The Middle East in 2013: Strategic Implications of a Second Obama Term

The reelection of President Barak Obama raises important questions about continuity and change in U.S. policy in the Middle East. The electoral process was a key focus domestically in 2012 with the expectation that U.S. options and choices in the region would evolve or show more flexibility in 2013. What is certain is that U.S. policy in the region will have to walk a fine line between sticking to long-term policies and interests while trying to innovate in the face of new and potentially long term challenges.

Domestic socio-economic considerations remain the core focus of the American public. Consolidating efforts towards a stable economic recovery will continue weigh heavily on the Administration throughout Obama’s second term. However, a second Obama term free of electoral considerations also means more flexibility and freedom of maneuver on international priorities, including in the Middle East. This may include changes in key leadership positions in the U.S. government interagency.

Changes are likely to be most visible at the U.S. Department of State where Secretary Hillary Clinton is expected to move on from the post in 2013. Instability, popular unrest, and regime change caught the U.S. foreign policy community off-guard in 2011, and Secretary Clinton has been critical to shaping and recalibrating U.S. policy on the Middle East. This has included having to balance U.S. interests in stability and security with values tied to supporting efforts to promote freedom and democratization.

Any new Secretary of State will have to face the challenge of maintaining continuity and innovating in U.S. policy towards the Middle East. This includes, on the one hand, bolstering the strategic partnerships with Israel, supporting key allies in the Gulf, buttressing the monarchy in Jordan, and limiting Iranian influence in the Levant. On the other hand, the U.S. will have to find new ways to maintain and strengthen its influence in Iraq and Egypt, deepen and consolidate its ties with Turkey and try to push for a stable political outcome in Syria without deepening the country’s internal divisions and civil conflict.

None of these challenges will be easy. The U.S.-Israeli relationship is widely seen to have been embittered by a difficult relationship between President Obama and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. However, the U.S. continues to stand by Israel diplomatically and bilateral military cooperation has never been stronger. The relationship with Egypt’s new Islamists rulers is unstable and uncertain, as is the future of Israeli-Egyptian bilateral relations and security in the Sinai. New opportunities may exist to move forward talks with Iran, but mutual distrust remains high, as do fears in the Gulf of a U.S.-Iranian “grand bargain” on Iran’s nuclear program in ways that could undermine the influence and interests of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.

No regional challenge the U.S. may face in 2013 and beyond is likely to be as intractable or as difficult to contain as the crisis in Syria. What started as political calls for reform backed by street protests has metastasized over time thanks to a brutal regime crackdown. The forces of President Bashar Al-Assad, by opting for a disproportionate security response, have alienated moderate opposition voices in favor of forces seeking a military solution to conflict.

Meanwhile, the conflict has divided Syria along communal and socio-economic dividing lines. The opposition is predominantly from the country’s Sunni Arab majority, while forces loyal to Assad are predominantly from the ruling Alawite minority. Other groups, including Christians, Kurds, Ismailis, Shiites, and some Sunnis have chosen either to side with Assad, stay out of the fighting, or seek to consolidate their own autonomy (as in the case of the Kurds in northern Syria).

The conflict in Syria poses yet another challenge to the U.S. in that it straddles broader regional Sunni-Shiite dividing lines. At the regional level, the regime of President Assad continues to enjoy the support of Iran, the Lebanese Shiite militant group Hezbollah, and tentative support from Iraq’ Shiite majority. At the international level, Assad has and is likely to continue to count on the support of Russia and China at the UN Security Council.

By contrast, regional predominantly Sunni states – including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Libya, and Egypt – have provided varying degrees of support to the Syrian opposition, ranging from political clout to financial support and military aid. Internationally, the opposition has enjoyed tentative support from the United States and European Union states such as France and the United Kingdom.

Divisions at the local, regional, and international levels have led to a gradual intensification of the conflict in ways that make it all but impossible for a quick settlement in Syria. As of November 2012, the conflict has led to more than 40,000 dead, hundreds of thousands of refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, countless wounded and detained by regime forces. It is not difficult to expect all of the metrics of the conflict to continue to deteriorate. This could lead to years of destabilizing conflict in the Levant.

U.S.-backed talks in Qatar in November 2012 lead to the creation of a broader political opposition in the form of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. Efforts to advance international diplomacy on Syria are important, but significant challenges will persist in 2013. Despite the formation of the new coalition with greater participation by groups inside Syria, it is unrealistic to expect a rapid shift towards cohesive leadership in an external opposition. It remains deeply divided amid accusations of continued overrepresentation of Islamist political forces. 

U.S. strategic choices remain challenging and Washington may have to adopt seemingly contradictory policy choices. The U.S. recognized the Syrian National Coalition on December 12, 2012, but just days before, Washington moved to isolate radical elements within the opposition. The Jabhat al-Nusra (or al-Nusra Front) – an Al-Qaeda in Iraq affiliate and key fighting group against Assad – was labeled a terrorist organization on December 10, 2012 by the U.S. State Department.

Meanwhile the U.S. has few easy options in dealing with Syria’s chemical weapons and the reported use of Syrian short range “Scud” ballistic missiles. There are few signs the U.S. will reverse in 2013 a policy that prohibits providing military support to the armed opposition, or promote regional steps towards creating so-called “no fly” or “no go” zones in parts of northern Syria that are under opposition control. U.S. and NATO support for the deployment of Patriot missile defense systems in southern Turkey was well received in Ankara. However the deployment will do nothing to resolve Syria’s civil war. The longer the conflict lasts, the more peripheral states like Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan will be affected.

While the U.S. presses on to recalibrate its responses to an ever-shifting and unstable Middle East, regional and international opponents may also serve to impede U.S. efforts at a favorable settlement in Syria. Iran and Hezbollah will likely deepen their support for Assad, in particular by providing training and equipment for Alawite militias and the “Shabiha” in addition to the conventional military. And should Assad’s political survival prove impossible, Iran and its allies will work to prevent the consolidation of a Sunni-dominated or pro-Western government in Damascus.

In short, there is no “silver bullet” to rapidly and decisively end Syria’s civil war and heal its political and communal divisions. The election may be behind President Obama, but there is still no appetite in the U.S. for military intervention in a country in the Middle East that is far more challenging than Libya and that threatens to destabilize the region for years to come. If Russia’s position in support of Assad softens, that might open a path to common ground on Syria. Even if a post-Assad Syria comes to pass, the real challenge for the U.S. will remain shaping a stable political outcome to avoid what could easily become a decade-long civil war. Given these realities, the U.S. will have to continue to rely on “flexible realism” to manage future challenges in the Middle East.