conception of the comprehensive approach is presented in direct connection with the EBAO\textsuperscript{40}. It thus seems that the use of the EBO and the EBAO has helped to launch the comprehensive approach on the doctrinal and military level\textsuperscript{41}. But although the EBAO is considered a tool, the comprehensive approach is more presented as a philosophy both in the Nato Defence College documents and in British memoranda on the issue\textsuperscript{42}. Finally, it should be noted that although

\textsuperscript{36} The EBO concept initiated by the US Air Force in the early 1990s aims at better targeting for more results during operations. This concept quickly became interarmy and developed at the time by the USJFCOM, under the influence of Warden and Deptula.

\textsuperscript{37} COQUET, Philippe, « Opérations basées sur les effets, rationalité et réalité », Focus stratégique n°1 1, Ifri, 2007.

\textsuperscript{38} DEMORTIER, Marie-Christine, « Débats intellectuels et enjeux politiques autour du concept d’approche globale de crise », Note d’étape n°3, Ministère de la défense, 13 December 2009.

\textsuperscript{39} In: “Military committee position on an effects based approach to operations”, MCM 0052-2006, 6 June 2006.


\textsuperscript{41} Theo FARRELL, Department of War Studies, King’s College London, available online: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmdfence/224/224we20.htm, viewed on 27 May 2010.

\textsuperscript{42} Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for
On the origins of the French military conception: the concept of global maneuver and the military tradition of Lyautey

In the French context, a first parallel may be made on the doctrinal and military level between the concept of “global maneuver” and that of “comprehensive approach”. The expression global maneuver exists on the tactical level. It concerns the conception of an operation on the ground when a crisis occurs in terms of the civilian organisations present. It is also about maintaining good relations with local authorities. Unlike the so-called “classical” maneuver, a “global maneuver” tries to integrate more immaterial actions such as actions of influence. Army officers often make a link between the comprehensive approach and the kind of approach practised by general Lyautey, and conceptualised under the name of “global maneuver”. We may quote the writings of Marshall Lyautey on his operation from 1903 to 1906: “It is necessary that very soon the entire region feels it is in our hands, materially and morally; materially through the shining action of our mobile forces, morally by having our domination accepted by all the groups that have to enter it. General Lyautey then lists activities such as ensuring delivery of seeds to the local population, reopening markets, setting up schools, etc. French officers questioned mention the Cimic as having taken form in this colonial context; and being today downscaled with the comprehensive approach, as in the Afghan example. Finally, when questioned French military often make the link between the comprehensive approach as currently developed and the inter-
-arms, inter-army, inter-allied and inter-agency approaches that have progressively emerged over the past decades. For instance, France has developed since the early 2000s an inter-army group for “civil-military actions”. Based in Lyons, the specificity of this group is the ability to establish multidisciplinary teams for operating in close cooperation with local populations in crisis areas.

In terms of military conception, two schools may be distinguished at the origin of the comprehensive approach: the Anglo-Saxon version based on the EBO and the EBAO, and the French one based on general Lyautey and the global maneuver. This allows both Anglo-Saxon and French actors to legitimise their present stance by presenting themselves as the originators of the comprehensive approach.

**On the political and institutional level**

On the national level the term “whole government approach” (WGA) is used for a state and the “whole of organisation approach” for an organisation such as the European Union. In both instances, the issue is to avoid duplication within a government or an institution between various services or ministries that make up the whole, thus contributing to the comprehensive approach on the political level. The objective is also to increase the information flow between various actors, civilian or military, to make them work more in synergy in times of crisis (typically, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the Development Ministry, names being different depending on the country). Finally, all actors involved must focus on the objectives and the end result, which implies links between civilian and military actors. This concept has been developed in particular by the OECD. The WGA concept is used within Security Sector Reform (SSR). But it may also progressively be found in texts on the comprehensive approach, especially on the European level.

**On the technological level**

Technological aspects should not be neglected in order to understand the evolving military strategies, as technical progress im-

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pacting them models the organisation and structure of forces, etc\textsuperscript{49}. But in fact, some publications view recent technological developments as one of the causes of the comprehensive approach, since they enable greater information sharing among actors in crisis environments. The ability to create collaborative computer tools has been key to concretising the comprehensive approach and previously the EBO and the EBAO\textsuperscript{50}. The new tools of information systems (notably those allowing for including multiple data layers) enable various civilian and military actors to access data while maintaining confidential information through the use of filters.

**Conclusion on the origins of the comprehensive approach**

The comprehensive approach “travels” a lot, according to Sartori’s expression\textsuperscript{51}. Its significance is so vast, its origins so diverse and its meanings so varied that there is a risk of wanting to compare the use of the concept in its widest sense, without paying attention to the specific context in which it is implemented. To avoid the risks of “concept stretching” as defined by Sartori, it thus seems important in each case examined below to take into account the particular nature of the European, Nato and UN concepts as well as the national concepts. In this sense, rather than being a comparative study, it will be a panoramic view of the various meanings given to the concept by international actors, but also the different ways in which they use it to position themselves on the international stage.

In summary, we will study how international organisations, states and NGOs use or position themselves against the comprehensive approach as an attempt to establish greater cooperation between international and local, military and civilian actors, in order to improve the efficiency of their action in times of crisis by combining three levers: security, governance and development.


The issue at stake is to identify how various actors have mobilised the concept for their own purposes, but also to analyse the problems raised by the establishment of the comprehensive approach. The study will combine an analysis of the emergence and the use of the concept within organisations, as well as in their bilateral relations. The issue of the incidence of the concept in headquarters and on the ground will be the focus of the case studies.

An overview of the use of the comprehensive approach by international organisations

Although the comprehensive approach consists of the rapprochement of the military and civilians in crisis management, each international organisation, state and NGO involved develops its own definition of the term. Behind the actors’ various postures on the comprehensive approach, hidden political and strategic issues have to be analysed. This second chapter will present the comprehensive approach of various international organisations: the European Union, Nato, the UN, the OSCE, the AU and the OECD.

The use of the comprehensive approach by the European Union

The European Union is often presented as the actor with the greatest ability to develop and enforce the comprehensive approach. Indeed, the European Union combines the military and civilian components of crisis management with the possibility of military intervention in crisis management since the European Council of Cologne in 1999\(^\text{52}\) and the possibility of civilian missions in crisis management (police, justice, civil administration and civilian protection) adopted by the Council of Feira in 2000\(^\text{53}\). Moreover, it is a forum of exchange between states, but also with NGOs, for instance through the Office of humanitarian aid of the European Commission (DG ECHO) and with other international organisations with a position on the subject (UN, Nato).


Establishing the concept

Historically, the European concept of comprehensive approach allegedly took form under the UK presidency in 2005, although the issue of improved civil-military cooperation in EU operations had been raised in the form of CMCO\textsuperscript{54}. Even though there is no official definition in the EU of the comprehensive approach, there seems to be a consensus on the following spelling-out of the concept: “it (the CA) implies the pursuit of a methodology aimed at commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favorable and enduring outcomes in the political, diplomatic, security, economic, development, rule of law and human rights dimensions of international engagements in pursuit of a common goal both within and beyond the EU\textsuperscript{55}”. After discussing with people working on these issues within the Council secretariat, it is clear that the EU uses the 3D concept when attempting to make the comprehensive approach explicit: defence, development and diplomacy (and for diplomacy the 3Cs: common strategy, common mission statement, common understanding of the strategy, mission statement and modus operandi). The principles considered central for the European comprehensive approach are: the development of local capabilities in the failed state (“strengthening local ownership”), the importance of politics for peacekeeping (“political primacy”), legitimacy, unity of effort, security, conflict transformation and regional commitment.

Further, studying the texts promoted recently by the European Union, one may note a wide reference to the comprehensive approach in several fields. This applies to the legislative texts from the Commission concerning migration\textsuperscript{56} or drug traffic\textsuperscript{57} for instance. It also applies to texts issued by the Council such as “Towards a comprehensive approach – the operating implications\textsuperscript{58}” (March 2010).

\begin{itemize}
\item GROS, Philippe, VILBOUX, Nicole, COSTE, Frédéric, KLEIN Michel (ed.) : 
\item Definition communicated by an official of the EU Council secretariat, featured according to him in internal working documents to explicate what the EU means by comprehensive approach.
\end{itemize}
following the first two texts conceptualising the EU comprehensive approach: “Military implications of a comprehensive approach” (MICA) and “Operating implications of a comprehensive approach” (OICA) while consolidating them59. This situation with an increasingly strong presence of the comprehensive approach on the EU level, both in the Commission and in the Council, is today reinforced with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, creating the European External Action Service and its Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) which bring together the civilian and military components around the CMCO concept (civil-military cooperation). The latter seems to be one of the most visible material outcomes of the ambition to develop a comprehensive approach within the European institutions.

The European concept of Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO)

In the context of the European Union, reference is made to the institutional efforts aiming at close collaboration of civilians and the military under the acronym CMCO (civil-military coordination). The official definition is as follows: “Civil Military Co-ordination in the context of CFSP/ESDP addresses the need for effective co-ordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of EU’s response to the crisis60”. The acronym started to spread during the Danish and Greek presidencies and the importance of the CMCO development was underlined in the paper of 6 November 200361. The objective was to implement the necessary institutional reforms within the EU to allow for a genuine coordination between civilian and military actors. In addition, the paper stressed the importance of a coordination culture that ought to create a new organisational routine of coordination. By its institutional and cultural impact, the CMCO was presented as a prerequisite to the implementation of a European-style crisis management, under the direction of the Political and security committee (PSC). It is indeed the PSC which may reflect upon all available European options (civilian and military) when a crisis occurs in order to coordinate them appropriately as needed. Through the crisis mana-

59 Documents absent from the bibliography (restricted distribution).
gement concept and common action, the PSC then sets the framework of the mission in a coherent and coordinated manner. In 2003, the Lisbon Treaty was not yet in place, but there was talk of creating a “Crisis Response Coordinating Team” (CRCT) to implement the comprehensive approach within EU crisis management. In the same manner, as early as 2003 it was thought that a special representative could coordinate EU actions in a comprehensive way. Operation Artemis in 2003 also confirmed this need.

Beyond the CMCO concept, an expression belonging to the European political and institutional context, Brussels texts also contain the term Cimic which is frequently used by the military to describe the relationship between civilian and military personnel on the ground. On the European level, the definition of the Cimic is the following: “Cimic is referring to a support function to military mission”. How then should the links between the CMCO and the Cimic be understood on the EU level? Cimic, which existed as an acronym on the government level to describe the links between the military and civilians to support ongoing military operations, has also been used in Brussels referring to relations between civilians and the military in crises managed by the EU in an operational framework. This concerns exclusively the link forged by the military with civilians on the ground.

If the Cimic only deals with operational and tactic support issues, the CMCO concerns the civil-military links on the political and strategic level, ie within the EU institutions in Brussels, with the implications this may have in times of crisis. The CMCO includes the civil-military cooperation within the Common Foreign and Security Policy, but equally the links between the community tools for crisis management and the intergovernmental tools, these being reinforced by the establishment of the EEAS since the Lisbon Treaty. The idea is to achieve coordination between civilian and military actors in all stages of the crisis management, and in particular already at the

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strategic planning stage where the role of the various instruments is defined.

The concept concerns both Brussels, the theatre and the link between the two. We will therefore study the CMCO, the key component of the European comprehensive approach, and not deal with the EU Cimic in the restricted sense. Therefore it seems useful to understand how the CMCO is incarnated by the new actors introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in the context of developing the European comprehensive approach: the European External Action Service (EEAS) and its Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD).

The role of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and its Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD)

In the context of the CFSP the comprehensive approach was expressed in an ad hoc fashion, well before the first conceptualized texts. As remarked by Frédéric Ramel, already by 2001 EU communication on conflict prevention mentioned the need for combining a large array of interventions in complementary fields, e.g. democracy development, restoring security etc. More accurately, there are three types of cases where the European comprehensive approach has been expressed ad hoc. First this may be found in the framework of the expanded Petersberg Tasks, as recently validated by the Lisbon Treaty. Originally the Petersberg Tasks were defined by the WEU in 1992, then included in the EU Treaty at the Amsterdam summit in 1997 to include peacemaking and peacekeeping. Second, the comprehensive approach was expressed ad hoc in the missions of civil crisis management following the Feira summit: this concerns above all restoring the police, justice, administration and in some cases civilian protection. Finally, it may also be found in civil-military operations, e.g. the Aceh Monitoring Mission. These three options are found in the reference text formalising the the EU comprehensive approach: “Towards a comprehensive approach”. Indeed, it is mentioned that “When appropriate the EU may deploy a civilian mission, with assistance from the military, or a military operation

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Article 17 of paragraph V.
with participation or assistance from the civilian components. In a complex scenario, the EU may choose to deploy both a civilian mission and-or a military operation where a wide range of instruments are available, possibly for an extended period. Until 2007, most of the civilian missions were planned by or with the help of the military, as in the case of Aceh, an intervention very extensively planned by the military.

The new structure incorporating the CMCO today is the CMPD, a department of the new European External Action Service. The objective is to integrate civilians and the military into the various stages of crisis management, from strategic planning to crisis management, including training and exercises. Documents exist to help civilian and military actors during a crisis, mainly the Crisis Management Concept (CMC), the Crisis Management Procedure (CMP) and the Guidelines for Joint Fact Finding Missions and the Guidelines for EU Crisis Response Information Activities. These documents serve as basic guides for civilians and the military and are regularly updated to include all essential data for comprehensive crisis management. Before the CMPD, the CRCT never really worked because of the institutional and human difficulties in making the various organisations work together (the military and civilians of the Council secretariat and the representative of the European Commission). The civil military cell of the Operation centre created in 2005 within the EU Chief of Staff never received the necessary support from the DG E of the Council and the Commission.

The Commission’s capabilities in terms of the comprehensive approach

Beyond the CMCO used in the framework of the Common Foreign Security and Defense Policy within the EEAS, the comprehensive approach may also be found in the services of the European Commission. This has led to discussions on the appropriate location for the civilian dimension of the crisis management within the European institutions, between Council and Commission. Among the Com-

68. Documents absent from the bibliography (restricted distribution).
69. PFISTER, Stéphane, « Le volet civil de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense : ambiguïtés et
mission’s instruments conducive to the comprehensive approach are: the stability instrument, humanitarian aid, the community mechanism for civilian protection, programs for reconstruction and development, economic support measures and all that pertains to capacity building (especially the role of DG Justice and Home Affairs).

However, documents presenting the comprehensive approach issued by the EU Military Committee do not include the humanitarian and development aid aspects managed by the European Commission in their actions. The humanitarian aspects in effect implemented by the NGOs are managed separately from the military aspects so as not to violate their principles of independence, neutrality and autonomy. This separation between humanitarian, development security and government issues within the European institutions poses the question of the limits of the European comprehensive approach. The UN for instance includes the three pillars in its integrated approach. We may ask whether this European distinction will prevail or progressively disappear within the European External Action Service. However, this distinction is precious to preserve the establishment of humanitarian principles. This may be concluded from interviews conducted with NGO members. They fear the rapprochement between the DG ECHO and the EEAS, for instance.

The EU comprehensive approach as coordination with other external actors

The comprehensive approach also means for the European Union creating partnerships and agreements with other international actors. Already with the European Security Strategy (2003\(^70\)) the EU underlined the importance of developing an efficient and effective multilateral approach, including improved collaboration with the UN, the OAU, Nato, etc.

In terms of the EU-UN relations, we may mention the two Joint Declarations (2003, 2007) and the creation of the UN-EU Steering Committee. The European Commission has also signed partnership agreements with UN agencies (UNDP, WHO, UNHCR etc). Further, in some operations, as in Kosovo, the EU was in charge of the integrated approach as reported by Cédric de Coning. Last but not least, the Commission finances numerous UN actors. Between 2001 and 2008, 37 per cent of European aid dedicated to peacekeeping was transferred to UN programmes. In parallel, a third of the EU stability instrument finances UN actions. Through these various interactions, we may perceive the establishment of an institutionalised EU-UN partnership in the civilian crisis management. It remains to be seen whether this could extend to partnerships including military aspects, within the comprehensive approach. Attempts have been made, such as the EUFOR Chad. But when talking to actors on the ground the perception is that there is stronger political reticence when the military are involved. This seems to make the EU-UN cooperation more delicate. To this should be added that the UN may not undertake coercive military operations. It seems that the more the two institutions try to formalise their partnership, the more it creates coordination problems. This element is explained by Joachim Koops who shows that the creation of the EU-UN Steering Committee has not allowed for a better coordination by institutionalisation.

Concerning the EU-Nato coordination, we may mention the role played by the Berlin + arrangements. Yet here again, an institutionalised partnership has not enabled to entirely simplify the interaction between the two institutions, according to Koops, on the contrary. Moreover, the situation is politically blocked, which prevents a true utilisation of the comprehensive approach on the strategic level to capitalize on the civilian component of the EU and the more developed military means of Nato. Indeed, the conflict between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey is detrimental to the existence of an in-depth strategic dialogue between the two organisations, as Tur-
key refuses to let the Republic of Cyprus participate in the PSC-CAN meetings and the respective military committees\textsuperscript{75}. Beyond this Turkish-Cypriot issue, there is strong competition between the EU and Nato in crisis management, as may be seen in concrete examples. Nato intervened in Darfur a year after the EU. When the EU relieved Nato in Bosnia, Nato stayed on. Nato intervened against piracy off the Somali coast whereas the EU was already present. Still, the EU-Nato partnership might have good chances to develop beyond this geopolitical conflict, as both Nato and the EU are in a context of “asymmetric” resources, in particular in terms of civilian crisis management resources. But according to Koops, the more the resources are asymmetrical between international organisations, the more cooperation is clear and simple\textsuperscript{76}.

Finally, there is also the African Union-European Union partnership. The EU supports AMIS\textsuperscript{77}, the EURO-RECAMP\textsuperscript{78} and the African Peace Facility\textsuperscript{79}, among others. It should be stressed that the EU is primarily in contact with other international organisations such as the African Union as principal funder. The issue is then the positioning of the European Union in relation to these institutions. How to develop collaboration beyond the financial issues in order to develop the European comprehensive approach? What may be the European Union’s influence through funding? What are the EU interests in this kind of partnership agreement?

The comprehensive approach in the European Union on the ground: the Atalante example

Launched in December 2008, the Atalante-Eunavfor Somalia contributes to deterrence, prevention and repression of piracy acts and armed robbery off the Somali coast\textsuperscript{80}. This operation takes place


\textsuperscript{77} African Union Mission in Sudan.

\textsuperscript{78} A European initiative with French origins: it is an instrument of the EFSP for Africa under the control of the PSC.

\textsuperscript{79} A European fund allocated in the EU-AU partnership.

within the European Union’s comprehensive approach, as it includes military, security, humanitarian and political components. The EU deploys in fact 1 800 troops on site, primarily with a navy focus. In terms of security, the EU has implemented transfer agreements to enable the restitution of prisoners captured by the military to the judicial authorities, for instance in Kenya or the Seychelles. The EU is working on implementing sustainable judicial solutions. In terms of development, the strategy document for Somalia concerning the period 2008-2013 has allocated 215,8 million euros from the 10th European Fund for development. This concerns three main cooperation sectors: governance, education and rural development. In this way the EU hopes to work towards long-term stabilisation in the region. The EU has contributed politically to the settling in of the new government through the election of Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed. The latter will be in charge of implementing democratically elected political institutions by August 2011.

Atalante is one of the first official examples of using the comprehensive approach by the European Union in an unstable zone. It is difficult to make a detailed assessment of the experiment as of today. However, based on interviews with people returning from the site we may note that obstacles and difficulties remain. For instance, regional cooperation projects initiated mainly on the judicial level remain fragile. Some prisons, as in the Seychelles, are replete with pirates. Thus it would seem that the comprehensive approach creates some short term management problems on the ground between EU and local actors. In addition, there is relatively little communication by the EU on this intervention, which makes its comprehensive approach little known among its citizens and politically little visible.

Further, the Atalante operation does not necessarily draw on the lessons of the previous operations in Bosnia and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. At the time the expression comprehensive approach was not in use, but the EU was already attempting to bring together civilian and military components in ad hoc crisis management operations. Studies published on the issue are rather critical

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81. Discussion with members of the piracy working group at Irsem.

of the implementation on the ground of good cooperation between civilian and military actors. Among the difficulties mentioned in these two examples are the lack of exchange between the Commission and the Council, to facilitate the civil-military cooperation on the political level, the cultural differences between the military and the police on the ground, and the complexity of implementing local leadership. Marco Overhaus underlines that the addition of civilian and military competencies does not mean coordination. Finally, one last limitation of Atalante is that it focuses more on the consequences than on the origins of piracy.

In the following section we will present the challenges of implementing the EU comprehensive approach.

The challenges

Having presented the European concept of comprehensive approach, it seems useful to present the challenges and the major difficulties.

Civilian committee and military committee: Brussels disagreements

It remains delicate to make the civilian and military committees within the Council work together. For instance, there was disagreement on the text adopted recently on the comprehensive approach, starting with a debate on the terms to be used. Some would like to see the word “mission” and others prefer that of “operation”: the first has a civilian connotation and the second a military. Negotiations on the texts demonstrate to what extent it is complex to make

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84. Telephone interview, the EU Council, June 2010.
civilians and the military work together, as both sides fear being subordinated by the other. However, the idea on the European level would be to have united political leadership of EU interventions with the military and civilians. Behind this unified leadership is the question of the best adapted organisation modes (for instance matrix organisation, network management, implementation of a coordination board) but also the revision of operational planning documents following the implementation of the comprehensive approach by the political leadership.

*What contribution from member countries to the comprehensive approach?*

A second significant challenge is to establish whether member states will adopt the whole of government approach, and if they are preparing to contribute to the EU comprehensive approach. Some EU states have implemented or are thinking of introducing the whole of government approach by developing inter-agency or inter-ministerial operational modes in crisis management. But this is not always the case; thus there are gaps on the national level. Moreover, if the EU wants to institutionalise the European comprehensive approach, member countries also must be able to contribute to it, for instance by making civilian personnel available. This poses the question of the states' reactivity to give the EU the means to develop its comprehensive approach. In summary, it is thus difficult to establish a connexion between the national intergovernmental systems and multinational organisations such as the EU.

*Implementing a European civilian reserve?*

A third challenge is then to have a sufficient reserve of civilians available for missions with the necessary competencies. How to make these complementary resources available for implementing the comprehensive approach, on the ground and in headquarters? At this moment a database of available experts is being elaborated on the EU level. Each state must contribute names of experts. However, the general trend is a lack of deployable civilian personnel. Although these experts are found in the EU database, they are often also listed in the Nato database. What happens then to their deployability in case of crises where the EU and Nato would be mobili-
If it is difficult for states to make personnel available, should the EU take care of it in its budget?

**Financing the comprehensive approach of the European Union**

Behind this question looms of course the larger issue of financing the comprehensive approach: will the states or the EU budget assume the additional budgetary effort? To what extent? How will funds be distributed among various European actors? Among the various crisis areas? According to what criteria? Following the interviews carried out, it appears that national actors count on European financing to develop the comprehensive approach and the European actors count on financing from the member states. Hence financing needs are very substantial on both sides, whereas the context of budgetary restrictions means that the comprehensive approach benefits from no funding in many states, including France.

**Creating a European hub for comprehensive crisis management on the ground?**

To optimise harmonisation of the planning by civilian and military actors on site, one idea circulating is to establish a European hub of sorts on the scene of the crisis. This hub could become the focal point for planning operations, but also perhaps for their implementation or for support and logistics functions. This would also allow for compensating the lack of continuity on the ground, due to staff turnover, mainly the military. The issue of these constant turnovers has sharpened in zones where a good knowledge of local culture is necessary to be operational within the comprehensive approach. Finally, the hub could be used for improving staff management on site by allowing for the long-term implementation of a common system for civilians and the military.

**Information-sharing on the European level**

Another issue concerns a common computer system for European civilian and military actors, but also the question of information sharing on site. The comprehensive approach requires the development of computer tools to serve it: tools capable of integrating the

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85. Telephone interview, the EU Council, June 2010.
diversity of military and civilian users (e.g. network enabled capabilities, computer network defence, and its civilian equivalent etc). What about the type of tools to be used on the European level and their interoperability with Nato tools or with other national tools?

Having distinguished the challenges linked to the development of the comprehensive approach by the European Union, let us now turn to another organisation looking to position itself in terms of the comprehensive approach: Nato.

The use of the comprehensive approach by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato)

It is more difficult for Nato than for the EU to position itself in relation to the comprehensive approach, on one hand because Nato holds no civilian means to deploy, on the other because there is no consensus so far on the manner in which Nato should deal with this new concept. The situation in Afghanistan is revealing in this respect.

Implementing the concept

One of Nato’s difficulties is the fact that the Alliance internally does not really benefit from deployable civilian capabilities. Likewise, the organisation culture, procedures and doctrines are foremost military and currently leave little room for a civilian approach. This makes cooperation with institutions of a civilian nature more difficult, because of the cultural shock which may exist between military habits of Nato actors and the practices of other actors. However, already at the Riga summit in 2006, Nato put the question of having recourse to the comprehensive approach. According to Brooke Smith-Windsor, the Danes are behind the concept entering Nato’s vocabulary in the spring of 2006. Seven countries then allegedly presented a “non-paper” on civil-military interaction to optimise Nato planning and crisis management operations: Denmark, Canada, Hungary, Norway, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

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87. The original acronym was CPA for “Concerted Planning and Action”. The challenge was to make Denmark promote better coherence between civilians and the military during crises and during post conflict periods.

88. GROS, Philippe, VILBOUX Nicole, COSTE Frédéric, KLEIN Michel (ed.), Les nouveaux concepts militaires dans
They were then supposedly joined by the United States and the United Kingdom which were working to promote the concept within international exercises, e.g. MNE5 and 6, in the framework of the experimental program devised by the USJFCOM89.

These exercises served as a platform to develop the concept on the transatlantic level, primarily by contributing to the development of a common vocabulary90. Since April 2008 and the Bucharest summit, the allies agree on an action plan with proposals for a Nato contribution to the comprehensive approach. The term thus stresses that Nato is not in itself the carrier of the comprehensive approach as it does not have civilian capabilities to deploy. Instead, the organisation would like to contribute by working towards a better coordination between civilian and military actors. The idea is to improve relations between Nato and other organisations surrounding it during crisis management. This Nato position was restated at the Strasbourg Kehl summit in 200991: “Experience in the Balkans and Afghanistan demonstrates that today's security challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community, combining civil and military measures and coordination. Its effective implementation requires all international actors to contribute in a concerted effort, in a shared sense of openness and determination, taking into account their respective strengths and mandates. We welcome the significant progress achieved, in line with the Action Plan agreed at Bucharest, to improve Nato's own contribution to such a comprehensive approach, including through a more coherent application of its crisis management instruments and efforts to associate its military capabilities with civilian means. Progress includes Nato's active promotion of dialogue with relevant players on operations; the development of a database of national experts in reconstruction and stabilisation to advise Nato forces; and the

89. U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) is one of the combative ten commandments to come out of the US Defence department and has played a key role in transforming American military activities.
involvement of selected international organisations, as appropriate, in Nato crisis management exercises”.

Nato’s explicit objective is to work for a better planning and implementation of operations by giving more consideration to the interface with civilian actors operating on the same theatre during crisis management operations. To strengthen cooperation with other partners, various fields are identified, primarily debriefings, trainings, exercises and information-communication.

The lack of consensus on the comprehensive approach within Nato

Ever since the concept of comprehensive approach was raised in Nato, we may note that there is not yet any consensus within the Alliance on the subject. Among the disagreements is firstly the issue of civilian competency. Does Nato go too far by trying to better integrate civilian aspects into the military aspects? Does it go beyond its mandate? To some allies, it is necessary to focus on the Alliance’s basic missions and not seek to spread out, as the concept of comprehensive approach could indicate. To some allies who are both members of Nato and the EU, the role sharing must also be clear between the two organisations. This means that Nato must not intervene in civilian aspects of crisis management until now handled by the EU which holds civilian crisis management capabilities already institutionalised within the organisation. A second point of discord within Nato linked to the use of the comprehensive approach (primarily in Afghanistan) remains the financial issue. Having recourse to the comprehensive approach has very considerably increased the Nato budget. By building roads and hospitals etc, Nato finances very costly reconstruction activities in a context of internal financial crisis. There are also discussions on the way to position the EBAO in relation to the comprehensive approach. Although the Secretary General tends to take an all-encompassing and politically strategic view of the comprehensive approach, others try to maintain a clear distinction between the EBAO and the comprehensive approach, using the EBAO as an internal Nato concept and the comprehensive approach as an international concept to which Nato may contribute. In

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raising this point, Brooke Smith-Windsor hints that government actors within Nato are manipulating the concept to influence the development of the Alliance to further their own interests.

The difficult relationship between Nato and the UN

Although Nato develops its comprehensive approach, the Secretary General deplores the lack of coordination with the UN on these issues. This is due in part to the fact that some states, e.g. China and Russia with permanent seats on the UN Security Council, do not take kindly to the rapprochement between the UN and an Alliance which seems to serve American interests rather than their own. To illustrate this position: when the joint UN-Nato declaration was to be signed on 23 September 2008, the ceremony had to be postponed several times and be done without cameras, as Russia found that the UN Secretary General exceeded his mandate by signing such a document. To this must be added tensions between Nato and the UN which appeared after Nato interventions without a UN mandate. Finally, there is a certain defiance within the UN towards Nato which is seen as an actor potentially capable of crowding out the UN in crisis management, while imposing a US-centric world view. One way to improve UN-Nato relations within the comprehensive approach would certainly be to work for a better mutual knowledge of the other. In addition, Nato and the UN could consider working together on pre-assessments. This means that they could exchange upstream on planning issues to better establish on what grounds they could intervene and already reflect on how to share their vision of the situation in sensitive areas. However, these possible axes of improvement currently remain difficult to explore, as the UN actors do not want to be seen as corroborating Nato’s approach and analyses.

95. VIGGO JAKOBSEN, Peter, “Right strategy, wrong place – why Nato’s comprehensive approach will fail in Afghanistan?”, UNICSI Discussion Papers, N°22, January 2010, p. 87.
96. WENDLING, Cecile, “UN-Nato collaboration in times of crises: Could the comprehensive/integrated approach be a way to bring the two organizations closer together?”. Paper submitted for the International Research Symposium “The UN and Nato: Forward from the Joint Declaration” – New York, USA, 21 October 2010.
The Nato comprehensive approach on the ground: the Afghan example

Cooperation between various civilian and military actors is often more concrete on the operational level on the ground than in organisation headquarters. It thus seems relevant to analyse the consequences of Nato’s recourse to the comprehensive approach in crisis management operations. The example chosen is Afghanistan.

First of all, the integration of international and local actors to implement the comprehensive approach goes via training activities especially for the police force and the Afghan army troops. The goal set on 3 February 2010 was to train 134,000 soldiers of the Afghan National Army (Ana) and 82,000 Afghan policemen. Apparently these figures have been revised, some sources indicating some 240,000 military staff trained by 2014. In this context Nato supplies support in terms of equipment to the Ana. Concerning the difficulties in training local actors, it should be noted that severe corruption problems remain. There are also problems linked to drug abuse and illiteracy among the people in training.

Further, Nato’s contribution to the comprehensive approach in Afghanistan is made concrete by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). Initially introduced by the United States to undertake civil-military reconstruction activities in non-securised environments already in 2002, these were progressively adopted by other countries doing ISAF missions in Afghanistan. In effect, by taking over command of the ISAF, Nato found itself in charge of a growing number of PRTs. Germany, Canada, Spain, the Netherlands, Hungary, Italy, the UK etc have had the opportunity to conduct PRTs on the ground. In July 2009 there were 26 PRTs under ISAF jurisdiction.

One problem is that there is no “normalised” Nato PRT model:

97 TAYLOR, Claire, “Military campaign in Afghanistan”, House of Commons Library, international affairs and defence section, SN/IA/5227, 3 February 2010.
100 RINGSMORE, Jens, DAHL, THRUelsen, Peter, “Nato’s counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan: are classical doctrines suitable for alliances?”, Unisci Discussion Papers, No 22, January 2010, p.68.
“There is still no established model for PRTs, some were civilian controlled, others military-run, but all were attempting to fulfill the goals of the UN mandate. Most US PRTs were composed of 50-100 military personnel, civilian government officials (both American and Afghan) and many had staff to train Afghan security forces. The PRTs are presented by Nato and ISAF in their 2009 Afghanistan Reports as having very diverse activities, ranging from agricultural development to education and training activities, as well as restoring local police forces. PRTs have often had very localised actions, leaving other zones without assistance. This has contributed to reinforce regional disparities. Moreover, in parallel to the PRTs managed by Nato (through the PRT Executive Steering Committee), other civilian actions take place on the ground, which does not make for a global view and a precise steering of the civil-military priorities of the forces in Afghanistan. Although there is now a Nato Handbook on PRTs, this is not yet a concept integrated in the Alliance doctrine.

New structures have emerged in Afghanistan as a result of Nato having recourse to the comprehensive approach. For instance, for the first time since Nato was founded a high representative for civilian issues was nominated in Afghanistan in parallel to the military command. Currently, ambassador Mark Sedwill of the United Kingdom occupies this position. This follows the initiative of Secretary General Rasmussen who wanted a representative of his own on site. Little by little, the latter has taken charge of the comprehensive approach process. His task is to liaise between Nato and other local or international actors present in Afghanistan (especially the EU and the UN). He then informs Nato headquarters and may issue recommendations. However, many allies are opposed to implementing such a civilian chain of command, in particular because this could create risks of duplication between Nato and the EU. For all these reasons, Afghanistan illustrates the difficult positioning of Nato in terms of the comprehensive approach.

105 The nomination took place in October 2003.
106 http://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natolive/topics_50096.htm, viewed on 1 October 2010.
Challenges

In short, what are then the challenges linked to Nato’s recourse to the comprehensive approach?

Transformation challenges of military activities with increased recourse to the comprehensive approach

One challenge for Nato is to figure out how the military may integrate the comprehensive approach. Do they only need to stop the shooting in order for civilians to get on with their job? Or do they have to, for instance, contribute to reconstruction operations? This kind of operation is already implemented to obtain a positive psychological impact on the populations, or because rebuilding is necessary for good working conditions on site. But do they really have to do more, as is the case in for instance Afghanistan with the PRTs? There may have to be an upstream definition of what Nato can indeed include in its comprehensive approach and what should be excluded, and better distinguish the limits between civilian and the military which have to be preserved. Another alternative is to work on a case by case basis according to operations, but this may revive tensions during ongoing interventions and thus prevent the normal functioning of allied operations.

There is also the issue of integrating new civilian structures into Nato within the development of the comprehensive approach. David McGregor Pursley considers for instance the introduction of a committee of civilian security. Christa Meindersma mentions the possibility of institutionalizing civilian actors of reconstruction within Nato, or using arrangements with the European Union such as Berlin+ in reverse. Thus Nato could if needed use EU civilian staff for managing complex crises. France is not favourable to developing civilian capabilities properly speaking within Nato, as she does not want the organisation to develop at the expense or in duplication of the European Union. But France cannot hide that the issue of civilian expertise within Nato becomes very important in the context of sta-

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Civilian experts would therefore be integrated at Nato headquarters for instance, so that the North Atlantic Council is better informed of what other civilian actors are up to on a given theatre of operation. A small task force could then act on the political level to bring their experience and contacts. Similarly, France would be prepared to consider the presence of an advisor at the Saceur surrounded by a dozen civilian experts to help the military take into account civilian challenges during the planning stage. Finally, during an operation a military command could also be supported by a restricted team on the civilian planning aspects. The idea would be to have an exchange on PRT best practices for instance, and better synchronise Nato activities with those of other actors.

The question also concerns the implementation of a Nato doctrine around its use of the comprehensive approach. For the moment Nato's recourse to the comprehensive approach only appears in summit declarations, but is not translated by an official doctrine specifying the terms of planning consequences and operation management, human resources, etc. It is hard to say whether the PRTs or the use of the comprehensive approach are here to stay or if their utilization is but temporary.

Finally, conducting reconstruction operations and monitoring their efficiency also means for Nato military personnel attending a large number of meetings with civilians, completing numerous assessment documents for reconstruction and assistance operations, etc. The opportunity cost of the comprehensive approach should thus not be neglected. That is to say, all the things that the military no longer have time to do when they invest their time into the development of the comprehensive approach.
**Nato interaction with civilian organisations (NGOs ...)**

The comprehensive approach poses the question of Nato’s interaction with civilian organisations. Should Nato for instance organise joint-training or joint-lessons learnt sessions with civilian actors, such as NGO members? This could indeed contribute to exchanges of best practices on close and long-term interactions with local populations. It could also increase the level of trust between civilian actors and Nato by creating interpersonal relations and mutual knowledge. It could create a sense of common effort. On the other hand, there is a risk that this is perceived as a Nato ambition to control NGO actions. What degree of interaction should be developed to encourage mutual synergies and respect? This is certainly a question that Nato has to face if the recourse to the comprehensive approach is amplified. Until now NGOs stressed that they appreciated Nato because it only dealt with the military aspect. This attitude may change with a possible Nato push towards more civilian actions.

**The division of labour between Nato and the UN**

The link between Nato and the UN is another challenge for Nato’s recourse to the comprehensive approach. Indeed, the UN developed the “integrated approach” and the UN is often present on the same theatres of operation as Nato. In the case of Afghanistan, two coordination structures for the comprehensive approach actions including the two organisations: the PRT Executive Steering Committee and the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB). In both cases, Nato actions and UN representatives were present. But as underlined by William Butcher the outcome of the coordination between the two organisations is rather limited. There is also the issue of leadership. Should one of the two organisations take command of the operations in order to improve the effective enforcement of the comprehensive approach? This remains a delicate question, as the UN insists on keeping a distance with a military alliance that tends to expand the scope of its competencies.

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The allied states and their commitment to use the comprehensive approach

Finally, the implementation of the comprehensive approach has also given rise to divergent views among the allies in Afghanistan. A typical example concerns the positioning towards drug trafficking. “The coalition is struggling in this field because the approaches are very diverse among different nations. Many of them consider indeed that it is not ISAF’s task to conduct or participate in operations targeting crops.”\textsuperscript{110} Therefore, using the comprehensive approach may be a relevant means of ending armed conflict, but it may also create unexpected tensions among the allies, in particular concerning the fields to include in the comprehensive approach (adopting or not PRTs, implementing or not actions against drug trafficking within military operations, etc). This may also reinforce geographical disparities between various zones of intervention. But as Nato Secretary General Rasmussen underlined in his Chicago speech, the Alliance needs a comprehensive approach in the future, not only in Afghanistan but also in 16 other conflicts where the Alliance is involved. “We need what we call a comprehensive approach. And that is the first lesson of this mission (in Afghanistan). The days when the military could defeat the enemy, then hand the baton off to the civilians and go home, are past us. And Afghanistan is not unique. There are 16 major armed conflicts underway today. All of them are within, rather than between states. In many cases, it is the basic pillars of society that need to be rebuilt. This means that the military and civilians need to work much more closely than they have in the past.”\textsuperscript{111}

We may thus underline the uncertainty existing within Nato today as to the positioning towards the comprehensive approach. It is thus important that Nato seizes the opportunity of the new strategic concept to clarify how it wants to contribute to the implementation of the concept. Should the Alliance remain exclusively focused on military security aspects? Or should the Alliance instead develop civil-military links internally and externally (in particular with the UN)? To date, Nato has progressed on the issues of recourse to the com-


\textsuperscript{111} Speech by Nato Secretary General at the University of Chicago, 8 April 2010: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_62510.htm, viewed on 20 April 2010.
The comprehensive approach (PRTs, etc) and its relations to other organisations (e.g. Nato). On the other hand, Nato has not yet developed a training strategy specific to the comprehensive approach.

The use of the integrated approach by the United Nations
Implementing the UN concept

Within the framework of peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations, the United Nations is moving towards the implementation of an integrated approach. The UN official vocabulary uses the expressions “integrated approach” and “integrated missions”, referring in particular to examples from the African context. It is specifically about having “shared evaluations” and “shared programs” as explained by Kofi Annan: “An integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programmed interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner.”

Organisational change related to the implementation of the integrated approach

Since the 1990s and the implementation of the integrated approach, the UN has enlarged its scope of action during crises, and modified its organisation structure in consequence. From having mainly focused on ceasefire upheld by the Blue Helmets, the UN

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112 UN Secretary-General’s Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, 2000.
has gone from an approach integrating new tasks, such as the security system reform (SSR) to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), election monitoring, human rights enforcement, among others. All these new functions assumed by the UN have entailed organisational change, primarily creating new units or functions, new procedures, new training for the staff. In terms of functions within an integrated mission, the leadership is in the hands of the special representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), assisted by a deputy special representative of the Secretary General who henceforth is the common executive for functions formerly carried out separately, i.e. the humanitarian coordinator (HC) for the humanitarian aspects, and the resident coordinator (RC) for development aspects. In parallel, the integrated approach goes together with implementing an integrated planning ensured by a single structure, the integrated mission planning process. According to the department of peacekeeping operation this structure includes all actors involved during a crisis, both on the local level and at UN headquarters. In practice this structure rests on two pillars: the integrated mission task force as recommended by the Brahimi Report, and the integrated missions planning team. Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) are signed between various entities of the UN system to enable them to work together in a more systematic and coherent manner. This is the case for instance in the memorandum signed between the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). New Guidelines have been produced to enable the implementation of integrated approach procedures internally, for instance the DPKO’s integrated mission guidelines. To implement the integrated approach, the UN has primarily put forward its senior staff with experience in multidimensional approaches.\(^{113}\) New types of training modules have also been developed. We may thus say that the integrated approach was progressively institutionalised at the UN headquarter level during the 2000s.

\(^{113}\) EIDE, Espen Barth, KASPERSEN, Anja Therese, KENT Randolph, VON HIPPEL Karen, Report on integrated missions: practical perspectives and recommendations, independent study for the expanded UN ECHA core group, May 2005.
The UN integrated approach and its opening towards other international actors

The UN works with numerous institutions in the context of its integrated approach which themselves develop their own comprehensive approach. The idea is to have a more coherent approach to avoid unnecessary duplication between the concerned international institutions. Beyond, the issue is to recognise that as security, development and good governance are intimately linked in conflict resolution operations, it is not possible to keep these three aspects separate and at the same time obtain efficient results in terms of restoring and maintaining peace. The EU-UN and the Nato-UN relationships have already been dealt with in previous sections on the EU and Nato respectively. We will not revert to this topic here, but it is important to remember that these links also contribute to implement the UN integrated approach.

A key element in the opening of the UN to international actors in its integrated approach: the ambition to rely on regional entities based on chapter VIII of the UN Charter. This is not devoid of difficulties, in particular to decide which type of organisation should be included or excluded from the eligible regional entities for a close collaboration on the basis of chapter VIII. Another key element: the UN does not use the comprehensive approach concept, but that of integrated approach. The overall objective is to distinguish the organisation from Nato in offering a unique multidimensional approach, thanks to the number of actors it includes. The UN therefore is opening up to international actors, but remains wary of Nato.

The UN integrated approach on the ground: the case of Liberia

The UN remains the international organisation with the longest experience of the multidimensional approach through its integrated approach. The first lessons from its use were learned from its intervention in Liberia in 2003. This operation was carried out on a large scale involving 16 000 civilian and military participants. In Liberia the UN merged for the first time under a single political leadership all its action levers, i.e. the humanitarian and the political-military
elements. Thus the UN was able to closely direct the operation conducted in Liberia, targeting all the programs implemented on site according to the political objectives established. On the ground, this change entailed the closing of the UN-OCHA and leadership by the UNMIL. This did not occur without protests from NGOs which viewed in the implementation of the integrated approach the risk of creating injustices in the treatment of different zones in terms of humanitarian action. The NGOs feared that some zones would be either abandoned or strongly supported according to political rather than humanitarian needs. The closing of the UN-OCHA also destabilised the links of this organisation with local actors on site.

The following chart describes how the integrated approach was translated in the case of Liberia:

Source: HULL, Cecilia, Integrated missions: a Liberia case study, FOI, Swedish research defence agency, August 2008

As may be seen in this chart, the military are entirely integrated. Thus, there is no longer any unity as such to manage the links between civilians and the military, but indeed a comprehensive structure where different functions (humanitarian, development etc) are

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114 Telephone interview with Oliver Behn, EISF, Paris, 30 June 2010.
integrated, as underlined by Cecilia Hull. Also, there is a single logistics unit to serve civilian and military actors. Similarly, there is a unit to integrate intelligence coming from the military and civilians – the police, etc. Finally, we may also note that the integrated approach in Liberia tried to remain as close as possible to the populations by implementing Country Support Teams (CSTs).

The implementation of the integrated approach followed a process where ad hoc actions were formalised to allow for a greater coordination between civilians and the military. In parallel, numerous concepts elaborated by UN headquarters could not really be applied on the ground. This is also clearly stated in Cecilia Hull’s report: “The experience of UNMIL shows that while integration at field-level has either been institutionalized or informally improvised, it has at the headquarters and planning level mainly been absent. At this level, when theory has proven impractical the UN has relied on fall-back strategies and traditional approaches not always consistent with the IM concept. At the strategic level the implementation of IM has so far failed to capitalize on the potential of the United Nations as a broad and inclusive wide-ranging organisation in creating a fully comprehensive peace operation, leaving a great divide between the Integrated Missions concept and practice.”

We may thus observe a gap between theories elaborated internally and their practical application on the ground. Moreover, some NGOs on site expressed their opposition to implementing the integrated approach. They had the impression that this meant integrating all actions at the DPKO level, and not to treat all UN entities that applied the comprehensive approach as equals.

What is at stake

Nato internal tensions

A first evaluation report published in 2005 mentions internal approval of the changes to enable implementation of the integrated approach. However, this has brought about internal tensions in

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two departments: the Department for Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Each of these would like to take charge of the integrated missions within the implementation of the comprehensive approach.\(^{117}\)

On the ground these tensions also occur between the UN country team and the envoys of the DPKO. The DPKO representatives arriving take charge of operations under the auspices of the SRSG, whereas the people of the UN country team on site have for a long time felt excluded from the planning phase of the integrated mission. Conversely, the DPKO staff dispatched have the impression that local UN staff are not adapting to the new procedures of the integrated approach.\(^{118}\)

**UN decision-making procedures**

The UN meets some obstacles in implementing the integrated approach because of its decision-making process. For instance, once decisions have been made in the Council after long negotiations, UN headquarters is not as such in charge of operations conducted on site. Direct links between the theatre and UN headquarters are rare. It is the SRSG who on site coordinates civilian and military issues. This means that the UN integrated approach is more operational than strategic, the links between the DPKO and the SRSG being essentially technical. It should be added that many UN agencies are independent, which prevents the UN General Secretariat from monitoring their activities in the context of a complex crisis.

**Linking UN and non-UN humanitarian actors**

The total integration of UN actors leads humanitarian UN actors to serve first the political interests of the organisation, and not those of the humanitarian actors nor their first guiding principles (i.e. neutrality, autonomy, independence). This appears very clearly from critical comments by NGO officials. Beyond the cultural differences between the military and civilian officials who do not facilitate coordina-
tion, strong tensions are present between pro-UN activists and humanitarian workers.

**The UN role in civil-military rapprochement for catastrophes**

Through its humanitarian affairs office (UN-OCHA), the UN participated in the implementation of the Oslo guidelines related to civil-military relations in disaster management. The text was issued in 1994 and then amended in 2001 and 2004. It was completed by another reference text, Civil-military relations in complex energies. Through these texts the UN positioned itself on the international stage by imposing a specific vocabulary: the term is henceforth Civil-military coordination or CMCoord. The texts mentioned above settle the civil-military coordination on particular issues such as the use of military escorts and the use of defence instruments in case of major disasters. Thus we may see that the integrated approach applies also to natural disasters when facing a risk (natural or industrial) and further in terms of a deliberate threat (armed conflict). This first nuance should be stressed, for in some cases the comprehensive approach is only implemented in case of weak or failed states, and not in order to react to a disaster. This is the case for instance in the French approach of the concept.

Further, the texts stress that humanitarian aid is neutral and impartial, but especially that the military may only intervene in the last resort when all other options prove insufficient to manage the disaster. The text has also given rise to stormy debates on this point. For instance, the European Commission intervenes in major disasters by sending civilian protection forces. As these are sometimes military (depending on the countries participating), the UN-OCHA text led to excluding them from assistance operations in disaster situations, although this is the primary mission of emergency teams for civilian protection.

Intense discussions occurred between European Commission officials working on the unity of civilian protection as the text was negotiated. This illustrates the tensions existing between the definition of so-called civilian and military actors. The example of non-armed civilian protection forces under military status demonstrates to what
extent limits are sometimes blurred and make situations more complex. Although the Oslo guidelines deal with interactions between civilians and the military in disaster situations, no text settles the issue of civil-military interactions in peacekeeping operations. This situation is typical of the confusion around the issue, but also of the tensions between military and humanitarian actors in the crisis management of weak or failed states.

The UN role in managing the civil-military rapprochement in conflicts

The UN positions itself as counting on the emergence of regional organisations to be potentially used to best manage conflicts and restore peace. In this context the UN counts in particular on the African Union, the European Union or the OSCE. In relying directly on these organisations and no longer on states, the UN modifies the deal by betting on closer interactions directly on the level of the organisations, instead of their members.119 This however is not without difficulties. The UN positions itself as a global actor, relying on regional instances, whereas the latter do not always consider themselves as strictly regional actors in the UN sense. Speaking of the integrated approach, the UN positions itself above the crowd, integrating the action of regional actors whereas these are not necessarily ready to be subject to such arrangements. They develop their own documents and try to conceptualise what their relationship with the UN should be.

For instance, the EU has defined four major principles to be used in relating to other international organisations: added value, interoperability, visibility and autonomy in decision-making. For the EU, there is not one single way of interacting with other players in managing crises; many configurations are possible depending on the situations. Nato endeavours to do as much by currently conceptualising its contribution to the comprehensive approach.

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The use of the comprehensive approach in other international organisations

It is not possible within the scope of this study to make a complete presentation of the use of the comprehensive approach in all the international organisations involved. Having said that, to give a comprehensive overview not limited to the EU, Nato and the UN, some data are put forward here on the OSCE, the African Union and the OECD. Other international actors could have been included, such as the World Bank, the IMF etc. They are not because they are more of financial institutions than political actors in the sense of the international organisations mentioned here.

The comprehensive approach by the Organisation for security and cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The OSCE developed historically on the concept of “comprehensive security”. The latter is concerned by the “comprehensive approach” through three major dimensions: the political-military approach, the human approach but also the economic-environmental approach. The “comprehensive approach” specific to the OSCE is therefore broader than the EU, Nato or UN versions for it includes environmental changes. In the reference document OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century the comprehensive approach appears through the expression “global security”, i.e. the OSCE relies on a very wide security concept including respect for basic liberties, the rule of law, implementing democratic institutions but also socio-economic and environmental factors. One specific element of the OSCE is to present the comprehensive approach above all as a lever to counter terrorist threats since 2001, but also corruption in the widest sense. The objective is to bring together the OSCE member states to produce united action against increasing terrorism and corruption. A second specificity: the OSCE promotes a comprehensive approach to enable not only conflict resolution, but to anticipate conflicts through an early warning system.

120 Email exchange, OSCE, August 2010.
The OSCE played a leading role in implementing thinking about the comprehensive approach within its member states, for instance by organising numerous conferences such as the one on the comprehensive approach and cyber-security held in April 2010 in Lille in connection with the fight against terrorism. In addition, the OSCE works in partnership with other institutions to implement the comprehensive approach. The OSCE works predominantly with the UN. This was the case with the peacekeeping operations in Georgia (UNOMIG) and in Tajikistan (UNMIT). The cooperation is most developed and constant with the UN both in terms of intervention and exchange of ideas and views on the institutional level.\(^{122}\) There is also an OSCE-Nato partnership. On the operational level, the cooperation between the OSCE and Nato takes place above all in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict recovery. It is particularly dynamic in the western Balkans. Further, in November 2007 the OSCE decided during its ministerial meeting in Madrid to intervene in Afghanistan. This opened the door to a new form of collaboration with international actors in Afghanistan within the framework of a comprehensive approach, such as Nato.\(^{123}\) The OSCE also maintains a link with Nato in the sense that the Alliance adopts some of its concepts inspired by OSCE norms.\(^{124}\)

### The integrated approach within the African Union (AU)

The African Union integrates the following dimensions in its comprehensive approach: security, humanitarian assistance, political governance, socio-economic reconstruction and development, human rights and justice, and gender issues. The AU talks of a multidimensional conflict resolution process, and relies predominantly on the concepts of human security and sustainable development.\(^{125}\) The African Union has adopted the same terminology as the UN in the framework of its African Standby Force Doctrine, i.e. the “integrated

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124 GRAEGER, Nina, NOVOSSELOFF, Alexandra, “The role of the OSCE and the EU”, manuscript received during the interview with Alexandra NOVOSSELOFF.

approach". It would seem that the AU tries to position itself in the line of the UN attempts to develop the comprehensive approach on the ground during crises. It would therefore be in its strategic interest to adopt the UN vocabulary.

Although the vocabulary stems from the UN, the AU relies mostly on the EU for financing the management of complex crises. In addition, a security and development instrument has been implemented between the EU and the AU through the Joint AU-European Commission monitoring mechanism, reinforced by the new EU strategy for Africa adopted by the Council in December 2005. A new step was taken in 2007 with the idea of going beyond the simple financial link between the EU and the AU by establishing a common project on security, governance and development issues. Eight partnership programs were then created to link security and development.

We may thus observe the formation of a long-term trio UN-EU-AU for improved conflict management in Africa. Numerous imitation processes are also taking place between the EU and the AU on comprehensive approach issues, in particular on the structural level.

The comprehensive approach by the Organisation for economic cooperation and development (OECD)

In terms of the comprehensive approach the OECD has mostly positioned itself on the Whole of government approach (WGA or WHOGA) in failed states through its international network on Conflict and fragility bringing together the Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation (CPDC) and its Fragile States Group (FSG). It concerns the government actors working on security and development issues to ensure good coherence in the use of funds allocated for the reconstruction of failed states. The OECD has elaborated its own position through this concept, but works in collaboration with Nato and the UN for its implementation.

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126 L’African standby force is a permanent force of five regional multidimensional brigades including military, civilian and police components.

127 Interview, Ministère de la défense, Paris, July 2010.


Conclusion on the positioning of the international organisations on the comprehensive approach

By studying the use of the comprehensive approach concept by the international organisations, we may observe a kind of internal struggle where each tries to impose her own policy and her own norms of crisis management. Each international organisation studied here produces a large number of official documents available online to promote its model of the comprehensive approach, namely its own conception of post-cold war human security. Also, numerous seminars and conferences are organised to this end. The goal is to use one’s own interpretation to influence others, or to move towards others. Typically, the fact that the African Union has adopted the UN vocabulary is a way to position itself as a kind of UN in Africa, for instance.

The overall objective is to become legitimate in new areas of intervention. For Nato for instance, there is a trend to seek legitimacy in actions that are more civilian than military in nature. Through the comprehensive approach Nato may justify its role in fighting piracy. It can also legitimise its presence in Afghanistan by not positioning itself as an occupying power but as a rebuilding. Second, it is about convincing different categories of actors. For instance, Nato may avoid some rejections of the Afghan intervention by public opinion, media and parliamentarians by using its recourse to the comprehensive approach. It can also get better accepted by local populations. The comprehensive approach contributes indeed to the famous “win hearts and minds” effect. Beyond, the comprehensive approach might enable Nato to send a signal to states which make only a small contribution in terms of troops, but which could conversely contribute financially or by making civilian personnel available for actions of restoring governance or development actions.

A strategic question for the future of the comprehensive approach is whether the various international institutions presented here (EU, Nato, UN, OSCE etc) will succeed in developing synergies

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130 Thus Nato is organising several seminars and conferences in 2010 on the comprehensive approach, e.g. the interallied conference of reserve officers in Stavanger, or a research symposium in New York in October.
beyond their different views. One proposal is currently being studied, namely the establishment of an international forum in Brussels (International Community Planning Forum, ICPF) to enable experts from the various organisations involved in the comprehensive approach to meet and exchange on the different modes of crisis management. This forum would for instance allow for an exchange of best practices and feedback. This initiative sponsored by the Americans in the context of a Nato-EU rapprochement is supported by those who view an opportunity for Nato to move towards the UN and other actors who by nature are less opposed to a rapprochement with the EU rather than purely with Nato. Conversely, the NGOs are very critical of this initiative. As for the military, some fear that the enlarged perimeter of the forum will only allow for very limited discussions, as may be currently seen in the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) in Afghanistan. This forum is so wide in terms of participants that it is presented as an ineffective “talking shop” on Afghan issues. The IFCP will certainly run the same risk.

In any case, it is important to have a double perspective of the implementation of the comprehensive approach within the international organisations: first on the conceptualisation in the general secretariats and another on the operationalisation of the concept during crises. It would seem that the theory elaborated in headquarters is not always translated effectively on the ground. Conversely, some practices underpinning the comprehensive approach develop on an ad hoc basis in crisis theatres, as shown by the three examples studied above (Somalia, Afghanistan, Liberia).

We may finally underscore that the study of the comprehensive approach within international organisations reveals that some government actors have played a decisive role in how some international organisations have positioned themselves. Denmark, for instance, is presented as an actor having initiated the inclusion of the comprehensive approach by Nato. This is why the following chapter will focus on the implementation of the comprehensive approach on the national level, using four case studies.

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The use of the comprehensive approach by states: the cases of France, the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States

Many states work to implement a comprehensive approach. This takes many forms: the objective is sometimes, as in the UK case, to pool funding to manage a crisis between civilian and military actors, implementing a team of civilian actors who may be rapidly deployed in areas where the military need their support. In other instances, this includes the establishment of common feedback or even common training seminars. In Germany, this has given birth to the Zentrum für internationale Friedenseinsätze (Centre for international peacekeeping intervention). Sometimes, it is simply about interministerial meetings organised to keep the actors mutually informed, as in Sweden. In Japan, a system for human resources management has been devised to facilitate the implementation of the comprehensive approach. In Canada and Norway, there is a system for matching the available resources to the needs. The list is not comprehensive.

In order to depict the diversity of national comprehensive approaches, four case studies will be presented here: France, the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States. These countries were chosen for several reasons. As this study is being published in France, it seemed important to analyse the French case. Concerning the United Kingdom and Germany, they are included because they played a role as initiators of the comprehensive approach in Europe, although they each represent a different model. These three examples will allow us some comparisons of the way the comprehensive approach was institutionalised on the national level in different EU countries. Finally, the American example seemed paramount, as the US has had a leading role in developing the concept, albeit more domestically than on the international level.

Three aspects will be compared in these four case studies: the implementation of the concept on the national level, some limitations or criticisms, and finally the issue of the Provincial reconstruction teams in the Afghan context. The PRTs are structures combining civilians and the military on the theatre of operation, as in Afghanis-
tan or Iraq. This enables a comparison of the implementation of the comprehensive approach both on the political doctrine level and on the operational level on the ground thanks to the presence of these four countries in Afghanistan, although they use the concept differently – no French PRTs, very different PRTs in the British and German cases, and the American PRTs as model.

The global response in France

The French concept of civil-military crisis management as comprehensive approach

Several French actors are in charge of implementing the comprehensive approach, including the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (MFEA). To understand the French approach, these two actors have been consulted through interviews and documents produced by these institutions have been studied.

The Centre Interarmée de concepts, de doctrines et d’expéri- mentation (CICDE) is in charge of conceptualising the French comprehensive approach within the Ministry of Defence. Its work is a result of the reports by the prefect Jean Dussourd who underlined the lack of coordination in the civilian crisis management. Its work also takes place under the auspices of president Sarkozy’s wishes in the 2008 White Paper on security and defence to see the French defence develop to better integrate the challenges linked to globalisation and new types of conflicts. “The complexity of international crises requires the definition of strategies bringing together the diplomatic, financial, civilian, cultural and military instruments, both in the prevention stages and in crisis management proper, as in the post-conflict sequences of stabilisation and reconstruction.”

The French concept elaborated by the CICDE rests on the fact that military action alone does not restore peace.\textsuperscript{134} It only concerns the crises to be managed in weak or failed states. It consists of implementing three conjoined actions: restoring governance, security and development in the concerned area. To achieve this three modes of the comprehensive approach are identified: surveillance, containment and intervention. Surveillance consists of sharing information among the actors concerned by the crisis. This means establishing a surveillance structure which would be interministerial, enabling the sharing of expertise and a common vision. Containment equally is about a large prevention action including, beyond security, governance and development issues. Finally, during the intervention the military are present to bring about a ceasefire, but in parallel civilians must be able to train local actors for securisation, restoring the judicial system, work on development to let the concerned societies recover from the crisis in the best possible way. The comprehensive approach should help to respond to the population's legitimate needs. On the international level, it must also reinforce cooperation between the international organisations, military alliances, the states and the NGOs.

The definition of the concept in the CICDE documents is the following: “The comprehensive approach aims at preventing or settling durably and rapidly a crisis through the synergy of actions carried out by various actors in the fields of governance, security, and economic and social development. It combines collaboration between actors sharing a common final vision and coordination with the other actors present on the theatre. It requires, as soon as possible, an appropriation of the solution by the host nation or the local representatives. It favours conditions conducive to satisfying quickly the legitimate aspirations of the population. Finally, it seeks to associate regional actors with this effort.” The actors met at the French Ministry of Defence do not hesitate to use the expression comprehensive approach. The term is also found in the working documents.

At the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, the vocabulary used is a different one. Only the expression “global response”\textsuperscript{135} is

\textsuperscript{134} The presentation of the French concept of comprehensive approach is based on interviews conducted at the CICDE in April and May 2010.

\textsuperscript{135} Or sometimes “démarche globale”.
accepted (and not comprehensive approach) in order to make a distinction from the Nato or American concepts. It even seems that the expression “civil-military management of external crises” could prevail eventually so as to avoid any too direct link with the comprehensive approach. Yet the same references may be found in the White Paper on defence and national security, and the same idea of a security, governance, development continuum.\textsuperscript{136} Beyond this reference, the MFAE also relies on the Dussourd report to underscore the need to develop an interministerial method. The structure in charge of implementing the global response is made up on one hand of a steering committee at the top level, meeting three times a year, and a Task Force which is the working group under a double authority, i.e. the political power and the crisis centre of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs. Its objective is to elaborate an interministerial strategy of external crisis management enabling a global response. A specific element of the French Task Force compared to interministerial or interagency structures in other countries is that it includes the Ministry of Finance.

Some limitations and criticisms

Among the limitations or criticisms targeting the French concept is the difficulty in establishing an appropriate interministerial structure. Indeed, government ministries are sometimes rival organisations and this limits the structural implementation of the comprehensive approach. On this point, one may wonder why the General Secretariat of the National Defence has not managed to take a leadership role in the interministerial aspects.

It would seem that thanks to its inclusion in international exercises, the military are more inclined to adopt a standardised Nato-EU vocabulary in the form of the expression “comprehensive approach”.\textsuperscript{137} Conversely and in order to limit British and American influences, the MFEA tries to keep a certain distance by using the expression “global response”. The institutionalisation of the concept at the Ministry of Defence seems to occur more by imitating international norms, whereas the MFEA tries to get away from these. Following

\textsuperscript{136} Interviews, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, July 2010.
\textsuperscript{137} The Multinational Experiments 5 resulted in the publication of a document in September 2007 « L’approche globale : un cadre conceptuel pour les MNE5 ».
the interviews, we may stress that the military personnel is convinced of the concept, respecting the chain of command of military operations, i.e. the President of the Republic, the Chief of Staff of the armed forces. The question is then how this chain of defence could be made compatible with a better interministerial coordination in crisis management.

A second critical point concerns resources. To date, there is no budget for implementing the comprehensive approach. Yet the fact that a representative of the Ministry of Finance sits on the task force could indicate a possible introduction of a financing mechanism in the future, beyond its role for seeking European and international financing. The people interviewed fear that no funding will be available for the comprehensive approach, which could lead to the cost being included in the existing budget, for instance the budget for external military operations. The risk is then that the action capability of the French forces deployed in their purely military action is reduced. Another fear is that a gap will appear between the financing of crisis management in emergencies, and the funds linked to long-term development. Between the two there is a need for “post-crisis” funding within the framework of the comprehensive approach which few actors seem to integrate.138

Finally, the issue of human resources is a delicate one. There are fears in the Ministry of Defence of seeing reserve officers being deployed within the comprehensive approach framework and no longer in the army services. But the military personnel interviewed stress that it is already difficult to cover all the needs of the Ministry by using reserve officers in times of crisis. The position of the Ministry of Defence is then that it is necessary to send civilian personnel (judges, etc) but this should not take the place of reserve officers to assist those in charge of complex crisis management (e.g. legal advisors to the commanding officers, etc). As far as the Minister of the Interior is concerned, the fears concern above all the security of the personnel deployed in complex crisis areas.

The absence of a French model for Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Althogh present in Afghanistan and commanding an American PRT, France has not developed any French PRT concept. The people interviewed for this study hint that this may be explained by politics rather than the situation on the ground. France did not want to align itself with the US or the Nato model. She would have preferred to underline her specificity or even her commitment above all to a Europe of Defence. This may also be found in the report by the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, Les nouveaux concepts militaires dans les nouveaux conflits.139

Yet, if France has no PRT strictly speaking, it is thinking about the links between the comprehensive approach and the influence in crisis areas. The people interviewed stress that it is essential in complex crises, as in Afghanistan, to articulate the comprehensive approach and influence in implementing the concept. This may take place through development operations of broadcast radio for instance. In addition, even without the presence of PRTs, Afghanistan is considered a successful example of implementing the comprehensive approach by the French. For instance, it is to date one of the crisis areas where interministerial coordination is the most accomplished. People interviewed in French ministries underline that the Afghanistan-Pakistan unit could become a model in the future for managing other complex crises on the interministerial level. On the ground, training French forces is being recognised in Kapisa and Surobi, and the expedition of additional gendarmes could occur for the benefit of a local training centre.

Others like Amaury de Féligonde140 take a more nuanced position. Although the comprehensive approach has enabled France to implement the distribution of fertilizer, to launch beekeeping and fish cultures, or even agricultural cooperatives for the long term, or to train hospital staff, the development of this approach stumbles on the lack of interministerial cooperation.

The comprehensive approach in the United Kingdom

The British concept relies on the Stabilisation unit

The comprehensive approach as a concept appeared in 2005 in the British military doctrine, moreover around decision-making issues at the highest strategic level. The comprehensive approach developed earlier in the UK than in France. To understand the British position on the concept, the online memorandum on the website of the Houses of Parliament was the main source, being one of the most recent documents on the concept in the UK.\(^\text{141}\) Further, the report by the defence committee of the House of Lords which details the British position was also used to establish what might be the specificity of the British approach.\(^\text{142}\) An interview was conducted with a representative of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).

To the British, the comprehensive approach is “a philosophy” offering a framework that is adaptable to the situations that occur. The comprehensive approach does not define “standards” for the modes of action, nor homogenises the operating modes of the various actors. It is more of a common effort to obtain better results thanks to a greater coherence of the actions of the different participants. As in France, the context for using the comprehensive approach is that of stabilisation and conflict prevention. Instead of the three French stages, the British have identified four: engage, secure, hold and develop. Since 2007, there is a doctrinal note: Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach (JDN 2/07). As in the case of the French text proposed as concept for the CICDE, the first stage is a shared vision of the situation. Between crises, exchanges should allow for a better comprehension of the challenges facing the various actors. What should bring the actors together is a sense of serving a common objective. The idea is to develop a climate of trust through close exchange and networking.

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\(^{141}\) Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development, available online: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmdfence/224/224we03.htm, viewed on 27 May 2010.

\(^{142}\) House of Lords’ Defence committee, The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace, Seventh report of the 2009-2010 session.
In the UK, the comprehensive approach concerns the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the armed forces, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Development (DFID). The Prime Minister holds leadership over the comprehensive approach and may delegate this aspect as needed to one of the relevant departments. Conversely, the French interministerial task force is based at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (although initially the plan was to locate it within the General Secretariat of European Affairs (SGAE). Just as the French White Paper stressed the importance of a multidimensional and interministerial crisis management, the updated National Security Strategy of June 2009 in the United Kingdom underlines the need for a “cross-governmental approach”. To this end the “stabilisation unit” liaises with various British ministries concerned by the comprehensive approach in terms of crisis management (DFID, FCO, MoD). Although this unit is based at the DFID, it is subordinate to the three ministries. The concept of stabilisation is closely linked to the comprehensive approach, as it covers the humanitarian, political, military and development aspects.\\

### Some limitations and criticisms

Among the criticisms or limitations concerning the British concept, a first point concerns the link between the national objectives and their implementation during operations. Some say it is very difficult to transpose the concept on the tactical and operational level, and that sometimes the continuum may be broken.\\

Another criticism is that promoting the comprehensive approach in the UK makes the civilian actors fear a potential takeover by the military. This has produced strong bureaucratic tensions on the national level. This is why the promotion of the comprehensive approach has undergone a process which is no longer purely domestic but international. The British strongly support the comprehensive approach both within the EU and Nato.\\

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PRTs within the British tradition of counterinsurgency

The British have conducted three PRTs in Afghanistan: in Mazar-e-Sharif, Lashkar Gah and Meymaneh. The British PRTs play a role in upholding the ceasefire, surveillance and reconstruction through the implementation of civilian projects. They have played a key role in carrying out security systems reform. In addition they participate in the fight against drug trafficking.

They are part and parcel of the British tradition of counterinsurgency and in developing the stabilisation unit. In other words, they are integrated in a dense network of links between civilians and the military. They are directly linked to the American PRT model, since the British were the first to take over a US PRT in 2003. At the heart of the British PRTs are the Military Observation Teams (MOTs) that bring together the necessary information for implementing reconstruction projects.

A major problem for the British PRTs is their difficult positioning between the central power and the local warlords. A second issue brought up by NGOs and the British and American PRTs alike concerns the dress of the military intervening in civilian operations. Some NGOs have mentioned cases where the military were not in uniform during certain actions within the context of PRTs. The NGOs then stressed their opposition to this kind of practice which according to them create a confusion between civilian and military western actors on the ground. This supposedly puts them in danger, as they are accused of being also under military orders.

The comprehensive approach in Germany

The German concept focused on reconstruction challenges

“Keine Sicherheit ohne Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung” (No security without reconstruction and development) is the German motto, in particular in the context of its commitment in Afghanistan.

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146 HETT, Julia, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan - Das amerikanische, britische und deutsche Modell, Analyse 04-05, ZIF, April 2005.
147 BUNDESREGIERUNG, Das Afghanistan-Konzept der Bundesregierung, September 2008.
After World War II Germany limited its external operations to participating in UN humanitarian missions, until the decision by the German Constitutional Court (12 July 1994) which authorised German actions within the framework of a reciprocal collective security system to uphold peace, for instance by enforcing a UN Resolution. This is why German public opinion and the political class are very sensitive to the manner in which troops are used in Afghanistan. The comprehensive approach then appears as a means for Germany to express its positioning in relation to its military commitment as close as possible to its founding principles since 1949. The overall objective is to reconstruct rather than to wage war. In the context of implementing the comprehensive approach, the Zentrum für internationale Friedenseinsätze provides analysis and studies. Yet, in the Afghan example one may see why it might be difficult for Germany to implement the comprehensive approach.

Some limitations and criticisms

First, the comprehensive approach is divided among three ministries: the Ministry for economic cooperation and development (BZM) which may finance large-scale reconstruction operations; the Ministry of the Interior on the federal level and in the Länder (regions) involved in implementing police training in failed states; and finally the Ministry of Defence which may contribute to complex crisis management by sending troops under Nato or UN command. Two difficulties are then intertwined, making these three ministries work together and making the regional and the federal levels collaborate.

Second, it would seem that development issues hold the upper hand, with in addition a competency deficit in terms of counterinsurgency. This makes it difficult to implement the comprehensive approach because of the lack of balance between the three dimensions security-governance-development.
The comprehensive approach by the United States

The American concept predominantly internally in the United States

The United States was first in taking an interest in the comprehensive approach concept in the early 2000s. The use of the comprehensive approach in the United States is characterised by the development of inter-agency coordination, as may be seen restated in the National security strategy (May 2010). In implementing the comprehensive approach in the United States, the State Department created in 2004 an Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The overall objective on the national level is to achieve a greater impact in complex crisis management by applying formalised coordination processes between seven departments (State Department, US Agency for International Development, and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security and Justice). That which previously existed on an ad hoc basis was institutionalised to enable a synergy between necessary expertise in crisis areas. In Afghanistan,
the S/CRS is present as is its civilian response corps, advising the ISAF Regional Commands and the Nato Senior Civilian Representative on site. Also, the United States has provided a special fund to finance the comprehensive approach during complex crises, the Section 1207 Funds.

Some limitations and criticisms

The comprehensive approach has become a keyword in the United States in many fields, as in fighting drug trafficking, protecting refugees, etc. There is at the same time a kind of dilution of the concept in all these areas and a standardisation of the inter-agency approach. Therefore, expectations on the allies and their use of the comprehensive approach are strong, whereas the concept is much less institutionalised in these countries than in the United States currently. This makes for frustration among relevant American actors who have the impression that they cannot count sufficiently on their allies within Nato to make the comprehensive approach operational on the ground.

In terms of the civilians recruited in the United States to participate in the comprehensive approach, numerous difficulties have materialised, such as their training and education. Also, in terms of the Civilian Response Corps there is a gap between the real figures – 1 000 people since the summer of 2010 – and those intended to permit the implementation of the comprehensive approach. Further, the figures include active staff and stand-by personnel, which means that in practice few staff are deployed. Thus, albeit far advanced on the comprehensive approach, the Americans also encounter the lack of deployable civilian experts. The ability to deploy massively and rapidly civilian personnel in crisis theatres will thus be a major challenge in the future.

The Americans at the origin of implementing Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Originally the PRT concept comes from the experience of implementing Coalitions humanitarian liaison cells during the operation Enduring Freedom in 2002. The objective was to establish links with the
UN AMA and the NGOs on site by conducting restricted reconstruction projects. As these cells grew in importance, the United States moved to the PRT model. There is a standard US PRT model\textsuperscript{152} including one colonel assisted by 82 troops or civilian staff. To this come one member of the Afghan ministry of the interior and Afghan interpreters. The civilians within the PRTs usually come from the State Department, USAID and the Department of Agriculture. The PRT attempts to work in partnership with local leaders have frequently proven difficult. This is why progress in terms of governance has been slower than in reconstruction (building hospitals, schools, etc). Thanks to substantial financing, the PRTs have progressively been able to move from very short-term to long-term projects. However, evaluating the impact of the PRTs remains delicate without a standardised gauge of their efficiency. Also, as some American PRTs subsequently passed to the control of other countries via the ISAF, it is difficult to distinguish the exact role played by the American model from that of the following model. Finally, it is hard to evaluate the impact of the PRTs, as often behind the benefits of the projects there are latent negative impacts. Thus, rebuilding a road which is beneficial to the populations has also sometimes led to new conflicts linked to expropriation, etc.\textsuperscript{153}

**Conclusion on the positioning of states in terms of the comprehensive approach**

There is no consensus on the comprehensive approach concept. The level of integration varies from one state to another as we have seen, and the enforcement via PRTs is very varied as underlined by the Afghan example. The study of the comprehensive approach as organised within states raises more questions than it offers answers. Each state stresses different elements (more organisational than cultural, more on the bureaucratic procedures or on the means, etc). Should the concept be more normalised on the international level? Or should one focus more on the added value of national specificities? Should one rely more on practical experiences on the ground, and the ad hoc implementation of the comprehensive approach or

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{152} UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, The US experience with provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan, available online: http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr152.pdf viewed on 20 September 2010.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{153} DE FELIGONDE, Amaury, “La coopération civile en Afghanistan, une coûteuse illusion?”, Focus stratégique, n°24, Aout 2010, page 14.}
conversely adopt a top-down approach to make newly written comprehensive approach concepts operational?

A future issue: the question of mobilising civilian experts deployable on crisis theatres will become strategic. Behind this issue is also that of using private businesses within the comprehensive approach. It would seem that the Americans and the British have managed to associate the private sector with their comprehensive approach. We may ask whether it would not be in France’s interests to think strategically on the positioning of its business sector within its comprehensive approach.

Moreover, other issues concern the integration on the national level of non-state actors such as the NGOs which are also present in crisis areas. The following chapter will therefore analyse NGO positioning in terms of the comprehensive approach.

The comprehensive approach and the NGOs

The NGOs are very critical of the implementation of the comprehensive approach. The comprehensive approach could also in some cases put them in a position of increased insecurity.

A critical positioning towards the comprehensive approach

Humanitarian principles and their limits

To the NGOs the development of the comprehensive approach is a potential danger. Above all it endangers their basic principles. The NGOs fear they will lose their neutrality, autonomy, impartiality and independence if they work hand in hand with the military who by definition intervene under a flag, be it national or multinational (UN, EU, Nato).¹⁵⁴ They would like above all to proceed with their own objectives, separate from those of the military. Concerning help to populations through troops, the humanitarian organisations are therefore mostly against, because it jeopardises their principles of action. Other arguments are also advanced, such as the fact that the military

¹⁵⁴ Cf for instance the UK Red Cross, available online: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmdfence/224/224we16.htm, viewed on 27 May 2010.
supposedly are less cost-efficient for this type of action. Further, their actions are too occasional to have a positive impact, according to the NGOs. They are also culturally less used to interact with locals than are aid workers. It may be seen however that these arguments are progressively less valid as the comprehensive approach evolves and the military in fact become better trained to interact with local populations.

Although NGOs are rather wary of the development of the comprehensive approach, they cannot uphold this principled discourse on certain aspects. First, being financed to a large extent by the same governments that send troops during major crises, this critical stance has limits when NGOs participate in partnerships for financial reasons. And this often happens, as they largely depend on these subsidies. Further, in the case of some major natural disasters, the NGOs restrict their attacks against the military since they recognise that the latter may play a supportive role in the first stages of emergency relief. The means made available by the military most in demand are then medical assistance, air support for transportation in areas difficult to access, and all that has to do with logistics and coordination. The NGOs consulted for this study (Care, Save the Children, MSF for instance) stress the fact that they sometimes have a hard time being critical of the comprehensive approach, for it is difficult to oppose better coherence of actions on the ground, a better inclusion of local civilian populations, etc. Yet according to these organisations, this military discourse hides a future takeover in crisis areas, or even a possible supremacy. Even in cases where the military would like civilian actors to take the lead (e.g. natural disasters like the Haiti earthquake), civilian actors like aid workers stress that in fact they control most of the indispensable means and resources, which pushes them to take the brunt of the leadership on the ground.

155 Telephone conversation with Oliver BEHN, EISF, Paris, 30 June 2010.
Are the positionings different towards the UN, Nato and the EU?

Concerning the integrated missions in the UN context, some NGOs like Oxfam oppose the integration of humanitarian imperatives in political negotiations. “Political negotiations should not incorporate humanitarian provisions that are contingent on political actions or agreements.”158 Yet the perception of the UN integrated approach by the NGOs is not altogether negative. The need for coherence between the various UN agencies is underlined159.

In terms of rapprochement between aid workers and the military in the context of the comprehensive approach within operations such as Nato’s in Afghanistan, most humanitarian workers oppose being included into exercises to win hearts and minds.160 Oxfam International has published a note on its positioning in multidimensional military missions in which the organisation states its opposition to being integrated in this kind of operation: “Oxfam international will distinguish itself from, and remain outside, the direct management of multi-dimensional military mission and oppose structural association between humanitarian and military entities in multi-dimensional missions.”161 Nato’s recourse to the comprehensive approach is very contested.

It would seem that the opposition towards the EU is less strong than against Nato and the UN, because of the very substantial financial assistance provided by the EU to NGOs. There are also some rather strong personal links between the staff of the DG ECHO and humanitarian organisations that seem to share common values and practices. “The EU should use financial and in-kind support to sustain efforts for the protection of civilians and support institution-building measures in fragile states, in particular in the area of security-sector reform.”162 On the other hand, a possible rapproche-

159 Telephone interview with Kerry Smith, Save the children, Paris, 24 August 2010.
161 Idem, p. 4.
ment of the DG ECHO and the ESEA could create new tensions between NGOs and the EU. The NGOs support the EU comprehensive approach as long as there is a strict separation between DG ECHO and the ESEA with distinct budget lines. \(^{163}\)

To sum up, the European Union has a card to play in terms of the comprehensive approach. It may be a preferred actor and this more easily since Nato does not have any civilian means to deploy and is not viewed as a possible partner by the NGOs.

**Consequences of the comprehensive approach on the ground for the NGOs: increasing insecurity?**

**Some NGOs are more exposed than others**

The NGO issue should not be addressed without distinguishing several types of organisations and thus several positionings in terms of the comprehensive approach. On one hand, there are “multi-mandate” NGOs with very wide activities, from major emergency management to long-term reconstruction. According to their field of activity, they are more or less inclined to being integrated into the comprehensive approach on the political and strategic level. On the other, there are NGOs that rely on local partners for specific missions. These are mostly concerned by the comprehensive approach on the ground when they intervene in the same areas as the PRTs, for instance. Finally, there are NGOs working directly and officially with international organisations such as the UN and which are very closely linked to the latter. These are recognized and listed as valid interlocutors for international organisations.

Through these links, one may observe a very considerable professionalisation of the NGOs and an interaction with governments and international organisations, which is increasingly institutionalized. Although the development of the comprehensive approach is supposedly a useful process of rationalization in times of budgetary constraint, it is difficult to ignore that this puts them on the political playing field. In Afghanistan for instance, some NGOs very close to the UN are seen as working for the Afghan government. By working

\(^{163}\) Telephone interview with Kerry Smith, Save the children, Paris, 24 August 2010.
close to political actors like Nato and the UN, some NGOs then become targets for terrorist attacks, reprisals or kidnappings. The fact that they are becoming more professional and receive a lot of money from such donors has increased the number of kidnappings of humanitarian workers from NGOs. The conclusions of a study from Care International stress this mounting insecurity.\textsuperscript{164} In summary, and as remarked by Frerks, it is necessary to distinguish different NGO positionings towards the comprehensive approach and also varying levels of insecurity for these organisations. As detailed in his study, even within one single NGO positionings may be different in terms of the comprehensive approach, the people at the head office often being more reticent than those working on the ground.\textsuperscript{165}

An easier humanitarian-military rapprochement in the case of natural disaster interventions

NGOs working in partnership with the military in natural disaster areas are less endangered than NGOs working alongside the military in failed states such as Afghanistan. As Quarantelli analyses, there is a difference between natural disasters which tend to unite all actors, and other types of crisis which are sources of discord. A seemingly discriminating factor is the fact that in failed states during complex crises, as in Afghanistan, NGOs feel more manipulated by the military, in particular for information gathering and in being used as actors of influence among local actors. They may then be seen by the populations as instruments used by the military to infiltrate society.

Conclusion on the positioning of non-governmental organisations

NGOs do not share the same cognitive references, principles and objectives as governments and international organisations where the comprehensive approach is concerned. They do not want the concept of comprehensive approach to give the impression that they could work hand in hand with them. This clearly came forth at the symposium of the interallied confederation of reserve officers of

\textsuperscript{164} Cf. memorandum by Care International UK for a summary of this study: \url{http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmfence/224/224we17.htm}, viewed on 27 May 2010.

Stavanger in August 2010 on the comprehensive approach. Both MSF and the Red Cross insisted on underlining that their actions could not be included in the framework of the comprehensive approach.

In consequence, other alternatives could be outlined for governments and international organisations: having recourse to private development and reconstruction businesses which are ready for anything as long as they are being paid for their work on the ground. In the future, one could imagine a competition between large NGOs and private reconstruction actors. The two types of organisations could respond to calls for tender from the EU or Nato, for instance.

A possible card to play in order to avoid too strong a tilt towards private reconstruction agencies at the expense of NGOs would be to aim at a strong role for the EU in implementing the comprehensive approach.

The last chapter of this study will list the strategic challenges to consider in the future for the comprehensive approach.
Future challenges for the use of the comprehensive approach

Organisational challenges linked to the comprehensive approach

Be it in the United States (inter-agency aspects) or in France and the United Kingdom (interministerial aspects), the issue remains that of making actors work together whose interests do not necessarily converge. As the British memorandum well explains: “It involves learning to understand and accommodate the different priorities and expectations of partners across government and beyond.”166 The same process may be observed within the international organisations. For instance, some UN staff do not necessarily appreciate the internal organisational change linked to the integrated approach, nor the fact that increasing pressure is put by Nato for a better collaboration between UN and Nato personnel on the outside. The comprehensive approach also means the ability to mobilise civilian personnel on external complex crisis theatres. This requires national structures enabling the management of such deployable civilians, and frequently databases for handling them in liaison with the international organisations that mobilize them. The EU as well as Nato develop databases that list civilians who may be deployed in crisis areas. It may be observed that implementing these databases in parallel can cause organisational problems should the same expert be called in by both organisations. One future challenge for the comprehensive approach will thus be the successful implementation of organisational change moving towards increased inter-agency, interministerial and inter-organisational solutions.

Several points may be raised to facilitate this organisational change. First, the possibility for the relevant services to exchange staff (sending one member of the Defence staff to the ministry of Foreign Affairs, for instance). Another solution consists of information exchange as far upstream as possible to enable the two entities to best anticipate necessary change. The comprehensive approach implies a transaction cost, as it requires numerous meetings, long

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negotiations, significant information exchange, etc. A political incentive to cooperate would thus be necessary to make the actors realize some advantages beyond the directly foreseeable nuisances.\textsuperscript{167} However, this proves difficult for there are few long-term strategic visions encompassing the different political, security, humanitarian and development dimensions or formulating clear priorities. The doctrines often have not yet officially integrated the comprehensive approach, which remains frequently on the declaration level.

Cultural change linked to the comprehensive approach

By its implementation the comprehensive approach contributes to the meeting and mingling of national and international organisation cultures, the UN and Nato cultures, civilian and military culture, diplomatic or military culture\textsuperscript{168} to offer some examples. This creates frictions and the need to get to know the other culture in order to better adapt to it. The military for instance believe they can easily make evaluations of the return to security (number of casualties and injured) and complain about the lack of reliable evaluations on the civilian side. On the other hand, it is sometimes more difficult for them to assess development or good governance. They also have a different planning culture, and different terminologies and vocabulary.\textsuperscript{169} The list could be extended further.

To implement the comprehensive approach in this context of cultural shock, it therefore seems important to recommend the development of trainings and common feedback processes so that the actors (civilian and military, international and local) learn to exchange and thus develop practices for mutual understanding. Through the development of interpersonal links, this would make it possible to overcome some cultural tensions typical of the implementation of the comprehensive approach (in particular between Nato and the UN).\textsuperscript{170}


\textsuperscript{170} WENDLING, Cecile, “UN-Nato collaboration in times of crises: Could the comprehensive/integrated approach be a way to bring the two organizations closer together?”, Paper submitted for the International Research Symposium
Between humanitarian neutrality and armed commitment

Human aid workers generally oppose the development of the comprehensive approach if this makes them participate in political or military strategies contrary to the principle of neutrality of their commitment. One future challenge of the comprehensive approach is therefore to establish the limit between constructive cooperation and destructive collaboration between humanitarian workers and the military. In other words: how far should cooperation and coordination between civilians and the military go to remain beneficial for both? It seems that many exchanges of knowledge and practices take place with the comprehensive approach. Some aid workers note that their method of interacting with local populations is being studied by the military. Yet beyond these practices, ethical and philosophical thinking on the interaction between aid workers and the military is necessary, as well as safeguarding the action principles of the two categories.

One could imagine setting up a working group on the international level composed of staff from the UN, Nato, the EU, the AU, the Red Cross, Médecins du monde … for instance. Its objective would be to write a Memorandum of Understanding to clarify the links between NGOs and the military that should prevail in complex crisis areas, in parallel with the existing work on interactions between the military and humanitarian workers in case of major disasters. Another solution would be to settle the issue of interaction between the two in case of major complex crises on a case-by-case basis according to the crisis context, with upstream meetings of the international actors involved on the ground. This solution could be preferred, as cooperation always seems easier between people on the ground than between actors at headquarters and general secretariats. All the people interviewed stress that links are often easier to develop pragmatically at the operational level than politically on the strategic level.

The opposition of the judges

Similarly, as explained by general Henri Bentégeat, former chairman of the EU military committee, the comprehensive approach runs into opposition from the judges because of the culture of the independence of magistrates. The separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers is indeed often presented by the magistrates as being contrary to the implementation of a comprehensive approach that would introduce a mix-up. This opposition is also in the statement by Eva Joly, president of the development commission in the European Parliament, who opposes such a confusion of functions. On the other hand, legislation and best practices tend to move towards enlarged possibilities of development for the comprehensive approach, despite the opposition of some judges. For instance, the texts regulating private reconstruction and security businesses are open to their inclusion and integration in crisis contexts. This is criticized by some magistrates who fear an increased intervention of private actors, supposedly more inclined to transgressions on the ground than the military.

It would seem that this opposition has not been sufficiently taken into account by the other actors in crisis management. Yet without a commitment from the judges, it will be difficult to carry out a truly comprehensive approach. In order to defuse these tensions, it would be wise to conduct a working group including judges and other actors from crisis management. Its objective would be to identify how magistrates could participate without jeopardizing the separation of powers in crisis areas. It seems that the ministry of justice has not been sufficiently included in the thinking about the implementation of the comprehensive approach. Yet sending members of its civilian staff could be a key factor in some crisis areas to rebuild the local judicial system.

Financial challenges

Financing is key in the comprehensive approach. As actors concerned by the comprehensive approach multiply, there are multiple

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171 Speech by the general Henri Bentégeat: L’approche globale, un outil conceptuel en construction, Ecole militaire, Paris, 6 May 2010.

zones of “duplication of effort” and thus redundant financing among actors which damage the efficiency of international crisis management. This is why the comprehensive approach aims at rationalizing expenditure related to crisis management among international actors (Nato, the UN, the EU, etc).

To this must be added the current context of financial crisis often accompanied by budgetary crises, as in the case of Nato following the onerous operations undertaken in Afghanistan. The financial crisis and restrictions of military budgets push the actors to think more extensively on what their core profession should be, and what could be delegated to others. It then becomes easy for the military to have civilian actors carry the cost of the comprehensive approach, as some civilians say anonymously. The Afghan operation for instance is far beyond the planned budgets, as the army pays for the PRTs, etc. Defending a comprehensive approach more inclusive of civilian actors means an attempt to distribute the financial burden of restoring peace in Afghanistan through security, development and governance on other actors involved. The same applies on the international level, for instance between the EU and the UN, and this goes beyond the purely financial issue, at the level of financial management culture.

Catriona Gourlay mentions frictions between the European Commission and the UN concerning their approach of financial issues. The Commission indeed attempts to keep a very strict administrative control of budgets allocated to development or humanitarian aid, whereas UN actors with strong financial backing from the EU allow themselves more time in providing expenditure justifications. Beyond the financial issues, there is the question of monitoring expenditure, between institutions but also internally. A reform is currently taking place in Nato to improve monitoring of budget lines.

The resource issue is also considerable on the national level, as working with an inter-agency or inter-ministerial approach also means providing the necessary budget lines, sometimes with un-

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equal contributions from participants. In the United States a discussion thus occurred on the balance of resource allocation between civilians and the military. Some US military resent that their contribution is rising, for instance for agriculture in Afghanistan taken out of the defence budget, whereas the Department of Agriculture which would have more appropriate resources, has not made any contribution.

The issue of financing sources is paramount to actors such as the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, etc. It is vital to obtain funding to rebuild civilian capabilities, the police, etc. The UN established a peacebuilding fund in late 2006, and the revision of the reference terms shows the growing importance of this fund as the comprehensive approach develops. But the challenge of finding donors remains. The OECD underlines that there are geographical gaps in terms of available funds. Apart from Afghanistan, Iraq and the Republic of Congo, which are very favoured financially, there are aid orphans, i.e. countries receiving little money in the context of the comprehensive approach. It seems that these financial imbalances are not sufficiently considered in the current thinking on the comprehensive approach.

Interoperability and information sharing

One of the apparently positive aspects of the comprehensive approach is certainly the development of greater interoperability and information sharing between actors of crisis management. However, behind this some undesirable effects may be seen. This tends for instance to promote the large NGOs which respond to calls for tender by international organisations and governments, whereas NGOs that are smaller or less networked with large international organisations decline, because their bigger colleagues get the funding but also because the latter have developed routines reinforcing the interoperability and information sharing. Eventually, the aspects of interoperability and information sharing developed to reinforce efficiency could entail a concentration of humanitarian actors in a few

176 Cf. “Recovering from war: gaps in international action, a report by the NYU center on international cooperation”, New York University.
large NGOs, while others disappear. Yet this diversity allowed for maintaining various levers of action on site when crises occurred. It would seem that the restructuring of the field of NGOs connected with the implementation of the comprehensive approach has not been studied to date. But this could have an impact eventually on complex crisis management if some smaller NGOs can no longer survive and thus intervene in particular areas which are sometimes less well-known by the large NGOs.

**Using the comprehensive approach in a non-western state**

The comprehensive approach prides itself of being as close as possible to the culture of the country in crisis. The actors who use it often stress that they do not seek to impose a western model in their intervention. The idea is to let the local population take ownership of reconstruction, the return to peace and the rule of law. The local population is therefore often presented as a full partner, at least in official declarations. All actions, military or civilian, must include the inhabitants of the area in question. In Afghanistan, the military sometimes switched tactics by informing local populations in advance of their operations instead of taking them by surprise.177 Similarly, the NGOs on site inform and work closely with the local populations. The official discourse on the comprehensive approach is thus different from the typical discourse of “liberal peace” which sought to promote western democratic values with the return to peace.178 As mentioned by some French soldiers returning from the front, the issue in Afghanistan is not to promote western values, such as making girls go back to school, but instead to integrate local culture into the comprehensive approach.

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178 TARDY, Thierry, “Building peace in post-conflict environments : why and how the UN and the EU interact”, paper presented at the workshop « improving effectiveness of peacebuilding and state-building through EU-UN cooperation », organised by the Department of Political Science, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Kiel, on 29-30th March 2010, in Berlin, p. 11.
A first challenge is therefore relaying action to local actors, empowering them to appropriate and construct the return to peace. This takes place through intensive training of police forces, the judiciary, etc. This entails numerous problems. It is for instance sometimes necessary to train illiterate people. Another problem is that local staff is sometimes corrupt, or consumes alcohol or drugs.\footnote{GIUSTOZZI, Antonio, “The Afghan national army, unwarranted hope?”, The RUSI Journal, vol. 154, N°6, December 2009, pp. 36-42.}

A second challenge concerns adapting to local culture. Using the comprehensive approach requires a very fine knowledge of local customs and habits. It also requires taking into account the fact that populations are not homogeneous, but often belong to subgroups with their own rules and values. Thus Human Terrain Teams bringing in anthropologists and sociologists were for instance created in Afghanistan. But this is not without difficulty either. The academics are often wary of being associated with the military on the ground.\footnote{Intervention d’ OLSSON, Christian, “Human Terrain System et la transformation du renseignement dans la COIN”, lors de la conférence Se préparer aux opérations d’influence, Ecole militaire, Paris, 16 June 2010.} A third challenge is that the interests of the local populations are not necessarily those of the international actors. Some local actors may pretend to work to restore peace while pursuing other hidden agendas. This is clear from testimonies by soldiers returning from conflict areas, especially in Afghanistan and Somalia. It stresses the anomalies linked to the establishment of western aid (corruption, manipulation). A fourth challenge in implementing the comprehensive approach in states like Afghanistan or Somalia is that their social structures are not adapted to a western-style centralized approach where one central government runs the country. Conversely, western actors are confronted to tribal areas. But because it is often easier for diplomats to negotiate with one single partner for the whole country, transition governments have been established which do not correspond to the realities on the ground and which have great trouble in finding their legitimacy.\footnote{Presentation by GUIZIOU, François, “L’opération Atalante”, Groupe de travail Piraterie, Irsem, Paris, 3 June 2010.} Adopting a “whole of government approach” in a country like Afghanistan or Somalia thus seems hardly compatible with the idea conveyed by the advocates of the comprehensive approach, i.e. adapting to local culture. This is why it seems useful to add a cultural instrument to
the panoply of security, governance and development in order to be more closely associated with local populations and thus make an impact on stabilization in crisis areas. This remark stems from interviews. For instance, Olivier Entraygues who recently published on Afghanistan and asked about the comprehensive approach, mentions the importance of further integrating the cultural pillar, as would have Commander Hoggard in the past.182

The comprehensive approach and influence

One challenge of the comprehensive approach is also related to its use as factor of influence. The goal is to better control local populations to avoid them supporting insurgents. In this sense, the comprehensive approach is part and parcel of military strategies aiming at populations and winning their hearts and minds. This is all about persuasion. The comprehensive approach therefore is closely linked to communication strategies (establishing local radio stations, etc).

Although local populations have frequently been duly considered, for instance in Afghanistan, it seems that populations of the countries deploying troops in complex crisis areas are sometimes forgotten. The populations of countries involved also need to be convinced to make the comprehensive approach possible. As it is both costly and political, the comprehensive approach requires the support of public opinion. But it is difficult to find the right tone and means of communication to achieve this objective. As an example, compared to US public opinion, Europeans are less concerned by strategic issues in Afghanistan or the implementation of the comprehensive approach and its implications.

The comprehensive approach and global commons

The nascent debate, especially within Nato, on the securisation of global commons (“common strategic spaces”) stresses that both in terms of air, space, oceans or cyberspace, it is no longer possible to ensure the protection of vital flows without intensive coordination on the international level. Beyond the use of the comprehensive approach in crisis management, this must be anticipated to maintain

the perennial functioning of our shared strategic spheres. It looks like the UN could be brought to play a political role in this area. Yet it is essentially Nato through ACT which to date is leading the thinking on this new concept. It is therefore relevant to follow the developments of elaborating the concept of global commons. And it would be wise to accompany this thinking. Among the points to explore is the relevance of the comprehensive approach in terms of managing the cyberspace.

Beyond is the urgent need for a world governance to counter the surge of new threats (climate change, nuclear proliferation etc). Civilian and military actors should increasingly work jointly on these new challenges.
CONCLUSION

The comprehensive approach has gained importance recently in the context of complex stabilisation operations conducted primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although this concept is undergoing “doctrinisation” and therefore remains blurred and imprecise, some large trends have been identified in this study, in particular organisational and cultural changes. What come out of the implementation of the comprehensive approach are the dilemmas, which the international community must deal with.

Better identify the dilemmas of the comprehensive approach

First of all, there is a dilemma concerning the cooperation between international actors. The UN, the EU or Nato do not share the same interests. In fact they are often rivals in crisis management. Whereas the comprehensive approach concept is supposed to facilitate coordination and links between international organisations, it seems that all the discussions taking place on the concept and its blurred nature underline to what extent each and everyone is trying to pull in his own direction, using it to increase his legitimacy or visibility, at the expense of others.

Second, there is a neutrality and independence dilemma linked to the humanitarian workers, the judges or academics (involved in the Human Terrain Teams). The humanitarian workers want the assistance to the populations to be neutral and autonomous, and the judges want to remain independent wherever they are sent, whereas the political and security challenges of the comprehensive approach are often linked to commitments during conflicts which are outside of strict neutrality and independence. The development, security and governance objectives are therefore not always easy to reconcile in the minds of military and humanitarian actors, judges or politicians interviewed. If development or good governance becomes a political or security instrument, this goes beyond the framework of the grand principles that prevailed before, and this creates difficulties for the foundation of the actions and their implementation.
on the ground (e.g. mounting insecurity for humanitarian workers who are increasingly targeted in kidnappings or attacks).

A third dilemma is the empowerment of the local actors, whereas the international actors are still very present in the crisis management, and even more so with the comprehensive approach which makes them handle all the dimensions of the situation in an integrated manner. A number of examples of crises where the comprehensive approach is applied as in Afghanistan or Somalia, demonstrate that it is difficult to hand over to local actors because of corruption, drug use, illiteracy, etc. Also, it is sometimes complex to rely on the establishment of a provisional central government in very decentralized countries. Beyond this issue it is sometimes delicate to promote peace and human rights while relying on local representatives who are not necessarily the right people to guarantee their enforcement. How then can you be present without giving the impression of imposing practices, which are not the local ones, and at the same time train the population? How can you be sure that the actions undertaken will allow for an orderly and secure withdrawal of troops?

The comprehensive approach seems to gain importance because more and more actors are involved and more and more money is at stake. Yet because of this situation, it becomes more and more delicate and burdensome to manage in terms of budget and to monitor in terms of impact. A kind of inertia then appears especially in meetings including a large number of international organisations which themselves rely on rather considerable bureaucracies. Whereas the comprehensive approach was supposed to bring greater rationalization for improved efficiency.

Anticipating the consequences of the comprehensive approach

How will the comprehensive approach evolve? What will be the consequences on the civil-military crisis management by international and local actors? Will there be a kind of normative appropriation of the concept? Will we witness the birth of a formalized comprehen-

\[183\] KUEHNE, Winrich, Peace Operations and Peacebuilding in the Transatlantic Dialogue – Key Political, Military, Police and Civilian Issues –, Analyse 08-09, Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), Berlin, August 2009, page 34.
sive approach or will it remain more informal, not being integrated in texts in the form of a doctrine? It seems that this will depend above all on the results observed from its implementation, both in Iraq and in Afghanistan. The lessons will primarily be learned on the ground. This will also depend on the great government powers but also on the major international organisations (the UN, Nato, the EU, the OSCE, the OECD and the AU). Depending on their respective positioning, we may see one or the other form of the concept appear (e.g. a comprehensive approach circumscribed to crisis management in failed states, or a comprehensive approach including natural disasters, etc). Finally, it will be contingent on the positioning of civil society (humanitarian workers, judges, public opinions). Its importance should not be underestimated. Media coverage of crises may push civil society to influence national governments, or even to lobby international organisations.

For the moment, the emerging picture makes it possible to distinguish first the actors holding the high ground: the UN and the EU. They benefit from the fact of having already structures integrating civilian and military actors in crisis management. They might rely on this comparative advantage to act as civil-military stabilizers and invest in their specificity. On the other hand, there is a category that could gain legitimacy by using the comprehensive approach: Nato, the AU and private security actors. By contributing to a better reconstruction, they may obtain a kind of moral status that they sometimes did not enjoy previously. Finally, one group of actors seems rather threatened by the comprehensive approach: the humanitarian workers (and to some extent the judges). One issue raised in this study is indeed the beneficiaries of the comprehensive approach. Could one say that the comprehensive approach is beneficial today to some international organisations, to some private businesses? Considering regional disparities, can one say that it benefits a certain geographical area, or one segment of the population? The issue of the announced target and that which finally benefits from the actions, but also the issue of cooperation strategies which mask latent corporatist or institutional conflicts often remains taboo in studies, because it is politically delicate. When one speaks of a possible repositioning of the actors through the comprehensive approach, the issue concerns the institutions to be preferred. Should
so-called “universal” institutions like the UN have more space, or should one aim for the commitment of regional instances? Is a generalist approach to be preferred to integrate all types of actions by all types of organisations (from development to governance, via security) or on the contrary targeted and specialized actions, where each actor focuses on what he does best? Because of the implicit competition between the actors involved, these issues are not addressed and everybody makes the most of the situation, politically and pragmatically on the ground, without analyzing in a purely functional manner if he is best suited to respond to the needs of the comprehensive approach.

**Qualifying the French position**

To conclude more precisely on the French case, we may observe that on the ground France does not attempt to adopt the Anglo-Saxon concept of PRT, while developing however a comprehensive approach. By claiming an origin in the French colonial experience and the texts by Lyautey on the global maneuver, the French army positions itself as a forerunner and makes it easier for its troops to accept the concept. Thus we may note that the military have indeed integrated the notion and try to have a good knowledge of the human environment before intervening. They rely on the three main levers: security, governance and development. In the capital, the implementation of the task force within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the writing of the concept by the CICDE at the Ministry of Defence seem to indicate that the concept and its organisation will be formalized shortly.

But to date, we may not speak of institutionalization for a number of obstacles remain for a solid implementation of an inter-ministerial approach (lack of resources, bureaucratic rivalry, leadership issues). We may stress here that nobody currently impersonates the concept in France, whereas often new concepts only become official through figureheads (Warden or Deptula for the recent cases of the institutionalization of new military concepts in the United States).

Finally, it remains to be seen if in the wake of the thinking initiated by general Abrial, France will reflect on the use of the compre-
hensive approach in protecting the global commons, or instead prefer a restrictive interpretation of the concept limited to complex crisis management. The question is especially relevant as increasing interdependency in many other fields could require more of the comprehensive approach in securisation processes.

**Analysing the operational impact**

Among the operational aspects emanating from this study that may interest the military, five aspects may be underlined: first, the issue of leadership. Knowing who should assume leadership is essential in managing a crisis, but especially how to transfer it as needed from civilian actors to the military and vice versa, depending on the situation and the context. For instance, the French Constitution includes provisions for a state of emergency, which exceptionally entails greater powers for the president in direct connection with the armed forces. One could imagine that during a complex crisis leadership is handed to the military for a short period of great instability, and then returned to the civilian government, and vice versa.

The second issue concerns the chain of command. On some aspects such as logistics for instance, it is possible to have an integrated vision including the military and civilians for a given crisis area. Conversely, on planning issues each and everyone must be able to retain his own methods of planning and rules of commitment.

Third, it is indispensable to take into account that numerous international organisations now have a security role, but that the latter differs a lot from one actor to another. This makes interaction delicate and poses the question of interfaces to implement between international security instances to allow for a better management of complex crises. It seems necessary to think about reinforcing liaison functions and conjoined committees, taking care to let these functions enable more than just information exchange.

Fourth, the space for the national dimension within multinational designs for crisis management remains an open question. As we have seen, there is great divergence between PRTs of different states. The comprehensive approach thus needs to strike the right
balance between multinational integration and national specificities. Lest we forget that at the end of chain of command in a multinational operation, it is always the nations that commit their troops.

Finally, we have to understand how the centre of gravity should be positioned between civilian and military actors.

Reinforcing academic thinking

To finish, in revisiting the theories used in this study, we may note that the comprehensive approach is revealing of the impact of new security concepts (human security, societal security, etc). In this sense, it addresses new questions to researchers in security studies: to what extent may the comprehensive approach translate into transformation of military strategies? Another open question is how far the comprehensive approach should extend. To what extent should cultural actions (theatre, music) or educational actions be included, but also legal actions (putting insurgents before international criminal courts) or purely financial issues (allocation of international aid)? What implications could this have on the new types of actors to be considered in security studies? For instance, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank or the European Investment Bank could be studied as security agents, since for several decades they have provided funding for post-conflict reconstruction. Their arbitrations could be analysed to evaluate through a comparative study the impact of financial measures of reconstruction and return to good governance.

Other issues: to what extent does the comprehensive approach require a rethinking of the temporality of crisis management? This concerns reflecting on the temporal discontinuities between short-term civil-military actions and long-term development processes. The objective here is to study the means of developing gangways between the emergency and the long term, between the actors of crisis management and those who will stay on the territory.

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Finally, we may ask whether the comprehensive approach should question the construction of security “sectors”. The theoretical field developed by “sectors”, a terminology, which may be found in many expressions, such as security sector reform. But the comprehensive approach is in fact about opening up sectors. It is no longer about finance, health, justice or education but about a “unity of effort”, or going further in decompartmentalisation, about the “whole of government approach”. But for the practitioners of the comprehensive approach as for its theoreticians, path dependency mechanisms often make this decompartmentalisation difficult. The researchers studying the comprehensive approach must be able to go beyond the framework of sector or organisation expertise (Nato, African Union, etc). They must also be capable of crossing various literary fields, depending on the crisis studied (operations against piracy, restoring the rule of law, emergency operations following natural disasters, etc).

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